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ABSTRACT 
 
Firms are facing challenges in managing corporate social responsibility (henceforth 
CSR) in their offshore outsourcing relationships and often fail to meet the ever-
increasing expectations from stakeholders. The main cause of these challenges stems 
from the complexity of offshore outsourcing. This thesis attempts to advance 
understandings of the mechanisms through which key relevant factors operate and 
interact to influence CSR performance outcomes. Three pieces of research taking 
different approaches embedded in multiple theories and levels of analysis are 
presented. Paper 1 advances the theoretical understanding of firm performance 
outcomes in cross-border inter-organisational relationships, mainly informed by 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and relational view. By specifically 
looking at CSR in offshore outsourcing relationships, the study enables prediction of 
CSR performance outcomes under institutional and inter-organisational differences. 
Paper 2 empirically studies a specific type of CSR failure, corporate social 
irresponsibility (henceforth CSiR) exposed by the media. Using an extensive amount 
of longitudinal data, the study demonstrates that CSR performance is an outcome of 
the interactions between the way firms are perceived by key stakeholders and attention 
to the subject matter. The paper contributes to the attention-based view, the theoretical 
underpinning of the paper, by separating out depth and breadth of attention 
conceptually and empirically. Paper 3 narrows down the sectoral context of the study 
to the retail industry considering its representativeness in the subject matter. Drawing 
on resource dependence theory, the study provides conceptual insights into a shifting 
paradigm from dyadic to trilateral governance. The findings of the three studies 
examining an identical phenomenon, but adopting different approaches and research 
tools, suggest CSR performance outcomes are formulated by internal and external 
contextual conditions and firms’ strategic choices. Overall the thesis contributes to our 
understanding of CSR in offshore outsourcing by unravelling the mechanisms through 
which these crucial factors work. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background and Overview 
Firms are expected to deliver return on investment to shareholders (Friedman, 1962, 
1970) as well as to other stakeholders including customers, investors,  employees, and 
their local and global communities (Freeman, 1984). Managing and addressing 
stakeholders’ concerns is a challenging task (Doh & Guay, 2004, 2006; Matten & 
Moon, 2008). The media is littered with stories of firms failing stakeholders often as 
a result of engaging in corporate social irresponsibility. The practice of offshore 
outsourcing, for instance, has faced criticisms from stakeholders for irresponsible 
practices in overseas suppliers’ operations (Jiang, 2009). This thesis aims to advance 
the understanding of the phenomenon of CSR failure in the complicated context of 
offshore outsourcing. Specifically, by explicating theoretical underpinnings of the 
mechanisms leading to the phenomenon and then empirically exploring them through 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. I adopted multiple complementary 
methodologies as a strategic choice to achieve better understandings of the 
phenomenon from different perspectives.   
Managing CSR in offshore outsourcing relationships raises conceptual and 
practical challenges. Hence the phenomenon has stimulated and attracted scholarly 
interest over the last few decades (Maloni & Brown, 2006; Walker, Miemczyk, 
Johnsen, & Spencer, 2012). The increasing number of articles published underscores 
the burgeoning interests of scholars in offshore outsourcing (Walker et al., 2012; 
Yawar & Seuring, 2017). An extensive literature review conducted by Walker et al. 
(2012) demonstrates that the number of published papers on sustainable procurement 
increased by over 20 times, from less than 5 papers in 1998 to more than 100 papers 
in 2010. The literature agrees that institutional distance and inter-organisational 
differences are the major challenges for CSR in offshore outsourcing (e.g. Ciliberti, 
de Haan, de Groot, & Pontrandolfo, 2011; Maskell, Pedersen, Petersen, & Dick 
Nielsen, 2007; Midttun, Dirdal, Gautesen, Omland, & Wenstop, 2005; Pedersen & 
Andersen, 2006). What is less clear, however, is how the factors at different levels 
jointly formulate CSR performance outcomes in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
To address this issue a multi-level conceptual framework is developed to explain the 
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direct and interactive effects of macro and inter-organisational factors on CSR 
outcomes.  
Offshore outsourcing is a contract-based relationship between financially 
independent firms belonging to different national institutions. At an institutional level, 
CSR practices are greatly influenced by national institutions (Matten & Moon, 2008). 
While firms in the same or proximate locations or regions tend to have similar or even 
isomorphic CSR practices as they share an identical institutional background, firms in 
distant countries, as in the case of typical offshore outsourcing relationships, are likely 
to have dissimilar standards and practices of CSR (Doh & Guay, 2006; Matten & 
Moon, 2008). At an organisational level, stakeholders have higher expectations toward 
firms that are more visible and considered to be endowed with more resources and 
capabilities (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Udayasankar, 2008). Therefore, two firms in 
an offshore outsourcing relationship are likely to deal with different levels of 
expectations and pressures from their own stakeholders. Therefore, strategic 
governance of such differences is a key determinant of CSR outcomes in an offshore 
outsourcing relationship. However, a supplier is not within a focal firm’s boundary. 
Hence, the focal firm is unlikely to have full control over the supplier. As such, 
offshore outsourcing brings challenges to CSR management including institutional 
distance, organisational differences and relationship governance. Therefore, the 
understanding of the conditional complexity and firm strategic responses deserves 
more attention from researchers to enable an advanced level of comprehension of CSR 
outcomes in offshore outsourcing relationships. In Paper 1, I address this issue by 
looking at the critical roles of inter-organisational governance in tackling institutional 
and inter-organisational differences.  
For practitioners, struggles in managing CSR in offshore outsourcing 
relationships have a long history in practice. Since the sweatshops of Nike’s suppliers 
in South Korea and Taiwan were first reported in the 1970s, tragedies in operations of 
offshore suppliers have continued to occur and have recently become more serious. 
The collapse of Rana Plaza complex in Bangladesh in 2013 was an especially 
devastating  event that resulted in  more than 1,100 deaths (Mena, Rintamaki, Fleming, 
& Spicer, 2016). Firms including Walmart, Primark, and Benetton that were sourcing 
from the factories in the building were denounced for the debacle. However, these 
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companies made similar claims to those of Nike in the 1970s, and argued that as they 
did not own the Rana Plaza, they were not responsible for the disaster (Gilmore, 2013; 
Siegel, 2013; Westhead, 2013). Such issues are not exclusive to the garment industry. 
A series of suicides were committed in Chinese factories owned by Foxconn where 
Apple products were assembled (Lee, Mol, & Mellahi, 2016). As a consequence of 
increased public attention, Apple promised to make changes. Simultaneously and 
ironically, however, the company was looking for an alternative supplier that accepted 
cheaper prices, and started working with Pegatron in 2011. In December 2014, 
allegations of horrendous conditions and illegal practices at the Pegatron factories 
were reported by the BBC (Lee et al., 2016).  
 In the last few decades, academic literature on  CSR in supply chains and more 
specifically on offshore outsourcing contexts has focused on three main themes: 
drivers for firms to engage in CSR in offshore outsourcing practices (e.g. Amaeshi, 
Osuji, & Nnodim, 2008; Ganesan, George, Jap, Palmatier, & Weitz, 2009; Wolf, 2014), 
offshore practices and their limitations (e.g. Murphy & Matthew, 2001; Pedersen, 
2006; Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015), and desirable solutions to account for the CSR 
issues (e.g. Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Gold, Seuring, & Beske, 2010; Lim & 
Phillips, 2008; Perry, Wood, & Fernie, 2014). Despite the significant advances made 
to date, there remain gaps within the current body of literature that need to be 
addressed, and some of these will be attended to in the conceptual paper, the 
quantitative research paper and the qualitative research paper of this thesis.  
In this thesis, I take critical realism as my philosophical stance as it allows 
plural empirical methods and provides an appropriate perspective in conducting 
research on such complex phenomenon (Archer et al., 2016; Miller & Tsang, 2011). 
Answering the research question requires multi-dimensional analyses and 
understandings of underlying mechanisms. Critical realism offers flexibility to 
accommodate more than one type of methodology (Mingers, 2001). The ontological 
positioning of critical realism is that social phenomena and events cannot be and 
should not be observed in a closed system as they are the outcomes of interactions of 
participants and factors in an open system (Mingers, 2006), and which is a 
fundamental and central assumption of this research. As such, to cover plural theories 
and hypotheses, the study is to be framed with critical realism epistemologically and 
  
16 
 
will be led by both qualitative and quantitative analyses methodologically. In this way, 
this thesis will make contributions to shedding light on the complex phenomenon of 
CSR failure in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
Table 1.1 presents information on each of the three papers in this thesis: types, 
research questions, theories, methodologies, data sources, and findings. As can be seen, 
this thesis takes a mixed-methods approach to the study of CSR in offshore 
outsourcing because of the complementarity of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods. Specifically, Paper 2 intends to test a broad theoretical framework to predict 
CSR failures in offshore outsourcing and it benefits from large-N quantitative research 
while Paper 3 studies a relatively new and emerging off shore outsourcing governance 
paradigm requiring an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon itself and the 
empirical and theoretical background of its emergence rather than testing hypotheses.  
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1.2. Paper 1: Motivations, Research Questions and Contributions 
The impetus for the first paper came from observing what have unfortunately become 
regular tragedies in offshore outsourcing - communities experiencing large numbers 
of casualties or serious injuries with very little satisfactory explanation for their 
occurrence. Empirical studies have explored responsibilities for such events and their 
impact, but to date there is no conceptual framework that provides a thorough 
theoretical explanation of how and why such events occur. The existing literature does 
recognize some critical causes for CSR issues in supply chains. They include 
institutional distance (e.g. Maskell, Pedersen, Petersen, & Dick Nielsen, 2007; 
Midttun, Dirdal, Gautesen, Omland, & Wenstop, 2005; van Tulder & Kolk, 2002) and 
principal-agency problems that involve information asymmetry and supplier 
opportunisms (e.g. Ciliberti, de Haan, de Groot, & Pontrandolfo, 2011; Pedersen & 
Andersen, 2006). However, the extant literature has failed to identify clearly the 
mechanisms and processes through which those causal factors interact and jointly 
contribute to formulating certain CSR outcomes. The lack of such comprehensive 
understanding is caused, at least in part, by the fact that there are few conceptual works 
in comparison to  the number of empirical papers in this field of study (Brandenburg, 
Govindan, Sarkis, & Seuring, 2014). Yawar and Seuring (2017) argue in their 
systematic literature review that among social issues in supply chain literature almost 
70% of the studies are empirical studies mostly in the form of case studies and surveys 
while only 25% of studies are conceptual pieces. Considering the complexity of the 
context of offshore outsourcing, as well as the multiple participants playing with 
distinct agendas in these relationships, this is a gap in our knowledge that needs to be 
addressed. On top of the academic needs, there is also practical urgency to discover  
what leads to these failures considering  the impact of failure is usually much more 
salient and longer-lasting than the effects from doing good (Lange & Washburn, 2012). 
Therefore, discovering ways to minimize failures by understanding underlying 
mechanisms should take priority over finding ways to optimize CSR performance in 
offshore outsourcing.     
Paper 1 provides a mid-range theory enabling a prediction of CSR performance 
outcomes, especially CSR failures, from offshore outsourcing relationships focusing 
on institutional and inter-organisational level factors. The study asks: how do 
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institutional distance, inter-organisational relations, and their interaction help to 
explain CSR failure in offshore outsourcing? The question requires an in-depth 
understanding of two separate disciplines, namely, strategic management (strategic 
decisions on CSR practices and interorganisational relationships) and international 
business (institutional distance). While acknowledging the constraints and challenges 
generated by the context such as institutional distance and organisational differences, 
the proposed framework focuses on the critical roles of inter-organisational 
governance in identifying and managing CSR issues, and ultimately moderating the 
relation between conditional factors and CSR outcomes. Drawing on institutional 
theory, resource dependence theory (RDT) and relational view, the paper develops a 
number of propositions. The conceptual paper advances a theoretical understanding of 
CSR in supply chains literature. This is a critical contribution to the literature where 
extant studies are mostly phenomenon-driven and in the form of fragmented empirical 
investigations usually on weak or limited theoretical grounds. 
1.3. Paper 2: Motivations, Research Questions and Contributions 
Paper 2 is concerned with a more specific type of CSR failure, namely CSiR exposed 
by the media. When Apple Inc., was accused by the media of human rights violations 
in their suppliers’ operations, they claimed that other companies have the same or even 
worse supply chain issues, but that Apple was unfairly subjected to more media 
attention (Lee et al., 2016). Observing this, the study asks what makes certain firms 
face more media scrutiny than others as a result of CSiR in offshore outsourcing. The 
study considers organisational level factors and asks whether strategic organisational 
attention to CSR in offshore outsourcing would effectively reduce the effect of 
conditional firm level factors including visibility and prior media reporting on CSR 
failure. Specific questions are developed further: What drives media reporting on 
perceived corporate social irresponsibility originating from offshore outsourcing? 
Can firms’ attention and active engagement in the subject matter reduce media 
reporting?  
In pursuit of answers to the research questions, the study simultaneously seeks 
to fill a gap in the literature. CSR literature has advanced for decades and there are 
several studies using numerical measures for CSR performance, they use publicly 
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available indexes and rankings provided by other organisations (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 
1984; Orlitzky, Schmitdt, & Rynes, 2003). Still, there has not been an agreeable and 
generalizable measure for CSR (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Brammer & Millington, 
2008). Thus, a way to measure CSR performance in offshore outsourcing across 
industries and aspects also remains an unanswered question. 
Specifically there have been only a few quantitative works in this field of study 
and most of the quantitative works are constrained in terms of aspects and subjects 
(Harms, Hansen, & Schaltegger, 2013; Seuring & Müller, 2008). In other words, there 
is limited research that presents generalizable findings using replicable numerical data 
collection methods (Brandenburg et al., 2014). Lack of quantitative research also 
means lack of studies that provide findings from studying an extensive amount of data 
across different aspects of CSR. There exists significantly more studies with data on 
environmental aspects than social aspects mainly due to the difficulties involved in 
measuring social aspects, and  few ways are suggested to measure the two aspects at 
the same time (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012; Searcy, 2012; Yawar & Seuring, 
2017). As such, a major challenge in this research stream is the reliable and replicable 
measurement of different aspects of CSR/CSiR performance outcomes in offshore 
outsourcing. The paper empirically and quantitatively tests its hypotheses using an 
extensive 15-year panel data for 120 Forbes listed companies. The study uses media 
reporting as a measure for CSR performance outcomes from offshore outsourcing 
relationships. One of the benefits of this method is it is replicable so it enables 
longitudinal data collection. It also enables specification of particular contexts and 
inclusion of different aspects of CSR in the study.  
The paper makes a theoretical contribution to the strategic management field 
by extending attention-based view (ABV) to the firm that has been rarely used in 
understanding CSR. While ABV has been recognized for its explanatory power in the 
realm of behavioural theory of a firm, especially in explicating firm decision making, 
strategic moves, and performances (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Ocasio, 1997, 2011; 
Surroca, Prior, & Tribo, 2016), it has hardly been extended to the CSR. In addition, 
the study fleshes out ABV by examining depth and breadth of attention separately and 
suggesting the importance of proper allocation of attention. At an empirical level, the 
paper makes a significant contribution to the CSR literature by suggesting an 
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alternative way to measure CSR/ CSiR performance in specific contexts as well as a 
way to measure the depth and breadth of efforts made by firms and managers. The 
implementation of media articles on CSiR performance also enhances reliability and 
replicability of the variable while embracing the practical concerns of managers for 
being publicly criticized. 
1.4. Paper 3: Motivations, Research Questions and Contributions 
The final gap in the offshore outsourcing and CSR literature can be found in the work 
that attempts to provide solutions to address issues. This is due, at least in part, to the 
fact that the majority of the extant work seeks to make improvements without 
systematic understanding of context specific factors. So far, the literature has mainly 
focused on the dyadic relationships between buyers and suppliers and proved that  top-
down approaches, including monitoring and sanctions, are somewhat limited or 
ineffective (Lim & Phillips, 2008; Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007).  
Developing co-operative relationships seems to be an idealistic alternative 
(Turker & Altuntas, 2014), but considering that the various tragic deaths in factories 
keep happening in practice, this method also has not been particularly effective enough 
to fundamentally address CSiR in offshore outsourcing. Literature especially in the 
fields of developmental studies and sustainable supply chain management recognises 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) as an alternative. However, the traditional MSIs 
work merely as an extension of a global level bilateral governance that adopts global 
standards instead of individual firm codes of conduct. It still has the same problems 
that traditional methods have, e.g. lack of implementation, and become nominal 
institutions that issue certificates for joining the club (Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Lund-
Thomsen, 2008; O’Rourke, 2006; Rasche, 2012). Yet, the broad concept of MSI 
includes different sorts of initiatives and they evolve into further variations as 
problems and tragic events keep happening (Fransen & Kolk, 2007). In practice, firms 
are going beyond bilateral governance and MSIs, by engaging in more active types of 
coalitions, i.e. a trilateral governance. Thus, there needs to be an investigation into 
firms’ strategic movements of actively tackling the issues in their supply chains 
through the trilateral governance system. This means that the extant literature is not 
fully capturing the fast-changing paradigm in supply chain management and is not 
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applying theoretical and empirical lenses to the mechanism of this new type of 
coalition.  
In Paper 3, I focus the context of the study to one sector and attempt to provide 
empirical and theoretical understandings of real-life challenges that firms face in 
managing CSR in offshore outsourcing relationships and making strategic choices. In 
line with the above-mentioned gaps in the literature, the research question seeks 
further details of firms’ proactive strategies to address CSR issues resulting from 
offshore outsourcing. It asks the following question: Why do buyer firms from 
developed countries and their suppliers in developing countries in the garment 
industry use trilateral governance?  
The study focuses on the retail clothes sector because of its long history with 
the events that provided the impetus for this thesis. As the study examines a new 
phenomenon and realistic insights into the dynamics among those involved, a 
qualitative research method is deemed the most suitable approach. Interviews were 
conducted with CSR practitioners from diverse organisations ranging from retail 
companies, third party organisations (TPOs) and a supplier. The interviews were open-
ended so that the interviewees could freely talk about practices but the main questions 
were informed by RDT. The statements of the interviews were cross-checked with 
extensive secondary data including archived company reports, information on the 
websites, and relevant news articles. The triangulation of data enables me to avoid 
methods bias resulting from collecting data from same sources (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). The analysis of the data provides empirical evidence 
for the ineffectiveness and limitations of dyadic relationship governance and provides 
theoretical grounds for going beyond dyadic governance. Observation of changing 
paradigms in practice, and guided by RDT, the paper offers a conceptual framework 
for a trilateral governance in managing CSR in supply chains. To the best of my 
knowledge this is the first study that explored the emerging trilateral governance 
structure in offshore outsourcing. As such, Paper 3 makes its contribution to the CSR 
in supply chain literature, and the on-going discussion on MSIs by exploring trilateral 
governance as a new paradigm in managing CSR in supply chains and more 
importantly by providing conceptual and theoretical explanations and supports to the 
new governance model.  
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1.5. Contributions of the Thesis  
The three papers together contribute to our understanding of CSR failure in offshore 
outsourcing, from different perspectives, at different levels and through diverse 
approaches. In addition to the contribution to the CSR failure in offshore outsourcing, 
this thesis contributes to the broader strategic management and international business 
fields by developing theories encompassing two fields of business; CSR performance 
and offshore outsourcing. Steered by representative theories in the fields such as 
institutional theory, stakeholder theory and RDT and combined with relatively less 
used theories including ABV and attribution theory, the thesis develops and introduces 
theories that explain CSR failure in the very specific context of offshore outsourcing.  
The second contribution that is made is that the study puts an emphasis on 
CSiR rather than CSR practices. The thesis has its focus on negative CSR outcomes 
rather than positive ones considering their more salient and long-lasting impact (Lange 
& Washburn, 2012). This is a relatively under-explored and under-theorized area 
considering that existing studies have their focus on how to improve CSR performance 
or how responsible practices contribute to improvement in other corporate 
performances.  
The third contribution is that it enriches the offshore outsourcing literature by 
looking at CSR performance as one of the outcomes that firms should take into account 
in offshore outsourcing decisions while previous literature considered cost reduction 
and gaining resources/ knowledge as expected outcomes (Ellram, Tate, & Billington, 
2008; Gilley & Rasheed, 2000; Wong, 2011). This also applies to the CSR literature 
because the papers in the thesis advocate that CSR should be studied as an outcome of 
the offshore outsourcing decisions in contrast to existing literature which considers 
CSR as a strategic means to achieve other corporate objectives such as financial 
performance and reputation (Burke & Logsdon, 1996; Cochran & Wood, 1984; 
Mcguire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2000; Porter & 
Kramer, 2006; Ullmann, 1985).  
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1.6. Thesis Structure 
The following chapter provides an extensive literature review on (offshore) 
outsourcing as a context of the study, CSR as the focus of the study and finally CSR 
in (global) supply chains. Following that, Paper 1, a conceptual paper, unravels the 
mechanisms through which institutional distances and dynamics of inter-
organisational relationship interact in determining CSR outcomes in offshore 
outsourcing contexts. Paper 2, a quantitative research paper, looks at firm level factors 
that lead to CSR failures and organisational attention as a proactive strategic 
movement to reduce such failures. And Paper 3, using data from interviews, explores 
a changing paradigm in addressing CSR issues in global supply chains. A final chapter 
concludes the thesis by presenting findings and implications from the individual 
papers.  
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Overview 
This literature review starts by presenting offshore outsourcing literature. 
Understanding the body of literature is critical as it is the contextual background of 
the subject matter. The section contains extant works covering definitions, drivers, and 
the process and performance outcomes of offshore outsourcing. By examining 
definitions, the issue of the lack of clarity in terminologies and concepts within this 
literature is addressed. The literatures on drivers and performance outcomes help us 
understand why CSR issues are an unexpected but inevitable outcome of offshore 
outsourcing. The review on the process of offshore outsourcing governance provides 
a general understanding of how performance in offshore outsourcing relationships is 
managed and determined. The literature on CSR follows as the comprehensive 
understanding of CSR lays the foundation stone for investigation into CSR in a more 
specific context of offshore outsourcing. The review covers the mainstream topics in 
CSR literatures: definitions, drivers, and effects of CSR on company performances. 
Finally, the third part of the literature review begins with an analysis of existing 
knowledge on the motives for firms to adopt CSR policies in their offshore outsourcing 
operations. Literature on current practices and challenges in implementing CSR in 
offshore outsourcing relationships and suggested solutions to address the difficulties 
are then discussed. The chapter concludes with a summary and discussion of the 
evident gaps in the existing literature.   
2.2. Offshore Outsourcing 
This section introduces offshore outsourcing literature in order to provide a 
background understanding of the context of the thesis. Following the definition of 
offshore outsourcing in relation to other types of governance modes, the drivers that 
lead firms and managers to opt for (offshore) outsourcing are elucidated. This is 
followed by a discussion of the literature concerned with the process and performance 
outcomes of offshore outsourcing. 
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2.2.1. Definition of Offshore Outsourcing 
A firm’s strategic choices on governance modes could be categorized into four 
dimensions as presented in Table 2.1. A firm could make a ‘make-or-buy’ decision: 
whether to produce goods and services internally or to purchase externally produced 
goods and services. Although it is acknowledged that there are governance structures 
that fall between markets and hierarchies (Arnold, 2000) i.e. alliance or franchises, 
this is a discussion that goes beyond the boundary of this literature review. 
Simultaneously, a firm decides on production location: whether to have the goods and 
services produced domestically or globally. Although the term outsourcing tends to be 
used to refer to offshore outsourcing (e.g. Bettis, Bradley, & Hamel, 1992), by 
definition, “outsourcing is the procurement of supplies from legally independent 
entities (suppliers)” (Mol, Tulder, & Beije, 2005, p.600) whereas “offshoring is 
restructuring the firm along another dimension, namely geography. It entails the 
relocation of operations from the home nation to a foreign location where the same 
company activities are performed under either the multinational company’s own 
subsidiaries or allocated to a foreign contract vendor” (Contractor, Kumar, Kundu, & 
Pedersen, 2010, p.1417-1418). Accordingly, when a firm is taking an offshore 
outsourcing strategy, the firm is procuring goods or services from an overseas 
independent supplier (Bertrand & Mol, 2013): see this is summarized in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Corporate sourcing strategies 
 
Ownership 
Captive Outsourcing 
Location Domestic Sourcing goods/ services 
internally and domestically  
Sourcing goods/services from an 
independent supplier based in the 
same country (Mol et al., 2005) 
Offshore Sourcing goods/ services 
from a subsidiary abroad 
(Contractor et al., 2010) 
Sourcing goods/ services from an 
independent supplier based in 
different country (Bertrand & 
Mol, 2013) 
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2.2.2. Drivers of Offshore Outsourcing 
Despite the disagreements as to the way of differentiating core and non-core activities, 
it is a widely accepted fact that firms attempt to keep their core activities internal while 
outsourcing non-core activities (Contractor et al., 2010). By outsourcing peripheral 
activities, either previously done in-house or not, to the suppliers who are able to do 
the tasks at a lower costs chiefly thanks to the economies of scale, a firm could enjoy 
reduced costs (Ellram et al., 2008; Gilley & Rasheed, 2000). Outsourcing provides 
firms with a potential for flexibility by reducing the risks of making investments in 
irreversible fixed assets and enabling firms to conveniently replace a supplier with a 
more advanced technology and a cost advantage (Leiblein & Miller, 2003). By 
outsourcing less important activities, not only can firms retain core competences but 
also secure a capacity to spare for additional investments in those competencies 
(Gilley & Rasheed, 2000; Murray & Kotabe, 1999). Furthermore, as Wong (2011) 
suggests, given limited capabilities and capacities of individual firms, outsourcing 
offers them an opportunity to access resources that are unavailable or costly to gain 
internally. Offshore outsourcing can potentially magnify the benefits of outsourcing 
by allowing firms to access cheaper options overseas and provide them with even 
greater flexibility and lower switching costs as they can choose among suppliers across 
the globe (Bertrand & Mol, 2013). 
Among a few theoretical perspectives that help us to understand the drivers of 
a firm’s decision on (offshore) outsourcing, this literature review focuses on 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and resource-based view (RBV) since they are 
considered to have the most influential explanatory power (McIvor, 2009). TCE and 
RBV play critical roles and complement each other in evaluating outsourcing 
opportunities (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; 
McIvor, 2009).   
A market transaction between two independent organisations is likely to entail 
transaction costs due to market inefficiency characterized as information asymmetry, 
bounded rationality, and opportunism (Coase, 1937). TCE suggests that firms should 
take transaction costs and surrounding conditions into account before jumping into 
outsourcing attracted by the expected reduction of production costs. A firm benefits 
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from vertical integration or internal sourcing when high transaction costs are expected 
due to the high frequency of transactions, asset specificity, and uncertainty 
surrounding the transactions (Williamson, 1975, 1985). In consideration of the fact 
that transaction costs are incurred mainly in the process of gaining information about, 
communicating with or monitoring contracting parties, offshore outsourcing could 
potentially incur even higher transaction costs than onshore outsourcing due to 
increased geographic distances (Qu & Brocklehurst, 2003).  
However, the dramatic development and dropping costs of information and 
communication technologies have encouraged firms to opt for outsourcing beyond 
national borderlines (Abramovsky & Griffith, 2006; Javalgi, Dixit, & Scherer, 2009; 
Maskell et al., 2007). Offshore outsourcing attracts firms in advanced countries as it 
allows them to be more focused on high-skilled tasks while taking advantage of 
relatively cheap labour in developing countries for low-skilled tasks (Cheung, Rossiter, 
& Zheng, 2008; Jabbour, 2010). This rationale has meant that China, India, 
Bangladesh and other developing nations are often perceived as places where 
strategically important opportunities lie, across manufacturing industries (Javalgi et 
al., 2009; Lahiri & Kedia, 2011; Maskell et al., 2007; Stringfellow, Teagarden, & Nie, 
2008). In addition, through offshore manufacturing, firms can avoid high import taxes 
by having their products produced and sold in target markets (Stringfellow et al., 2008). 
RBV claims that valuable, rare, hard to imitate and non-replaceable resources 
that bring a firm competitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) are best 
kept in-house rather than being outsourced (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 
2006; Quinn & Hilmer, 1995; Quinn, 1999). To outsource relatively less critical 
business processes or activities is a more attractive and economic option for a firm 
especially when there is a supplier who is better at the jobs (Espino-Rodríguez & 
Padrón-Robaina, 2006). The idea of outsourcing only peripheral tasks stems from the 
concerns firms have of losing their skills and competences due to excessive and 
undiscerning outsourcing, as can be seen from the example of the dematerialization of 
some manufacturing companies (Arnold, 2000; Bettis, Bradley, & Hamel, 1992).  
Yet, firms have started offshore outsourcing more sophisticated and 
intellectually challenging areas of their activities, expecting knowledge transfer and 
performance improvement (Bertrand & Mol, 2013; Maskell et al., 2007; McIvor, 2009; 
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Nieto & Rodríguez, 2011). One example is the fairly recent participation of the service 
sector including banking and IT in offshore outsourcing when compared to the 
production offshoring that started in the early 1900s (Crino, 2010; Jensen & Petersen, 
2012; Stringfellow et al., 2008). Moreover, there is a trend of outsourcing and 
offshoring more knowledge-intensive tasks such as Research and Development (R&D) 
(Bertrand & Mol, 2013). From their examination into the drivers and consequences of 
domestic and offshore R&D outsourcing, Bertrand and Mol (2013) argue that firms 
are willing to accept accompanying costs when they see the potential to acquire 
complementary inputs from offshore outsourcing. This suggests that one of the 
strongest drivers of outsourcing is now to seek for an access to valuable but internally 
unavailable resources such as knowledge and technologies as well as to pursue more 
diverse and economic alternatives.  
2.2.3. Process of Offshore Outsourcing 
Once an outsourcing decision is made, outcomes of (offshore) outsourcing are now 
mostly determined by the process and efforts in managing the governance mode that 
includes suppliers selection, contracting and supplier relationship management 
(Handley & Benton, 2009). When traditional supplier selection processes were mainly 
concerned with finding the one that offers competitive prices, the importance of 
strategically selecting the ‘right one’ that enables improved performance outcomes 
through communication and information sharing is increasingly recognized (Sarkis & 
Talluri, 2002; Spekman, 1988). Considering the increasing significance, research has 
suggested that firms should add criteria and factors, ranging from quality, time, 
flexibility, to culture and technology, in their supplier selection decision making 
processes (Choi & Hartley, 1996; Ellram, 1990; Sarkis & Talluri, 2002). 
Once a supplier has been selected, performance outcomes from the relationship 
depends on how well firms specify contracts and manage their relationships. A firm’s 
ability to design contracts is highly valued in inter-organisational settings (Argyres & 
Mayer, 2007) and gaining more significance in supplier relationships since it makes 
both parties understand and agree to relationship specificities and prepare for future 
contingencies (Zhu, Hsu, & Lillie, 2001). However, well-specified and -designed 
contracts alone cannot guarantee the desirable performance of suppliers, especially 
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under circumstances where fulfilment of agreements are not institutionally enforced 
(Zhou & Xu, 2012).  
Hence, governance is more critical to performance outcomes than what is 
written in the contracts. In order to achieve the original goals and objectives of the 
partnership, firms engage in monitoring and evaluating suppliers’ practices and 
performances. As resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests power is subject to 
dependency. In an inter-organisational relationship, dependence and power have an 
inverse relationship (Provan & Gassenheimer, 1994). In other words, the less 
dependent party in the relationship is likely to have more power over its counterpart 
(Emerson, 1962). In this sense, it is generally agreed that a supplier’s performance 
improves as its dependence on relationship gets higher (Carr, Kaynak, Hartley, & Ross, 
2008). In such relationships, a buyer can exert more power over suppliers (Reimann 
& Ketchen, 2017). Yet, in pursuit of a long term benefit and in order to avoid potential 
opportunistic behaviour from suppliers, there is an increasing interest in developing 
co-operation and mutual trust in buyer-supplier relationships (Hoyt & Huq, 2000). As 
a relational view suggests, an IOR can yield improved performance, reduce costs and 
produce competitive advantage when parties cooperate (Dyer & Singh, 1998). This 
also applies to buyer-supplier relationships. Trust and cooperation in buyer-supplier 
relationships decrease transaction costs usually spent on negotiation and conflict 
management (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). In addition, 
cooperative relationships enables parties to be less dependent on formal contracts and 
become more adaptive to unexpected events not specified in contracts (Zhou & Xu, 
2012). 
2.2.4. Performance Outcomes of Offshore Outsourcing 
In general, there is little empirical evidence to support positive outcomes (Gilley & 
Rasheed, 2000; Handley & Benton, 2009; Murray, Kotabe, & Wildt, 1995) except for 
some cases of improvements in export (Bertrand, 2010) and innovation performances 
(Bertrand & Mol, 2013; Nieto & Rodríguez, 2011). In practice, about a half of all  
firms that used offshore outsourcing experienced unsatisfactory outcomes while less 
than 10% are highly pleased with the outcomes (Gottfredson, Puryear, & Phillips, 
2005). For example, the empirical study of Gray, Roth, and Leiblein (2011) examining 
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the pharmaceutical industry suggests that offshore outsourcing of product 
manufacturing risks product quality significantly. As such, the studies show mixed 
results of the outcomes of offshore outsourcing.  
Some of the unsatisfactory outcomes are explained by institutional distance. 
Offshore outsourcing complicates the context by encompassing multiple and evolving 
environments surrounding individual organisations (Hofstede, 1983; Kshetri, 2007; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). Gooris and Peeters (2014) posit 
that institutional distance between home and host countries create uncertainties and 
difficulties. Thus, while outsourcing can be beneficial to firms, an inclusion of a 
foreign context in offshore outsourcing cancels out the cost reduction effect of 
outsourcing (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000). Kotabe, Murray, and Javalgi (1998) 
empirically demonstrate that sourcing non-core services from onshore suppliers 
positively relates to performances while sourcing the same services from offshore 
suppliers negatively affects a firm’s performances. As such, offshore outsourcing 
could lead to a decrease in performance due to the difficulties derived from cultural 
differences (Kotabe et al., 1998). Stringfellow et al. (2008) support the argument 
through their findings that cultural and linguistic differences have a negative effect on 
the quality of communication between two organisations in different countries. Thus, 
Zeidner (2009) stresses that relentless offshoring decisions that ignore cultural 
differences can cause difficulties in communication and eventually increase costs.  
There are political and social outcomes of offshore outsourcing (Park & 
Hollinshead, 2011). Layoffs in home countries (Bhagwati, Panagariya, & Srinivasan, 
2004), along with labour exploitation and environmental deterioration in host 
countries (Doh, 2005), are often attributed to offshore outsourcing. There is a political 
and national tendency to be against offshore outsourcing especially in US as workers 
in labour-intensive industries believe or/and experience the decrease in the demand of 
their skills and technologies due to the cheap labour in developing countries (Bhagwati 
et al., 2004; Bryman, 2004; Kshetri, 2007). Although the argument sounds plausible, 
empirical evidence suggests the opposite showing offshore outsourcing is unlikely to 
contribute to significant job losses and rather creates more jobs in US (Mankiw & 
Swagel, 2006). More recently as well, Gurtu, Searcy, and Jaber (2016) argue  that 
offshore outsourcing of manufacturing activities contributes to national economic and 
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social growth. Yet, the apprehensions toward offshore outsourcing gains more 
justification as their arguments extend to the firms’ exploitation of workers and the 
environments of developing countries taking advantage of relatively weak institutions 
wittingly or unwittingly (Doh, 2005; Gray, Esenduran, Rungtusanatham, & 
Skowronski, 2017).    
2.3. Corporate Social Responsibility 
The academic discourse on CSR can be categorized into three mainstreams: what CSR 
means, what drives firms to engage in CSR, and what are the implications of CSR to 
firm performances. This section examines the literature on these three areas.  
2.3.1. Definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Ever since academic literature on CSR appeared in the 1950s, there have been attempts 
to define the concept (Carroll, 1999), and the discussion has yet to arrive at a consensus 
(Dahlsrud, 2008). Bowen (1953) defines CSR as “the obligations of businessmen to 
pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which 
are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society” (p.6). After Bowen, 
further attempts to define CSR emerge in the 1960s and 1970s. Unlike Bowen’s 
definition that considers social responsibilities mainly as obligations, managerial 
decisions and discretions have more weight in the definitions that emerged in 1960s 
and 1970s. One example is that CSR “refers to the firm’s consideration of, and 
response to, issues beyond narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the 
firm” (Davis, 1971, p.312).  
 Carroll (1979) incorporates and stretches earlier definitions and defines CSR 
as “the social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary expectations that society has of organisations at a given point in time” 
(p. 500). This becomes one of the most widely used definitions of CSR. The economic 
responsibility is fundamental as it is the firms’ most basic reason for existence to 
produce goods and services and sell them to the market. Both legal and ethical 
responsibilities arise more from the view that considers a firm as a member of a society. 
A difference is that the legal responsibilities are codified in and enforced by the law 
while ethical responsibilities are not. This may be the point where the vagueness of 
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the concept of the CSR emerges. Ethics and norms exist implicitly in the society 
engaging in moral judgement rather than legal judgment, and it therefore remains 
debatable (Carroll, 1979). The next and the highest level of responsibility, discretion, 
indicates that decisions and actions are taken by firms even though they are neither 
implicitly nor explicitly required by the society. Such discretionary responsibility may 
also be expected and considered to be desirable in some developed societies, but the 
decision whether to take the responsibility or not is completely down to the company’s 
or the manager’s discretion and firms do not get blamed for not taking it in principle. 
By acknowledging that there are different levels of CSR, Carroll embraces all previous 
attempts to explain CSR and categorizes them rather than arguing certain 
responsibilities should or should not be included in CSR.  
A more recent definition of CSR implies that CSR is not limited to a firm’s 
behaviour but also consequences of their actions; “a business organisation's 
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, 
and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal 
relationships” (Wood, 1991, p.693). This implies that although drivers, responses, and 
policies are still of importance, what is also critical is the outcomes. In other words, 
the social responsibility of firms does not stop at setting rules and policies that reflect 
stakeholder expectations but is extended to implementing them in practice and 
accounting for consequences. I adopt the definition of Wood’s (1991) because this 
thesis puts an emphasis on the outcome of CSR considering the significance of its 
impact on firms and their stakeholders, and seeks to enable prediction of CSR 
outcomes.  
2.3.2. Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility   
There are both external and internal drivers for a firm’s decisions to engage in CSR. 
Institutional theory provides an explanation for the external part of the drivers. 
Institutions encompass formal institutions including geographic, legal, political, 
linguistic factors and informal institutions such as culture (Hofstede, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). Campbell (2007) claims that institutions 
are capable of compelling a firm to be socially responsible. Firms’ CSR activities are 
under the influence of national institutions (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). Hence, under 
  
34 
 
strong institutions with high expectations equipped with strict regulations, firms are 
more likely to act in a responsible way and willing to take a higher level of 
responsibility. Gill, Dickinson, and Scharl (2008) support the view of Campbell (2007) 
in their empirical paper by showing that firms from North American countries and 
European countries tend to undertake CSR activities more proactively than their 
counterparts in Asian countries. The difference is also elucidated by the dissimilarities 
between the advanced institutions of North American and European countries and 
relatively less sophisticated institutions of Asian countries. Doh and Guay (2006) posit 
that there exists an institutional distance even between European countries and the 
United States, and which in turn leads to dissimilar CSR associated behaviours and 
decisions of firms. Matten and Moon (2008) provide theoretical explanation for the 
reasons behind these disparities. Due to the well-established and advanced social 
systems and infrastructure, European firms are less likely to develop explicit CSR 
policies and more likely to have implicit ones. On the other hand, there is more room 
for US firms to set up explicit policies. Not only CSR policies and practices, but also 
the level and the contents of firms’ self-disclosure on CSR is also affected by 
institutions that they belong to (Ali, Frynas, & Mahmood, 2017; Garcia-Sanchez, 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, & Frias-Aceituno, 2016). 
At an organisational level, Freeman (1984) suggests a firm should make 
decisions or behave in consideration of its stakeholders that have an influence on or 
are influenced by the firm. Campbell (2007) also counts the dialogue with stakeholders 
as one of the critical drivers of CSR. Stakeholders can largely be categorized into two 
different types according to the priorities of firms: primary and secondary stakeholders 
(Waddock, Bodwell, & Graves, 2002). In general, owners, employees, customers and 
suppliers fall under the name of primary stakeholders while NGOs, communities, and 
governments come within the secondary stakeholder categories. As firms pursue 
satisfactory fulfilment of the expectations from both internal and external stakeholders, 
stakeholders play critical roles in formulating firm CSR strategies (Wood & Jones, 
1995). The level of expectations is determined by various firm level factors such as 
size, visibility and previous commitments (Barnett, 2014; Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; 
Thorne, Mahoney, & Manetti, 2014; Udayasankar, 2008). Stakeholder theory claims 
that firms should initiate social activities in relation to their surrounding stakeholders, 
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and socially responsible actions would bring the company competitive advantages 
such as enhanced reputation, reduced risks and solid relationship with stakeholders 
(Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2001), and which ultimately could enhance profits in the long 
term. Namely, CSR enables firms to obtain competitive advantages by differentiating 
themselves from competitors and developing reputation and legitimacy, and which 
ultimately leads to stakeholder satisfaction and firm profitability (Carroll & Shabana, 
2011).  
However, such external factors, especially institutions and institutional 
stakeholders, do not sufficiently explain a firm’s CSR practices and strategies  
(Amaeshi, Adegbite, & Rajwani, 2016). CSR decisions are also driven by internal and 
individual level factors including managers’ motives, judgement, and capacity to 
engage in CSR activities (Swanson, 2008). CSR policies are ultimately approved by 
leaders of organisations (Petrenko et al., 2015; Waldman & Balven, 2014). The 
existing literature has attempted to elucidate the motivations behind managers’ 
decisions to engage in CSR. According to agency theory, CSR is driven by managerial 
opportunism at the expense of shareholders’ interests (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, 
& Snyder, 2003; Petrenko et al., 2015). On the other hand, the responsible leadership 
literature maintains that managers’ good intentions and moral choices influence firms’ 
CSR initiatives (Doh & Quigley, 2014). But more importantly, the level of discretion 
allocated to the managers determines the extent and level of CSR commitment 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). In this sense, Sharma (2000) claims that managers 
granted with more discretionary slack engage in more CSR activities.  
2.3.3. Corporate Social Responsibility and its Impact on Corporate Performance  
The discussions and studies on the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance have been animated since the 1960s (Cochran & Wood, 1984). Empirical 
studies on such relations have surged since the mid-1970s (Burke & Logsdon, 1996). 
Not to mention the fact that measuring financial performance is relatively 
straightforward, the relationship is clearly of great interest to managers who serve 
shareholder wealth maximization (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Friedman, 1962; Godfrey, 
2005).  
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Despite the efforts, it is widely accepted that so far there has been no 
conclusion that is  agreeable or generalizable (Barnett, 2007; Barnett & Salomon, 2012; 
Brammer & Millington, 2008; Cochran & Wood, 1984; Griffin & Mahon, 1997). 
While some studies prove positive associations between CSR and firm financial 
performance, others show negative relationships, and there are even studies claiming 
no relation (Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2000). Bowman and Haire (1975) find that the 
relationship between CSR and profitability is positive to a certain degree although the 
relationship is not incremental. Thus, an increase in CSR commitment and 
engagement does not guarantee higher profitability (Bowman & Haire, 1975). The 
empirical work of Spicer (1978) also shows a positive link between CSR and 
profitability though his research has its limitations in looking into a sole industry, pulp 
and paper industry, and in considering merely one aspect of CSR, pollution-control 
records. The positive link between CSR and profitability is also supported by an 
empirical examination of Stanwick and Stanwick (1998) while the empirical study of 
Vance (1975) proves a negative relationship between CSR and financial performance. 
The studies discussed above show a correlation between CSR and firms’ 
financial performance, but fail to show a causal link. But there have been  attempts to 
make up for these defects. Mcguire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988) discover the 
causality in the relationship: the existence of a positive impact of financial 
performance on CSR, and a weak influence of CSR on financial performance. The 
results indicate that the financial slack of a firm is likely to contribute to a higher level 
of CSR commitment, whereas a higher level of CSR commitment does not necessarily 
bring about enhanced financial performance. Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan 
(2010), on the other hand, prove that CSR measured by charitable contributions has a 
significant positive influence on the revenues in the following years. More recently, 
Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi, and Saaeidi (2015) suggest that CSR has a positive 
influence on a firm’s performance thanks to its ability to improve a firm’s reputation 
and competitive advantage. 
On the other hand, there are also studies proving no relationship between CSR 
and financial performance. Through their empirical research, Abbott and Monsen 
(1979) claim that CSR has no effect on the return to investors. Aupperle, Carroll, and 
Hatfield (1985) attest no impact of CSR on either short or long term profitability.  
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Such inconsistent results can mainly be attributed to the following three issues 
in research: misspecification of empirical models, inappropriate measurements, and 
the time taken for CSR to be reflected on firm performance. First, there are various 
critical factors that affect a firm’s financial performances, and CSR is merely a part of 
them (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2000). For example, 
Mcwilliams and Siegel (2000) claim R&D intensity has a significant effect on a firm’s 
financial performance, and their model including R&D intensity as a control variable 
proves the neutral impact of CSR on financial performance. Cochran and Wood (1984), 
on the other hand, find that firms’ asset age is linked to CSR levels. This could be 
interpreted in two ways according to the authors. Firstly, as the concept of CSR 
changes as well as external expectation, some elements considered to be basic 
requirements nowadays were not as such in the past. Also, there is a possibility that 
older companies may lack flexibility to adjust themselves to changes in society. Thus, 
the authors control asset ages of subject firms and the results show a weak relationship 
between CSR and financial performance.  
Second, there are doubts about the variables used to measure CSR as well as 
financial performances; the different and even conflicting results are a consequence of 
not having appropriate measures and proxies for CSR and financial performances (e.g. 
Abbott & Monsen, 1979; Bowman & Haire, 1975; Cochran & Wood, 1984). 
“Although one might have expected a certain diversity of measures of CSR, there is 
no real consensus on the proper measure of financial performance either” (Cochran & 
Wood, 1984, p.44-45). In an effort to prove the role of financial measures in bringing 
about different results, Mcguire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988) test both 
accounting- and stock-market-based measures in studying the relationship between 
CSR and firm financial performance. As might be expected, the results change 
according to the measures used. For example, social responsibility has no concurrent 
relationship with financial performance in terms of stock-market measures while it has 
significant relationships with some of the accounting-based measures (Mcguire et al., 
1988). 
Third, Arlow and Gannon (1982), in their review of empirical studies, argue 
that the mixed results can be attributed to the time taken for social activities to be 
reflected on actual economic results. Burke and Logsdon (1996) propose a longer-term 
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vision and benefits of CSR, “in particular by supporting core business activities and 
thus contributing to the firm’s effectiveness in accomplishing its mission” (p. 496). As 
such, the discussion returns to the controversies between shareholder theory and 
stakeholder theory. As the idea of CSR is not oriented to short-term shareholder 
interest in the first place, but long term benefits in consideration of relevant 
stakeholders, measuring a firm’s financial performance in the same year or in any 
proximate year of CSR policies may not be a valid approach. In other words, any effect 
of CSR is likely to reflect on firm performance in a relatively long period of time and 
not necessarily in the form of dollar figures. Porter and Kramer (2011) who stress the 
inseparability of business economic value and social value also admit that the 
economic value should not be expected to be realized in a short term. They also 
acknowledge that it is not an easy or a simple task to develop and integrate CSR 
programs that add value to the society while making business sense. As such the core 
belief of the concept of shared value is that firms should pursue profits, especially the 
long-term and sustainable profits rather than short-term and instant profits (Porter & 
Kramer, 2011).  
Departing from examining the direct relations, more recently studies have 
examined the mechanisms through which CSR influences a firm’s financial 
performances, and circumstances under which CSR is more likely to affect financial 
performances. In other words, they look at mediators and moderators between the two 
variables and institutional contexts. These studies complement the previous studies by 
taking firm critical factors that have the potential to influence the relationship between 
CSR and other firm performances into consideration. There are studies that point out 
that CSR is positively and directly associated with factors such as firm productivity, 
competitive advantage, reputation and customer satisfaction, and which in turn leads 
to enhanced firm financial performances (Hasan, Kobeissi, Liu, & Wang, 2016; Saeidi 
et al., 2015). Wang, Dou, and Jia (2016) on the other hand focus on the changing 
effects according to institutional contexts. Through a meta-analytic review, they find 
that the relationship between CSR and firm financial performance is stronger in 
developed economies due to higher market efficiency than in developing economies.  
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2.4. Corporate Social Responsibility in Offshore Outsourcing Contexts  
Given that CSR has many aspects and covers activities across all business aspects from 
upstream to downstream, discussions that used to be limited to downstream CSR 
matters are extending to firm CSR practices in the context of supply chains, and in a 
more specific context of offshore outsourcing (Li, Zhou, & Wu, 2017). This section 
looks into the reasons why firms are increasingly adopting CSR policies in their 
offshore outsourcing operations and in supply chains more broadly. While there are 
challenges in doing so, practices to address these difficulties are discussed.  
2.4.1. Drivers of CSR in Offshore Outsourcing 
The burgeoning academic interest in CSR/supply chains and sustainable supply chains 
is partly a consequence of the increasing number of controversies in business practice. 
A series of socially irresponsible business practices in offshore outsourcing operations 
in developing countries, from Nike’s sweatshops in the 1990s through to Rana Plaza 
collapse in Bangladesh in 2013, have provoked vigorous criticisms and moral 
objections from internal and external stakeholders including consumers, employees, 
the public and NGOs since the 1990s (Kolk, 2003; Perry et al., 2015). Given the fact 
that stakeholders are often unaware of the activities conducted by a firm and its 
partners in supply chains (Giunipero, Hooker, & Denslow, 2012), focal firms that are 
usually more visible get blamed when disasters or scandals happen  (Amaeshi, Osuji, 
& Nnodim, 2008; Glover, Champion, Daniels, & Dainty, 2014; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). Furthermore, progressive stakeholders now more explicitly require firms to 
take the responsibility for irresponsible actions committed in their supply chains 
(Klassen & Vereecke, 2012; Yawar & Seuring, 2017). Hence, CSR in offshore 
outsourcing relationships is inevitably a matter that captures a firm’s attention. When 
brands like Nike were named and shamed by the media for exploiting children in the 
third world, the company had to face boycotts led by consumers, the public and civil 
society organisations (Yuan, Bao, & Verbeke, 2011). Since the revelation in the 1990s 
and following vigorous pressures from its stakeholders, Nike has made a significant 
effort and progress in improving labour conditions and human rights in their offshore 
outsourcing operations (Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007). Despite its efforts, however, the 
  
40 
 
Nike brand continues to be associated with running sweatshops in developing 
countries.  
As such, a firm’s history plays an important role when stakeholders make sense 
of new information about the firm (Barnett, 2014; Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). And the 
public tend to be more influenced by negative events than positive ones (Lange & 
Washburn, 2012) and hardly update their beliefs especially from the negative to the 
positive (Barnett, 2007). Thus, disclosures of such damaging events, especially 
through the media can severely damage a firm’s image and reputation and such a loss 
is hard to recover (Emmelhainz & Adams, 1999; Frenkel & Scott, 2002; Wiese & 
Toporowski, 2013; Zyglidopoulos, Georgiadis, Carroll, & Siegel, 2012). Accordingly, 
firms with rather passive and defensive motivations for socially responsible practices 
in offshore outsourcing operations may be satisfied with being able to successfully 
avoid negative media coverage and public attention or to recover already damaged 
images from previous exposure (Carroll, 1979; Sethi, 1979). But there are firms driven 
by more proactive and progressive motives (Carroll, 1979; Sethi, 1979). Given that 
stakeholders of buying firms mostly from advanced countries now require such high 
standards to be met across global supply chains (Amaeshi, Osuji, & Nnodim, 2008; 
Emmelhainz & Adams, 1999; Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 2009), living up to and 
even exceeding such expectations can bring firms competitive advantages (Wolf, 
2014). Companies expect improvement in their image, reputation and even financial 
performance by promoting socially responsible practices in their suppliers’ operations 
(Ganesan, George, Jap, Palmatier, & Weitz, 2009; Hoejmose, Roehrich, & Grosvold, 
2014).  
2.4.2. Firm Practices and their Limitations 
Communication with stakeholders. Given that stakeholders mostly gain 
information regarding negative events in offshore outsourcing operations through the 
media, firms voluntarily supply alternative sources of information, from which 
stakeholders usually receive positive information: public announcements, 
advertisements, annual reports and stand-alone CSR reports (An, Davey, & Eggleton, 
2011; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). Through such 
voluntary disclosure, firms with positive achievements try to send a signal to 
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stakeholders and prevent them from “adverse selection” (Campbell, Shrives, & 
Bohmbach-Saager, 2001; Clarkson, Overell, & Chapple, 2011; Mahoney, Thorne, 
Cecil, & LaGore, 2013). Voluntary disclosures per se can be interpreted as a signal of 
actually doing good due to the costs and time taken to produce them (Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2004; Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 2013; Thorne et al., 2014). Firms 
willingly bear the costs and publish reports expecting enhanced reputation and 
compensation from stakeholders (Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Lyon & Maxwell, 
2011; Mahoney et al., 2013).  
Yet, voluntary disclosure can be selective in terms of its contents (Neu, 
Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). Firms with a negative event can attempt to explain, give 
an excuse, or attribute it to others or strategically manipulate stakeholder perceptions 
by greenwashing (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Mahoney et al., 2013; Mena et al., 2016; 
Thorne et al., 2014). Mahoney et al. (2013) suggest that firms can exploit CSR reports 
by intentionally omitting negative information and trying to greenwash their image. 
By doing so they intend to enjoy positive stakeholder perceptions and elude negative 
public attention (Cho et al., 2010; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011).  
Codes of conduct, monitoring, sanctions. With the lead of Levi Strauss in 
1991 and Nike in 1992, multinationals started to adopt codes of conduct (Murphy & 
Matthew, 2001; Pedersen, 2006; Roberts, 2003; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001). However, 
because codes of conduct are placed on a voluntary basis, their formats and contents 
are significantly inconsistent. In order to address this issue, Social Accountability 
International (SAI) developed a standard on labour conditions and human rights issues 
called SA8000 (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007) and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
provided guidelines for communicating environmental and human rights issues 
(Othman & Ameer, 2009). The United Nations (UN) also announced principles for 
human rights, environment, and working conditions in 1999 (Frenkel & Scott, 2002). 
These universally applicable tools provide guidance for firms to prepare somewhat 
more standardized codes (Albareda, 2013). 
What is established and agreed upon, however, cannot be more critical than 
how and whether the codes are implemented, performed and lived up to in practice 
(Babin, Briggs, & Nicholson, 2011; Pedersen & Andersen, 2006). Through meticulous 
monitoring, firms may also be able to or expect to send a signal to their suppliers and 
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the other stakeholders about how seriously they take CSR (Kolk & Van Tulder, 2002). 
However, such strict monitoring and strong enforcement is feasible and effective only 
when relatively more power on the buyers’ side is presumed to exist (Mamic, 2005). 
Hoejmose, Grosvold, and Millington (2013) stress the significant role of power 
distribution and dependency in buyer-supplier relationships. Unlike joint ventures 
where there can be two focal firms with equally distributed powers (Emerson, 1962), 
offshore outsourcing relationships have one focal company who has relatively more 
power in general. Considering the fact that most firms outsource non-core activities 
pursuing flexibility (Yan & Gray, 1994), the high flexibility and lowered switching 
costs increase the bargaining power of the buyer. An increased bargaining power 
makes the buyer a dominant player in the relationship and the buyer can put pressure 
on the supplier to follow or emulate its requirements. In a situation where a buyer 
holds more bargaining power than its supplier, the supplier is likely to comply with 
whatever standards the buyer lays out (Hoejmose et al., 2013).  
Nonetheless, as agency theory suggests, in a buyer-supplier relationship, there 
is a possibility of the suppliers’ opportunistic behaviour and attempts to hide 
information (Ciliberti et al., 2011; Pedersen & Andersen, 2006). Strict monitoring, 
scrutiny, and both sporadic and periodic audits, can be counterproductive and rather 
increase the risks of violation as they may give suppliers an incentive to hide critical 
information of breach or to bribe personnel in charge (Egels-Zandén, 2014; Plambeck 
& Taylor, 2014; Wiese & Toporowski, 2013). Boyd et al. (2007) make a conclusion 
from their review of literature on monitoring that there is no correlation between the 
level of monitoring and the extent of compliance or performance in buyer-supplier 
relationships.  
As such, monitoring does not guarantee compliance (Locke et al., 2007), and 
the loose relationship between monitoring and compliance may get even looser in 
offshore outsourcing relationships. One most obvious reason is geographic distance 
between buying firms and overseas suppliers, and this entails not only physical 
distance but also cognitive distance (Maskell et al., 2007; Midttun et al., 2007; van 
Tulder & Kolk, 2002). Doh (2005) claims that offshore outsourcing makes CSR 
complicated as it becomes challenging to lay out standards across autonomous firms 
having different resources and institutional settings. Firms are under the influence of 
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their individual environmental and situational factors such as institutions and 
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Frooman, 1999; Wood, 1991). The most common form 
of offshore outsourcing is between a parent company in an advanced country and a 
supplier from a low-cost/ less developed economy such as China and India (Lahiri & 
Kedia, 2011). Considering the fact that less developed economies are likely to have 
less strong institutions, suppliers are unlikely to have an incentive to bear any 
additional costs in order to take the responsibilities that are not forced or required by 
their institutions including the law, norms and culture (Ciliberti et al., 2011). Through 
their investigation into the petroleum industry, Midttun et al. (2005) discover that there 
is a severe strategic misalignment between buyer firms and suppliers primarily due to 
the different levels of stakeholder expectations the organisations have to face. In detail, 
compared to buyers in their study who put significant weight on CSR related strategies, 
more than 10% of suppliers are not prepared with CSR strategies at all.  
Cooperation with suppliers. Recognizing the limitation of codes of conduct 
and monitoring, there have been scholarly efforts to provide alternative solutions to 
address the issues of CSR management in offshore outsourcing relationships. 
Developing a cooperative relationship based on trust or mutual self-interests is 
suggested to be a desirable alternative to maintain and achieve expected CSR 
performance levels (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Gold, Seuring, & Beske, 2010; 
Lim & Phillips, 2008; Locke et al., 2007; Pedersen & Andersen, 2006; Perry et al., 
2015). As relational view suggest, balanced, trust-based cooperation can reduce 
associated transaction costs and produce superior outcomes, and therefore exhaustive 
power games and consumptive efforts for monitoring can be minimized (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Dyer, 1997; Yawar & Seuring, 2017).  
 Such cooperation can be more beneficial especially when the country of the 
supplier has weak legislative institutions that have less power to enforce contracts 
(Kshetri, 2007). It is mainly because the possibility of opportunistic behaviour and 
behavioural uncertainty (Williamson, 1975), a major concern of outsourcing, is 
reduced with the presence of trust and mutual dependence (Dore, 1983; Zaheer et al., 
1998). The reduced likelihood of opportunistic behaviour will first lower the need for 
formal safeguards such as contractual details so decrease the costs related to contracts 
(Gold et al., 2010). Moreover, communication between partners, which is considered 
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to be one of the most essential elements determining success or failure of the 
relationship but costly and difficult to be specified in a contract, is automatically well 
performed once trust is built (Ebadi & Utterback 1984; Argyres & Mayer 2007). 
Soundararajan and Brown (2016) claim that turning off buyer-led supply chain CSR 
management and creating shared values with suppliers will fundamentally address 
issues in supply chains, which includes usually more serious violations in sub-
contractors’ operations   
All in all, it might take some time to get it established (Kshetri, 2007), but 
cooperative relationships with suppliers can be a source of competitive advantage 
leading to an enhanced CSR performance outcome, since such relationships will 
decrease the need and cost for monitoring on the buyer’s side, and increase the 
likelihood of voluntary adherence of suppliers to CSR initiatives (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Uzzi, 1997).  
Collaborations with other partners. In order to complement their governance 
capabilities and capacities, companies collaborate with partners outside of their own 
supply chains, third party organisations (TPOs) such as non-profit organisations 
(NPOs) (Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009). Partnering with NPOs is not an unfamiliar 
business strategy when it comes to CSR. By setting up a partnership, the abilities of 
different organisations are shared and complemented (Waddell, 2000). NPOs have 
diverse specialties: some focus on environmental sustainability and some pursue 
animal welfare while others have their focus on human rights. NPOs provide expertise 
while firms offer financial support in exchange (Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009; Seitanidi 
& Crane, 2009). NPOs are selected according to their region-specific, issue-specific 
knowledge and expertise (Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009).  
Although the collaboration between a firm and an NGO is the basic form, there 
could be variations such as more than one company and one NGO, a company and 
more than one NGO, and by extension, multiple companies and multiple NGOs 
(Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009). There is a growing attention to such multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (MSIs) that are generally formed by involvement of multiple stakeholders 
including firms, competitors, TPOs (NPOs and NGOs), trade unions, and governments 
(Baur & Schmitz, 2012; O’Rourke, 2006; Rasche, 2012). Mainly due to the broad 
concept of MSI, there are a variety of MSIs and they vary in formation, dynamics, foci 
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and purposes. While Ethical Trading Initiatives (ETI), Global Reporting Initiatives 
(GRI) and UN Global Compact are categorized as representing MSIs, there are smaller 
and more issue-specific MSIs like Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (Rasche, 2012). 
They are functional in providing opportunities for stakeholders to share information 
and communicate. However, they suffer from ineffectiveness in addressing issues, as 
it is merely an extension of the bilateral enforcement and compliance governance 
mode but on a global level (Rasche, 2012) and these easily become entities simply 
providing certifications that are not properly regulated (Lund-Thomsen, 2008). 
Acknowledging the limitations, there emerge new types of collaboration that are more 
focused on a region or a specific issue, and one such example is The Accord, a legally 
binding coalition specifically designed to address fire and building safety in 
Bangladesh (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015).  
2.5. Summary and Gaps 
The current chapter extensively reviewed literature in (offshore) outsourcing, CSR, 
and CSR in the supply chain. Since the disciplinary bases of this thesis are in strategic 
management, international business, business, ethics and supply chain management, 
the review focused on articles published in renowned journals in the fields of 
management, strategy, international business, organisation studies, operations 
management, supply chain management, ethics and occasionally economics. The 
review shows that offshore outsourcing and CSR are discussed frequently and in 
significant depth both conceptually and empirically in these academic journals. 
However, the discourse on CSR in offshore outsourcing has not reached this level of 
depth in general.  
CSR has rarely been considered as an outcome of other firm activities, 
especially offshore outsourcing decisions, and is chiefly considered to be a means to 
achieve other corporate goals including an improvement of financial performances or 
an upgrade of reputation. Likewise, offshoring and outsourcing literature has almost 
exclusively looked at financial and strategic performances as outcomes of the 
governance mode. Accordingly, the effectiveness of offshore outsourcing has been 
evaluated based on its contribution to improvements in financial outcomes and 
efficiency. Chiefly driven by practical urgency, CSR has only recently been 
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recognized as an unexpected outcome or a by-product of strategic decision-making. 
For its relatively short history and complicated nature, the discussion on CSR issues 
in offshore outsourcing is not as developed as the individual studies of CSR and 
offshore outsourcing.  
Probably due to the phenomenon-driven characteristics and the inductive way 
of research, most of the studies on CSR in offshore outsourcing contexts are in the 
form of empirical investigation standing on a weak or limited conceptual basis. Some 
even skip the process of developing a conceptual framework and jump straight into 
empirical examinations or case studies (e.g. Babin & Nicholson, 2011; Emmelhainz 
& Adams, 1999; Locke et al., 2007; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003; Van Tulder & Kolk, 
2001) while others suggest one or two theoretical backgrounds that barely cover a 
fraction of the complicated context (e.g. Boyd, Spekman, Kamauff, & Werhane, 2007; 
Ciliberti et al., 2011). There has been no attempt to understand the phenomenon taking 
an exception by taking multi-level approach as Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and 
Ganapathi (2007) do to comprehend CSR. Considering the additional complexity that 
the modular context of offshore and outsourcing brings in e.g. institutional distance, 
inter-organisational relationships, studies on CSR in offshore outsourcing strongly beg 
for a systematic theoretical comprehension of the relevant levels and their interactions. 
In addition, researchers attempt to suggest ways to improve CSR practices or 
achieve successful CSR outcomes in offshore outsourcing relationships (Lund-
Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014; Perry et al., 2015; Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015) for the 
purposes of fulfilling stakeholders’ expectations and ultimately enhancing other types 
of corporate performances. Furthermore, the focus has been on advancing CSR 
performances, not on preventing failures and minimizing harm. Yet, considering the 
fact that issues and tragedies keep occurring, analysing and diagnosing what is behind 
a failure has to precede finding solutions to improve performances or achieve 
successful outcomes. There has been lack of research seeking a systematic 
understanding of what explains CSR issues, CSR failures namely, especially in the 
context of offshore outsourcing  
There are issues in empirical studies that caught my attention as well. First of 
all, there are much fewer quantitative pieces than qualitative works studying the 
subject matter (Park-Poaps & Rees, 2010). The issue I point out here is not that one 
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method is superior to the other, but that there is a significant imbalance in terms of 
approach. This has resulted in less sophisticated research designs with replicable 
measurements as well as lack of findings that are applicable and generalizable to a 
wider population. For instance, there has not been any consensus on an appropriate 
way of quantitatively measuring CSR performance. CSR performance has been 
measured in diverse ways: CSR reports published by firms (e.g. Mahoney et al., 2013), 
rankings published by the third party organisations (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984), and 
the amount of financial contribution to charitable donation (e.g. Orlitzky, Schmitdt, & 
Rynes, 2003). Such different measures inevitably lead to different results since they 
represent distinct aspects conceptually and fundamentally. In addition, they can only 
be a proxy for how responsible firms are and cannot be a proxy for how irresponsible 
firms are. Not to mention that they cannot be used to measure CSR performance in the 
specific context of offshore outsourcing. Hence, there needs a new measure for CSR 
and CSiR that can be replicable and that can specify diverse aspects of CSR 
performances in different contexts. Furthermore, there is a need for a more structured 
quantitative research with an extensive amount of data such that the findings can be 
generalized.  
Finally, current discourse in the existing literature on CSR in (global) supply 
chains acknowledge that firms seek to address the issues in bilateral governance by 
collaborating with partners that are not traditionally part of firm supply chains, e.g. 
TPOs and competitors. Although there is an increasing academic interest in studying 
MSIs, the discussion remains introductory and simply describes individual examples. 
While traditional MSIs mostly turn out to be nominal in practice, MSIs are evolving 
into different forms. Considering the fact that there are too many diverse coalitions 
categorized under the broad concept of MSI, there needs some specific examination 
on a newer type of coalition that addresses the defects of its precedents. The subject is 
new, and practically critical and conceptually complicated for involving multiple 
organisations. Hence, there needs in-depth discussion and investigation into a 
changing trend and studies to figure out whether/why this is a pragmatically feasible 
and theoretically valid solution to the issue. This discussion should follow an accurate 
diagnosis on previously suggested solutions and their limitations. 
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The following papers address the holes in the literature and contribute to the 
on-going discussion of CSR matters in offshore outsourcing contexts.  
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Chapter 3 PAPER 1 
HOW INTER-ORGANISATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES INTERACT: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FAILURE UNDER CHALLENGING CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Abstract 
We theorize on the interactions between inter-organisational relationships (IORs) and 
institutions, in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR) failure. 
Organisations generally find it challenging to manage CSR, but this is exacerbated 
when ownership and location choices lead to outsourcing, offshoring, and especially 
offshore outsourcing. We consider how inter-organisational factors, institutional 
differences, and their joint occurrence can produce CSR failure, seen as firm 
misconduct that does not meet stakeholders’ expectations. In the case of outsourcing, 
inter-organisational differences in stakeholder expectations increase CSR failure, but 
relational characteristics, especially inter-organisational cooperation and inter-
organisational dependence, may decrease it. Under offshoring, institutional distance 
increases CSR failure. We argue that under offshore outsourcing all the direct 
predictions under outsourcing and offshoring hold true. We further suggest that inter-
organisational cooperation acts as a negative moderator on the relationships between 
inter-organisational differences and CSR failure and institutional distance and CSR 
failure, while inter-organisational dependence is a positive moderator. Prior literature 
has not sufficiently emphasized how interactions between national institutions and 
IORs can produce outcomes such as CSR failure. Our framework generates new 
insights for CSR literature by deepening understanding of the impact of governance 
choices and by promoting failure to the central focus. Finally, we highlight an 
underemphasized type of hidden cost firms face when offshoring or outsourcing, 
namely CSR failure.  
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, institutional distance, inter-
organisational relationships, cooperation, dependence  
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3.1. Introduction 
On December 18, 2014, a BBC TV programme documented poor labour practices in 
Chinese factories operated by Pegatron, one of Apple’s biggest suppliers. These poor 
practices included excessive working hours and health and safety issues (BBC, 2014). 
This followed problems in 2010 at Foxconn (Moore, 2012), another Apple supplier, 
and produced a (social) media discourse about Apple’s corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). People asked whether managers could have done more, how the company 
could manage its supplier relationships better, and how to deal with differences in 
standards between China and the United States, but also queried whether high 
stakeholder demands at Apple are reasonable (Lee, Mol, & Mellahi, 2016). Thus, to 
understand the CSR impact of Apple’s decision to offshore outsource production one 
must simultaneously consider national institutional factors and the nature of inter-
organisational relationships (IORs). Our aim in this paper is to generate a new theory 
at the intersection of IORs and institutional distance, using CSR outcomes from 
offshoring and outsourcing as a context.  
The international business (IB) literature is full of work on cross-country 
differences in institutions, both formal and informal institutions. Drawing mainly from 
institutional theory, much of the literature aims to elucidate the significance of 
institutional distance in firm entry mode choices (e.g. Hernández & Nieto, 2015; 
Kogut & Singh, 1988; Salomon & Wu, 2012; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005; Xu 
& Shenkar, 2002) and subsidiary management including location choices and 
performance outcomes (e.g. Castellani, Jimenez, & Zanfei, 2013; Kostova, 1999). 
There is also a big branch of the literature discussing the effects of institutional 
distance on different types of performance outcomes (e.g. Aguilera-Caracuel, Aragón-
Correa, & Hurtado-Torres, 2012; Brouthers, 2002; Castellani et al., 2013; Morosini, 
Shane, & Singh, 1998). The most widely accepted and used measures for institutional 
distance are the measures for cultural distance suggested by Hofstede (1983) and the 
extended measure for multiple dimensions of institutional distance offered by Berry, 
Guillén, and Zhou (2010). 
There has been much work on IORs, mostly confined to within-country (e.g. 
Modi & Mabert, 2007; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976), or universal settings (e.g. Dyer & 
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Singh, 1998; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008), but to some extent also on IORs with partners 
from different countries (e.g. Luo, 2002; Luo & Ho Park, 2004). IORs are in many 
different types e.g. joint ventures, buyer-supplier relationships, strategic alliances, and 
the like (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011), and firms are increasingly engaging in 
one or multiple types of IORs (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). There are studies focusing 
on antecedents of different types of IORs (Gulati, 1995; Oliver, 1990). But more 
importantly and more frequently, studies have been centred around the factors leading 
to IOR performance outcomes. While inter-organisational differences hinder expected 
performance outcomes (Pothukuchi, Damanpour, Choi, Chen, & Park, 2002; Sirmon 
& Lane, 2004), a common argument is that trust-based cooperative relationships 
contribute most to overcome such obstacles and achieve improved performance 
outcomes in IORs thanks to reduced transaction costs and increased relational rents 
(Dyer & Chu, 2003; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Zaheer, McEvily, 
& Perrone, 1998).  
Nonetheless there is only a limited literature addressing the effects of IORs 
on (performance) outcomes in a cross-national context, in spite of both the increasing 
empirical occurrence of such IORs and the challenges cross-national IORs pose for 
our theorizing of organisations. As we argue more fully below, these observations are 
particularly pertinent in the context of CSR failure. Thus the central research question 
of this paper is how do inter-organisational relations, institutional distance, and their 
interaction help to explain CSR failure?  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We begin by laying out 
the need for a more intricate understanding of how IORs and institutional distance 
interact. We then turn to CSR, discussing relevant insights from prior literature, before 
developing a theoretical framework to predict CSR failure. Specifically, we focus on 
inter-organisational differences, cooperation and dependence as key antecedents of 
CSR failure at the inter-organisational level in an outsourcing context and on 
institutional distance as a further factor in an offshoring context. We then propose 
cross-level effects, specifying how inter-organisational factors moderate the effects of 
institutional distance on CSR failure. Throughout we provide some examples focused 
on labour conditions for ease of exposition. Finally, we discuss how the framework 
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generates novel insights for theories and practices of organisations and opportunities 
for empirical testing. 
3.2. Inter-organisational Relationships across Borders 
The literature on cross-border IORs has focused particularly on international joint 
ventures (IJVs) and alliances. And in understanding performance outcomes, the roles 
of governance mechanisms (Fryxell, Dooley, & Vryza, 2002; Luo, 2002; Luo & Park, 
2004) and institutional characteristics (Ertug, Cuypers, Noorderhaven, & Bensaou, 
2013; Pothukuchi et al., 2002) are magnified. The huge literature on IJVs focuses on 
prospects of how IORs may generate value for the parties involved in the relationship 
(Barringer & Harrison, 2000).  
Although there is relatively little literature looking at upstream relationships, 
relationships with suppliers to be specific, that which exists is centred around formal 
and informal governance mechanisms, and the extent to which these are complements 
and substitutes (Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 2010; Zhou & Xu, 2012). Also there are various 
insights on cross-national institutional differences, informal distance such as cultural 
distance (Handley & Angst, 2015) as well as formal distance (Wang, Zhang, Wang, & 
Sheng, 2016).  
Our central argument here is that the characteristics of IORs and institutional 
distance may interact in producing the (performance) outcomes of activities. Although 
it seems that there is not yet a fully-fledged theory of how IORs and institutional 
distance interact, based on the review above we would suggest there are inklings in 
both areas to suggest that this interaction ought to be significant. Such a view is also 
consistent with recent empirical advances in multilevel statistical modeling, which 
have put much more emphasis on cross-level interactions (Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra, 
& Nielsen, 2014) and warned against omitting levels, either through aggregation or 
through disaggregation (Peterson, Arregle, & Martin, 2012). 
Furthermore we see CSR failure as an ideal ground for developing more 
specific arguments how the interaction between IOR characteristics and institutional 
distance may affect (performance) outcomes for several reasons. First, CSR failure in 
offshore outsourcing is a major empirical challenge faced by firms. As firms have 
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outsourced, offshored, and offshore outsourced more activities, they have become ever 
more reliant on supplier firms for achieving desired CSR outcomes. As our initial 
example and similar cases like the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh (Perry et al., 
2015) and the well-documented historical problems of companies like IKEA (Maignan 
& Hillebrand, 2002) and Nike (Lim & Phillips, 2008) demonstrate, this is clearly 
proving difficult for focal firms to manage. Second, and related, CSR outcomes are 
now simply of significantly increased interest to firms and their stakeholders, meaning 
they are an important explanandum. Third, and on a more conceptual level, CSR 
outcomes are a domain where both informal and formal institutional differences are a 
crucial explanans (Lee, 2011). Similarly, we suggest that the CSR outcomes are an 
excellent setting to test key traits of value creation in IORs, because the intricacies 
involved in managing CSR in IORs necessitate the use of all four key mechanisms 
behind inter-organisational competitive advantage, i.e. relation-specific assets, 
knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resources/capabilities, and effective 
governance (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Thus we would argue that CSR outcomes represent 
a critical case in further developing the theory of IORs and national institutional 
distance. We now proceed to look at existing inter-organisational and cross-national 
explanations of CSR outcomes in further detail. 
3.3. Inter-organisational and Cross-national Explanations of CSR Outcomes  
CSR refers “to a business organisation's configuration of principles of social 
responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and 
observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships” (Wood, 1991, 
p.693). CSR is a multi-dimensional construct, including community related initiatives 
such as donation and philanthropy, and organisation related initiatives dealing with 
environment, customers, suppliers and employees. The extant literature sharply 
distinguishes between the CSR expectations an organisation faces and its CSR 
practices (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Brammer & Millington, 2008). This body of 
literature emphasizes the importance of alignment between CSR practices and 
stakeholder expectations. CSR expectations are shaped by a variety of organisational, 
industry and country level factors (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Levy & Kolk, 2002; 
Maloni & Brown, 2006; Matten & Moon, 2008). 
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Our organisational theories of CSR have progressed substantially in recent 
years. Other than discussions of what the concept entails (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; 
Basu & Palazzo, 2008), much attention has been paid to how CSR is related to 
performance of firms (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Mcguire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 
1988; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2000; Porter & Kramer, 2006; Tang, Hull, & Rothenberg, 
2012; Mellahi et al. 2016) and drivers of CSR in organisations (see Aguinis & Glavas, 
2012 for a review). At the heart of most analyses has been a focus on organisational 
level stakeholder expectations and CSR practices (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 
2012; Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004; Kolk & Pinkse, 2006; Sharma, 2000).  
Misalignment between CSR practices and stakeholders’ expectations often 
leads to problematic outcomes (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Kolk & Pinkse, 2006; 
Lindenmeier, Schleer, & Pricl, 2012). We therefore define CSR failure of a firm’s 
(mis)conduct that does not meet stakeholders’ expectations because they deem it 
illegal, unethical or socially irresponsible (see Barnett, 2014, p.697). Socially 
irresponsible activities include “corporate actions that are widely regarded as 
damaging to corporate governance, employee relations, communities, public health, 
human rights, diversity, the environment” (Hoi, Wu, & Zhang, 2013, p.2026). CSR 
failure is the central object of interest in this paper and we propose that organisations 
seek to minimize it because of its potential adverse effects on, among other things, 
their reputation (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006), stakeholder relationships, ability to 
attract talent (Bielak, Bonini, & Oppenheim, 2007), and market success (Frooman, 
1997). We therefore contend that for most organisations minimization of CSR failure 
is a much more important objective than optimization of CSR outcomes.1 
Of course, CSR failure is not just explained at the inter-organisational and 
institutional levels and past research has in fact examined CSR from a multi-level 
perspective, most prominently Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and Ganapathi's (2007) 
multi-level theorizing of firms’ motives for CSR engagement, but their work neither 
focused on CSR outcomes nor looked at inter-organisational settings. Table 3.1 
contains an overview of the various levels at which CSR failure might be explained. 
                                                          
1 We acknowledge that stakeholder CSR expectations and CSR practices do not exist independently 
from each other, but this is not the focus of the paper and is dealt with elsewhere (Bansal & Clelland, 
2004; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Waddock et al., 2002). We also acknowledge that at a measurement 
level CSR failure may be decomposed into likelihood and impact of failure. 
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At the individual level, explanations range from the agency perspective, where CSR 
is driven by managerial opportunism and perquisites in that managers engage in CSR 
initiatives to further their private benefits, sometimes at the expense of shareholders 
and other stakeholders’ interests (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, & Snyder, 2003; 
Petrenko et al., 2015), to the responsible leadership literature which argues that 
managers’ good intentions and moral choices influence firms’ CSR initiatives and 
thereby points to the positive effects of managerial attention. Doh and Quigley (2014, 
p.270) argue that leaders “who take an open and inclusive approach to understanding 
and incorporating the views of a diverse set of stakeholders into executive decision 
making may have a positive impact”. This also alludes to the fact that decisions 
concerning CSR are often taken at a supra individual, yet sub organisational level, i.e. 
by groups of people. 
At the organisational level, research on the antecedents of CSR perspectives 
has emphasized the importance of characteristics such as organisational size and 
capabilities in shaping CSR strategy (Aragón-Correa, Matı́as-Reche & Senise-Barrio, 
2004; Udayasankar, 2008). Overall, evidence suggests that larger and better endowed 
firms invest more in CSR than smaller, resource poor firms (Mcwilliams & Siegel, 
2001; Udayasankar, 2008). Formal adoption and implementation of CSR is shaped by 
the values – strategic and instrumental driven motives vs moral, ethical, and altruistic 
driven motives – espoused by the organisation (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; 
Christensen, Mackey, & Whetten, 2014), as well as the value it puts on pursuing CSR 
(Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2001; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). As a result, some 
firms become involved in CSR because of genuine concerns about social issues, while 
others are driven by economic gains, or simultaneous economic and social gains. At 
the supra-organisational level, industry is a key determinant of CSR because the nature 
of a firm’s industry has a significant bearing on CSR activities (Maloni & Brown, 
2006; Wanderley, Lucian, Farache, & De Sousa Filho, 2008). As noted, while we 
acknowledge these effects at other levels, they are not our central concern. 
 What Table 3.1 clarifies is that with outsourcing, with offshoring, and 
particularly with offshore outsourcing, additional challenges to align the expectations 
of the various stakeholders emerge. When firms outsource an activity, desired CSR 
outcomes need to be achieved within the IOR. When firms offshore an activity, desired 
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CSR outcomes need to be achieved across geographical borders. And when firms 
offshore outsource an activity, the central scenario in our paper, both challenges are in 
play simultaneously. However, the growing body of literature on outsourcing and 
offshoring has not really considered CSR challenges but instead focused on the choice 
of ownership and location choices, in a theory of the firm sense, and on the 
performance implications of different ownership and location choices (Contractor, 
Kumar, Kundu, & Pedersen, 2010; Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2009; Mudambi & 
Venzin, 2010).  
Table 3.1. Levels of explanations for CSR failure under different governance modes 
(the central explanations applied in this paper are in bold). 
 
Location 
Domestic Offshore 
 
 
 
 
Ownership 
Insourcing  Individual  
Group  
Firm  
Industry 
 
Individual 
Group  
Firm 
Industry 
Institutional Level 
 
Outsourcing Individual 
Group 
Firm 
Industry 
Inter-organisational 
Level 
 
 
Individual 
Group 
Firm 
Industry 
Inter-organisational 
Level 
Institutional Level 
 
 
 
Consistent with the literature (Bertrand & Mol, 2013) we define outsourcing 
as the procurement of inputs by a buyer firm from an independent supplier firm and 
offshoring as the procurement of inputs from another country. Offshore outsourcing 
combines both, i.e. it refers to the procurement of inputs by a buyer firm from an 
independent supplier firm based in another country. Outsourcing and offshoring 
constitute separate, yet related decisions (Mudambi & Venzin, 2010), and are 
especially driven by profound institutional and technological change (Mol, 2007). 
Extant literature has attempted to explain under what conditions offshoring and 
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outsourcing take place and has suggested various conditions at activity, firm, and 
industry levels (e.g. Lewin et al., 2009). Furthermore, scholars have studied the 
(performance) outcomes associated with different ownership and location choices, for 
instance in terms of product characteristics (Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002) and 
innovation outcomes (Bertrand & Mol, 2013). CSR has featured infrequently in this 
literature, but additional complications in managing CSR may be interpreted as one 
form of what have been called the ‘hidden costs’ of offshoring and outsourcing 
strategies (e.g. Larsen, Manning, & Pedersen, 2013). 
3.3.1. Inter-organisational Relationships and CSR 
There is a small but growing research stream on CSR in vertical inter-firm 
relationships. The adoption of CSR in supply chains, often labeled as upstream CSR, 
has a relatively short history of at most 30 years (Maloni & Brown, 2006), in 
conjunction with increasing stakeholder pressures arising partly from upstream CSR 
scandals in developing countries (Schrempf, 2012; Tan, 2009). An increasing number 
of European and US firms have established codes of conduct and enforced supplier 
compliance (Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001; Waddock et al., 2002). However, enforcing 
these codes in practice is challenging (Meyer, 2005), chiefly because stronger 
principles and sanctions do not necessarily lead to more compliance by suppliers (Kolk, 
2003). The level of compliance may be dependent on IOR characteristics: the 
direction/ degree of dependence and the level of cooperation in the relationship.  
 Cooperation, especially based on trust, is considered to be one of the most vital 
factors in achieving performance improvement in IORs (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Li et al., 
2010; Zhou & Xu, 2012). Trust can complement formal contracts and controls (Ertug 
et al., 2013; Fryxell et al., 2002; Luo, 2007). To be specific, trust discourages 
opportunistic behaviour of parties in a relationship and reduces transaction costs 
necessitated by monitoring (Gong, Shenkar, Luo, & Nyaw, 2007). In this sense 
nurturing trust-based cooperative relationships is a means to enhance CSR 
performance in inter-firm relationships in supply chains (Gold et al., 2010). The parties 
in a cooperative relationship are based in mutual dependence, and with the prospect 
of a long-term relationship, they jointly set goals and a supplier will make adjustments 
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in their practices while a buyer will actively engage in providing necessary supports 
in order to address issues along the way (Hoejmose et al., 2013).  
Yet, parties involved in a relationship may have different levels of dependence 
on the relationship, and resource dependence theory suggests an inverse relationship 
between dependence and power (Provan & Gassenheimer, 1994). When power is 
unevenly distributed in a relationship because of the disparity of dependence, the party 
holding more power is likely to exert it. When the more powerful party is a buyer, the 
higher level of compliance from its supplier is expected (Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 
2009). However, suppliers, especially those in developing economies, generally lack 
the motivation and incentives to conform because of limited pressure from their 
own/local stakeholders and the high costs associated with complying with a buyer’s 
code of conduct (Ciliberti et al., 2011). Strong sanctions, such as the threat of 
relationship exit, may produce unintended counterproductive consequences by, for 
instance, inducing suppliers to deceive the buyer, by inter alia, concealing misconduct 
(Baden, Harwood, & Woodward, 2009; Egels-Zandén, 2014; Plambeck & Taylor, 
2015). Moreover, if a buyer accounts for just a small proportion of supplier sales, it 
may lack the power to enforce implementation (Pedersen & Andersen, 2006). Below 
we build on these findings further to investigate the effects of inter-organisational 
differences in stakeholder pressures, inter-organisational cooperation and inter-
organisational dependence. 
3.3.2. Country Institutions and CSR 
At the country level, differences in institutional contexts are crucial. Institutional 
factors, the stable “collections of rules and routines that define actions” (March & 
Olsen, 1989, p.160), are also important in determining the level and type of CSR 
activities (Campbell, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008, p.407). Campbell (2007) posits 
that institutional contexts, in terms of both formal institutions and informal institutions 
such as culture, create socially accepted paradigms of CSR. That is, an institutional 
context characterized by strong advocacy for CSR, dominance of normative values 
supporting CSR, and a stringent regulatory framework can create the necessary 
incentives for strong CSR engagement. This explains why CSR has been treated as a 
“fringe issue” in institutionally weak contexts (Gill et al., 2008) and equally why most 
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well-known examples of CSR failure involve developed country buyers and emerging 
or developing country suppliers.2  
From an institutional perspective, firms engage in CSR to obtain external 
legitimacy. Hoffman (1999) shows that CSR practices develop through “institutional 
arrangements that govern industry and social actions” and are diffused through the 
interactions of firms in organisational fields. Matten and Moon (2008, p.409) advocate 
that depending on the institutional context, firms may choose implicit CSR where 
mandatory norms, values, and rules are expected, or explicit CSR where discretionary 
and voluntarily practices are enacted. Given the relatively stable path-dependent 
evolution of the national institutional factors that determine CSR, it becomes 
challenging to implement CSR when offshoring activities. 
Firms that operate in multiple institutional contexts are exposed to a multitude 
of competing and conflicting institutional demands (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Marano & Kostova, 2015). Brammer, Pavelin, and Porter 
(2006) highlight the complexity of undertaking CSR activities across institutional 
contexts because of differences in CSR expectations, which subsequently also lead to 
differences in countries’ willingness and capacity to tolerate aspects of corporate 
social irresponsibility (Christmann & Taylor, 2001).  
The basic premise of this body of literature is that for firms to gain external 
legitimacy abroad and avoid CSR failure they need to confront host country social 
issues and think beyond domestic institutional boundaries. Still, several studies (c.f. 
Aguilera-Caracuel, Aragón-Correa, & Hurtado-Torres, 2012) have noted that, partly 
under pressure from powerful home stakeholders, firms often transplant CSR practices 
within their internal network without paying due attention to local peculiarities. For 
example, firms may not pay attention to health and safety standards because they are 
covered by a stringent legal framework at home, even though host country laws are 
inexistent or not enforced (Dasgupta, Hettige, & Wheeler, 2000). Furthermore, 
transferring and implementing CSR practices across borders is arduous and costly 
                                                          
2 We note that the framework we develop below applies equally to the reverse context – it is merely of 
lesser practical importance under such circumstances. 
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(Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2012). Below we discuss how institutional differences affect 
CSR failure. 
3.4. Explaining CSR Failure  
Before proceeding to discuss factors that help predict CSR failure, it is important to 
clarify the process through which such organisational problems emerge and are 
managed. Following Sethi (1979), we suggest a straightforward three stage model 
consisting of 1) the pre-problem stage, when discrepancies between stakeholder CSR 
expectations and CSR practices arise, 2) the problem identification stage, when 
misalignment between CSR expectations and CSR practices is identified, and 3) the 
problem management stage, when actions are taken to alter CSR practices and/or to 
manage stakeholder CSR expectations. These phases occur in 
chronological/sequential order, i.e. problem management is only possible if a problem 
has been identified, and problem identification can only happen if the pre-problem 
stage leads to the emergence of problems, but after the initial start the process can 
become recursive; better problem management may for instance require that the 
problem be identified in more detail. 
In the pre-problem stage there is some existing set of stakeholder expectations. 
There are also strategic cognitions through which firms make sense of and understand 
these stakeholder expectations. The organisation creates practices based on this 
cognition (Bundy et al., 2012) but cognitions are biased and this can be problematic. 
For instance, Pegatron may increase the number of working hours in response to 
increased demand from its buyer (Apple), but not realize that the new number is 
inconsistent with buyer stakeholder expectations. When this realization comes about 
problem identification starts. In our example Apple may realize that the supplier 
requests its employees to work more hours than is deemed acceptable. Any action 
taken to tackle this problem falls under the phase of problem management, the third 
stage. In this example a drastic solution would be for Apple to require Pegatron to 
lower its number of hours worked, or face the sanction of relationship termination.  
Table 3.2 introduces the underlying mechanisms and the predictions they 
provide about our research question which are developed in detail below, while Figure 
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3.1 contains a graphical portrayal of the propositions. We first consider predictions of 
direct effects, before exploring cross-level moderating effects. 
Table 3.2. Levels used, key assumptions, implications and predictions. 
 Inter-organisational level Country level 
Mechanism Interfirm 
differences 
Cooperative 
relationships 
Inter-
organisational 
dependence 
Country 
institutions 
Key 
assumptions 
Both 
organisations 
seek to act in 
accordance 
with their 
respective 
stakeholder 
expectations 
Cooperative 
relationships can 
produce mutual 
benefits 
Organisations 
depend on other 
organisations for 
critical resources 
Formal and 
informal 
institutions 
affect 
organisational 
practices 
Key 
implications 
CSR 
practices 
differ 
between the 
two 
organisation  
Cooperative 
relationships likely 
to help with CSR 
problems 
Dependence on 
other party affects 
willingness to act 
Institutional 
distance leads 
to differing 
CSR practices 
Direct 
predictions 
Differences 
in 
stakeholder 
expectations 
increase 
CSR failure 
(P1) 
Cooperative 
relationship 
decreases CSR 
failure (P2) 
Extent of 
dependence on the 
other party by 
organisation facing 
lowest CSR 
expectations 
decreases CSR 
failure (P3) 
Institutional 
distance 
increases CSR 
failure (P4) 
Moderation 
predictions 
  Cooperative 
relationship 
negatively 
moderates 
relationship 
between inter-
organisational 
differences (P5a) / 
institutional 
distance (P5b) and 
failure 
Inter-
organisational 
dependence 
positively 
moderates 
relationship 
between inter-
organisational 
differences (P6a) / 
institutional 
distance (P6b) and 
failure 
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Figure 3.1. An overview of the conceptual framework 
 
 
3.4.1. Outsourcing Context: Inter-organisational Differences and Inter-
organisational Relationships 
Extending the analysis to the inter-organisational level brings in two new effects: 
organisational differences and governance. Buyer and supplier firms face different 
CSR expectations because their internal and external contexts vary. At the pre-
problem stage, discrepancies in CSR practices between the firms are likely to exist 
since both firms individually seek to meet the demands of their respective stakeholders 
through their practices to minimize CSR failure. Such differences may be quantitative 
in nature, when expectations vary in stringency, or qualitative, when expectations 
focus on different CSR priority areas. On the basis of anecdotal evidence, and in view 
of the literature, we argue that cases where buyer CSR expectations exceed those of 
the supplier are more plentiful, but in principle the reverse is possible too. 
Such incompatibility in CSR practices and expectations between the buyer 
and supplier is hard to identify because problem identification requires meticulous 
monitoring across organisational boundaries, which increases transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1985). For Apple the inability to keep track of actual supplier CSR 
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practices is an important part of the problem. Even when problems are identified, 
managing the problems are also expected to be challenging since CSR orientations are 
typically path-dependent and cannot easily be altered (Yuan et al., 2011). In other 
words, gaps between the buyer and supplier are hard to overcome. Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 1: The larger the gap between buyer stakeholder CSR expectations 
and supplier stakeholder CSR expectations, the more CSR failure will be 
observed. 
Furthermore, we suggest that there is a second set of effects that emerges in an 
outsourcing context that relates to the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship. As 
observed by Luhmann (1979), actors may cooperate because of alignment of 
incentives and/or trust. Alternatively they may be coerced into action by another actor 
when they are highly dependent on them because they fear the possible consequences 
(Luhmann, 1979). This suggests two alternative mechanisms that help to reduce CSR 
failure in an outsourcing context, inter-organisational cooperation and inter-
organisational dependence. 
 The characteristics of cooperative relationships include among others mutual 
trust, information exchange, and joint goal setting (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995). 
These characteristics offer a wealth of possibilities for reducing CSR failure in 
outsourcing. Through joint goal setting, parties are more likely to work towards CSR 
objectives that are agreeable to both stakeholder sets (Hoejmose et al., 2013), thus 
preventing failure in the pre-problem stage; Frenkel and Scott (2002) find such a 
premium for goal sharing between Adidas and its suppliers. Regular information 
exchange will help to identify problems at an early stage (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). 
Mutual trust increases the willingness of the buyer and supplier to manage new 
problems (Heide & Miner, 1992) and implies that stakeholders are more likely to find 
a chosen course of action agreeable. When a relationship is extended and reiterated 
based on an agreed will to enhance CSR performance, the actual practices may even 
develop in an innovative way instead of simply meeting codes of conduct (Frenkel & 
Scott, 2002).  
Dependence works in a fundamentally different way from cooperation, 
although we argue that it too helps to reduce CSR failure. Dependence on the other 
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party creates the fear that the latter may exit the relationship (Hirschmann, 1970; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Such fear will increase urgency and effort to align CSR 
practices more closely with the other organisation’s stakeholder CSR expectations. 
Again, empirically dependence of the supplier on the buyer is more prevalent than vice 
versa, although we acknowledge that there are an increasing number of cases where 
suppliers are equipped with higher leverage over buyers (Locke et al., 2009). Regular 
audits in buyer-supplier relationships are one means through which compliance is 
sought (Ciliberti et al., 2011). In the pre-problem stage strong dependence and the 
associated fear of relationship exit will lead to efforts to show compliance with CSR 
and other metrics in an audit. On top of the efforts made by the dependent supplier, in 
an outsourcing relationship, the buyer and supplier are already under the influence of 
the same national institutions, fewer critical problems are likely to emerge and be 
identified. In the problem management stage, fear of partner exit will again prompt 
the dependent organisation to pursue actions to improve existing and create new CSR 
practices. Thus we propose: 
Proposition 2: The more cooperative a buyer-supplier relationship is, the less 
CSR failure will be observed. 
Proposition 3: The more dependent the organisation facing the lowest CSR 
expectations is on the other organisation in a relationship, the less CSR failure 
will be observed. 
3.4.2. Offshoring Context: Institutional Distance 
Moving to the country level, the literature has discussed at length how national 
differences in institutions can produce problems with obtaining desired CSR outcomes 
(Marano & Kostova, 2015; Surroca, Tribó, & Zahra, 2013) and we therefore focus on 
institutional conditions that affect CSR (Campbell, 2007). Institutions may refer to 
informal institutions, such as national culture, and formal institutions, like property 
rights and labour laws. Given that the extent to which formal institutions are 
implemented effectively varies significantly, especially in emerging countries, we 
further note that the relevant measure is the de facto, not the de jure, institution. 
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Differences in institutional conditions can be measured by institutional 
distance, i.e. the degree of institutional (dis)similarity between two countries (Berry et 
al., 2010; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). As with inter-firm CSR differences, institutional 
distance may refer to quantitative differences and in many instances (as with Apple), 
the host (offshore) country has weaker institutions than the home (onshore) country. 
Institutional arbitrage, i.e. the profiting from weaker host institutions, can be a driver 
behind offshoring decisions (Surroca et al., 2013). But there can also be qualitative 
differences in institutions in terms of their focus, e.g. the relative importance of the 
natural environment vis-à-vis labour standards.  
 Institutional distance therefore produces discrepancies between CSR 
expectations that are formed onshore and CSR practices that emerge offshore. In the 
pre-problem stage, institutional distance negatively affects the ability on the offshore 
side to fully understand onshore stakeholders’ CSR expectations (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). Problem identification is hampered under conditions of institutional distance 
because of varying definitions of what actually even constitutes a CSR problem 
(Surroca et al., 2013). Similarly, problem management is more complicated since it is 
unclear what rule set to apply when solving CSR problems. Even if the onshore firm 
decides to push through certain practices to manage the CSR problem, institutional 
distance is likely to limit the ability and motivation on the offshore side to assimilate 
those practices. As suggested by the institutional literature, the larger the distance the 
smaller the scope and rate of knowledge transfer (Marano & Kostova, 2016). We 
therefore suggest: 
Proposition 4: The larger the distance between institutions in the onshore 
country and the offshore country, the more CSR failure will be observed. 
We now proceed to look at moderating effects. This raises a key question, namely, 
which of the variable sets is most suitable as the moderator, and by extension, which 
effect is being moderated? In principle, it is as plausible to imagine that institutional 
distance moderates the effect of IORs on CSR failure, as it is to imagine that IORs 
moderate the effect of institutional distance on CSR failure. Moreover, from an 
econometric point of view it is irrelevant which of the variable sets the moderator is. 
However, conceptually it is of course an extremely relevant decision. In our 
conceptual framework, we propose that institutional distance and inter-organisational 
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differences are moderated by IORs in consideration of strategic decisions on offshore 
outsourcing in practice. In offshore outsourcing decisions in general, suppliers and 
countries are selected mainly for economic and performance related reasons (Bertrand 
& Mol, 2013; Javalgi et al., 2009; Maskell et al., 2007) often without the concerns 
about potential CSR issues. Hence, institutional distance and inter-organisational 
differences are given conditions to firms in managing CSR issues while dependence 
and cooperation are governance issues that can be strategically managed later on. 
3.4.3. Offshore Outsourcing Context I: Cooperation and Inter-organisational and 
Institutional Differences 
While inter-organisational differences in stakeholder CSR expectations increase the 
likelihood of CSR failure when offshore outsourcing, establishing and maintaining a 
cooperative buyer-supplier relationship may help to moderate the relationship between 
inter-organisational differences and CSR failure. Mutual trust, reciprocity, 
information exchange, and joint goal setting will be valuable tools during various 
stages and cooperative relationships are particularly useful when partner firms face 
complex tasks (Dyer & Singh, 1998), of which preventing CSR failure when 
stakeholder expectations differ greatly is surely an example. During the pre-problem 
stage, information exchange enables organisations to bridge gaps through creating an 
understanding of existing differences, and such effective and faster identification of 
inter-organisational differences reduces the magnitude of problems and decreases the 
likelihood of further escalation. Based on the mutual understandings of the differences, 
joint goal setting helps to bring CSR practices closer together during the pre-problem 
stage, helping to reduce failure. During the problem identification stage, more frequent 
and honest information exchange between buyer and supplier is beneficial as it enables 
early identification of issues before stakeholders identify them. When managing 
problems both mutual trust and reciprocity are required, particularly if the buyer and 
supplier firms want to overcome large gaps in CSR expectations. Apple, for instance, 
would value being able to rely on Pegatron to handle labour practices in accordance 
with Apple’s stakeholder demands, while Pegatron would in return like to see Apple 
reward it with continued business when it has made an effort to do so. 
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Related arguments pertain to the relationship between institutional distance 
and CSR failure, which we suggest is also moderated by cooperative relationships. 
Due to the weak institutions that do not secure enforcement of and compliance with 
written agreements or codes of conduct, developing cooperative relationships is an 
effective way to prevent opportunistic behaviour among suppliers (Zhou & Xu, 2012). 
During the pre-problem stage in a cooperative relationship, information exchange 
between partners will help to generate insights into what de facto institutional 
differences exist between the onshore and offshore countries. The joint setting of goals 
will also elucidate any such differences. Continuous information exchange will help 
during problem identification because the onshore and offshore managers share some 
of the institutional conditions they operate under, and particularly explain the effects 
these conditions have on CSR practices. In the problem management stage mutual 
trust and reciprocity serve to support efforts to work with and around institutional 
differences by increasing belief that the onshore and offshore partners can handle these 
differences and the creation of incentives to do so. Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 5a: A cooperative buyer-supplier relationship negatively moderates 
the relationship between the buyer-supplier stakeholder expectations gap and 
CSR failure. 
Proposition 5b: A cooperative buyer-supplier relationship negatively moderates 
the relationship between institutional distance and CSR failure. 
3.4.4. Offshore Outsourcing Context II: Inter-organisational Dependence and 
Inter-organisational and Institutional Differences 
We also propose that inter-organisational dependence moderates the effect of inter-
organisational differences on CSR failure, but here the direction of the moderation is 
the opposite, especially where the dependent party is the supplier, who is expected to 
enact the CSR practices. We suggest that when inter-organisational differences are 
particularly stark as can be frequently observed in offshore outsourcing relationships, 
the more dependent the supplier is on the offshore outsourcing relationship, it will 
become more likely to engage in window dressing (Egels-Zandén, 2014) because the 
benefits of doing so increase, while the costs (exit or milder sanctions) are still broadly 
the same. In the pre-problem stage requisite practices are therefore less likely to have 
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been put into place. Furthermore in the problem identification stage stakeholders are 
more likely to scrutinize relationships where the stakeholder CSR gap with the other 
organisation is greater (Robertson, Lamin, & Livanis, 2010) while the effort of holding 
information back hinders the buyer from locating and managing the issues beforehand. 
CSR failure is therefore a more likely result in this instance.  
Moreover, we argue that this same mechanism also applies to differences in 
national institutions. With institutional distance, the higher dependence is likely to 
lead to more window dressing as the costs of compliance increase, the benefits of 
window dressing increase, and close monitoring is less viable due to physical distance. 
In detail, offshore CSR practices will differ more from onshore CSR expectations such 
that it requires more costs and efforts to take CSR practices up to the desired level. 
For a supplier that is relatively less dependent on the relationships will rather find an 
alternative buyer that requires less stringent rules and codes (Locke et al., 2009) while 
a dependent supplier will be desperate and tempted to find a less expensive way to 
maintain the relationship. And developing mechanisms to deceive becomes rather 
cheaper (Egels-Zandén, 2014; Jiang, 2009). The dependence mechanism that 
decreases CSR failure in a simpler context of outsourcing ceases to be fully effective 
under these circumstances. In the pre-problem stage, there exist issues and potential 
problems mainly due to institutional distance and lack of compliance. In the problem 
identification stage, the issues and latent problems are hidden intentionally from 
buyer’s monitoring and scrutiny, and which takes away the chance to manage 
problems in due course and increases the likelihood of further escalation of the 
problems. In addition, it gives more motives for the supplier to hide further 
information and fewer motives to improve practices (Egels-Zandén, 2014). We would 
suggest these two effects might hold the real clue for explaining Apple’s continuing 
CSR struggles. Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 6a: Dependence by the organisation facing the lowest CSR 
expectations on the other organisation in a relationship positively moderates the 
relationship between the buyer-supplier stakeholder expectations gap and CSR 
failure. 
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Proposition 6b: Dependence by the organisation facing the lowest CSR 
expectations on the other organisation in a relationship positively moderates the 
relationship between institutional distance and CSR failure.  
3.5. Discussion  
We have investigated what explains CSR failure under different ownership and 
location arrangements, offshore outsourcing being the most complex of these. We 
proposed a framework that suggests multiple factors influence CSR failure: inter-
organisational differences in stakeholder CSR expectations, buyer-supplier 
cooperation, and inter-organisational dependence matter only when outsourcing; 
national institutional distance matters only when offshoring; and by extension under 
offshore outsourcing both come into play. We argue these factors cannot be considered 
in isolation because of important cross-level effects. We specifically proposed that 
cooperative buyer-supplier relationships and inter-organisational dependence 
moderate the negative effects of the stakeholder CSR expectations gap and of 
institutional distance on CSR failure. 
As with any theoretical framework, ours is bounded in a number of ways. We 
deliberately focused only on inter-organisational and institutional aspects, ignoring 
other levels. For instance, is any kind of managerial attention, such as focused 
attention and sustained attention, equally valuable or do different types of attention 
pay off more than others? Are formal or informal institutional differences equally 
relevant to understanding CSR failure? How do institutional differences within 
countries matter? We encourage future work to take up such questions. 
We have also placed outside the scope of the paper the nature of the 
relationship between CSR expectations and CSR practices. Over time expectations 
and practices mutually affect each other (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Waddock et al., 
2002). A previous failure may lead stakeholders to have lower expectations of CSR 
practices, but it could equally harden stakeholder views and put organisations under 
more scrutiny, as has been the case for Apple. Cooperative relationships, the active 
driver of positive change in our model, will be informed by prior history. 
Moreover, our paper places much emphasis on the additional complications 
that arise when operating under outsourcing, offshoring or offshore outsourcing. But 
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stakeholder CSR expectations could be lowered for those more complicated contexts, 
i.e. if Apple was to produce its iPhones internally in the United States expectations on 
CSR practices could be even higher. If this is the case, then whether there is more CSR 
failure under more complicated governance modes is very much an empirical question, 
which theory of the firm scholars could tackle conjointly with those interested in CSR. 
 On a final note, we remain agnostic about the reasons why organisations fail 
at any one stage. Nevertheless, it matters to stakeholder perceptions whether a problem 
emerges due to cognitive or other limitations or because decision-makers deliberately 
decide to ignore it. In other words, our current model is naïve about the intentions of 
actors. We see this intentionality as another area for future conceptual and empirical 
work. 
3.6. Contributions and Implications  
We believe that the current paper produces important insights for multiple literatures. 
The CSR literature, rich as it is on discussion on the antecedents, nature of CSR and 
its performance impact, has hitherto not considered CSR outcomes under different 
ownership and location choices. Our focus on offshoring and outsourcing highlights 
that a simple organisational level model, even one that additionally includes the role 
of individual managers (McWilliams et al., 2006), does not sufficiently explain what 
shapes CSR outcomes in an age of modular and global supply chains.  
 Further novelty emerges from the emphasis we place on failure in CSR, rather 
than CSR performance more broadly. We formally defined CSR failure as a firm 
conduct that does not meet stakeholders’ expectations. In our view, existing literature 
places too much emphasis on discussing how firms try to optimize their CSR 
performance, when most are satisfied with merely preventing CSR failure. 
Notwithstanding this observation, the framework proposed here may offer some 
explanatory value for CSR performance as an outcome variable. 
From an offshoring and outsourcing perspective, we add to the literature by 
looking at a very different kind of outcome from customary financial, activity level or 
innovation outcomes. This helps to better understand the trade-offs firms face when 
undertaking offshore outsourcing: offshore outsourcing may improve costs (Javalgi et 
  
71 
 
al., 2009) and perhaps even innovation levels for the buyer firm (Bertrand & Mol, 
2013), but it also poses complications with CSR. These should be interpreted as one 
form of hidden costs of outsourcing and offshoring (Larsen et al., 2013). Furthermore 
the focus of our work shifts attention away from what happens during initial offshoring 
and outsourcing decisions towards the dynamics of ongoing offshoring and 
outsourcing relationships, in line with calls for a greater focus on the nature and impact 
of organisational processes in the offshoring and outsourcing literature (Bidwell, 2012; 
Jensen, 2012).  
Finally, our work serves to illustrate the important interactions between 
country level institutions and inter-organisational relations. Relations with foreign 
subsidiaries indeed affect CSR and legitimacy (e.g. Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), but we 
propose there is now a need to increase understanding of these issues across 
organisational boundaries. Given that our framework is relatively complex, we hope 
it can serve as an exemplar of theorizing efforts and empirical testing on this 
intersection between countries and inter-organisational relations. 
 Although the nature of the phenomenon and our framework may complicate 
efforts to test all propositions forwarded here we believe there are several empirical 
research designs that could produce fruitful insights. One way to test formally the 
propositions would be through undertaking a large-scale data collection effort in a 
single industry where all ownership and location choices are present, for instance the 
garments industry. Any effort to look at CSR failure empirically will have to account 
for the fact that some minimal gap between CSR expectations and practices will be 
acceptable, i.e. such studies will have to apply a threshold level for determining when 
gaps become failures. A cross-firm survey could be one way to measure CSR failure 
but there are also existing measures of ‘CSR success’ (e.g. Marano & Kostova, 2015). 
An alternative CSR failure measure could be found in (social) media mentions with 
negative CSR connotations. Firm level stakeholder expectations can be measured 
through survey methods (Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever, 1999) or by constructing 
proxies (based on firm size, visibility and so on). Inter-organisational dependence and 
cooperation measures can only properly be obtained through survey measures, 
interviews or participant observation. By contrast measures of institutional distance 
are widely available from secondary sources (e.g., Berry et al., 2010). A case study of 
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a single firm which undertakes concurrent sourcing (Parmigiani, 2007), i.e. it makes 
and buys the same product, as well as using both onshore and offshore sourcing, could 
offer unique insights into how such a firm approaches CSR practices differently, 
depending on the ownership and location choices, and how this then translates into 
CSR failure. Such cases may be relatively rare, but less so if the constraint about all 
modes occurring simultaneously is relaxed. Furthermore, those additional cases, of 
firms that have switched choices over time, offer interesting natural experiments in 
their own right. 
 From a practitioner point of view, although this is a paper about CSR failure, 
our message is mostly an optimistic one. We started by arguing that most organisations 
get CSR right most of the time. Furthermore, our paper sketched a number of 
mechanisms that organisations avail of to try and minimize CSR failure. In particular, 
they can choose to develop cooperative relationships with suppliers, which helps to 
lessen the negative effects of inter-organisational and cross-national differences on 
CSR failure.  
Under outsourcing firms can also decide to engage in lopsided relationships, 
where the other party is highly dependent on the firm, or increase dependency in 
existing relationships. But as we noted this is a double-edged sword; while dependence 
may make the other firm run harder to try and comply, it also increases the odds that 
the other party will engage in window dressing rather than actually complying when 
inter-organisational or institutional differences are large that compliance becomes too 
costly. Managing this trade-off well is one of the hardest challenges in CSR. We 
suggest that firms must restrain themselves from exploiting the dependence other 
firms have on them.   
3.7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we studied what determines failures in CSR, looking particularly at IORs 
and institutional distance. This is a topic of increasing practical importance, given the 
struggles of firms such as Apple to meet stakeholder CSR expectations, and one that 
requires us to develop more sophisticated academic theories of how these 
organisations approach this issue. We hope the present paper presents some steps in 
this direction. 
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Chapter 4 PAPER 2 
STAYING ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE LINE: WHAT DETERMINES 
MEDIA REPORTING OF OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING RELATED 
CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY 
 
Abstract 
Amid heightened concern over corporate scandals, we investigate what leads to firms 
being reported by the media for corporate social irresponsibility in their offshore 
outsourcing operations, drawing insights from the attention-based view. We extend 
the attention-based view by distinguishing between breadth (multiple types) and depth 
(extent) of attention, and propose that while depth of organisational attention allocated 
to corporate social responsibility issues in offshore outsourcing has a negative effect 
on media reporting, breadth actually has a positive effect. Furthermore, these effects 
are strengthened when firms are highly visible or have a history of prior media 
attention. The findings broadly support this proposed framework although the findings 
from our interaction terms suggest that both depth and breadth of attention can 
effectively buffer later media reporting for firms with prior media reporting. The 
antagonistic interaction between broad attention and prior media reporting implies that 
more broad attention can be beneficial to the firms with prior media reporting whereas 
it has a detrimental effect on firms without previous reputational crisis. 
Keywords: CSiR, CSR, offshoring, outsourcing, attention-based view 
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4.1. Introduction 
In today’s world of short but intense cycles of (social) media reporting, there is an 
ever-increasing chance firms will be singled out for (purported) wrongdoing. This was 
evident when the Rana Plaza factory collapsed in Bangladesh, leading to the death of 
more than 1,100 garment workers (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015), or when there was 
a series of suicides by workers at Apple’s supplier Foxconn in China (Xu & Li, 2013). 
Such media reporting then typically results in stakeholders, including shareholders, 
querying top management about these cases. This implies that managers are under 
significant pressure to pay attention in order to avoid incidences of corporate social 
irresponsibility (CSiR). 
In parallel a significant body of literature has developed on the topic of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in general (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & 
Ganapathi, 2007; Carroll, 1999; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2001; Wartick & Cochran, 
1985; Wood, 1991), and CSiR in particular (Lange & Washburn, 2012; Surroca et al., 
2013). We know, for instance, that CSR practices are affected by institutions and 
stakeholders (Campbell, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008; Wood & Jones, 1995), but also 
determined by firms’ internal resources and motivations (Amaeshi et al., 2016; 
Swanson, 2008).  
What is less clearly understood is the mechanism through which these internal 
and external factors are interpreted and turned into performance outcomes. The 
attention-based view (ABV) has been used in strategic management for its power to  
explain firm decision makings, strategic moves and performance outcomes in 
consideration of internal drivers and external stimuli (e.g. Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; 
Surroca, Prior, & Tribo, 2016; Yadav, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2007), but its application 
has not yet been used for understanding CSR related decisions and outcomes, except 
for few exceptions (e.g. Durand & Jacqueminet, 2015). Therefore, the attention-based 
view (Ocasio, 1997) provides a theoretical framework for linking antecedents and 
CSR outcomes through the attention organisations give to CSR failure.  
CSR in offshore outsourcing provides a good context to test and expand the 
ABV, considering the complicated nature of the issue itself. Firms engaged in offshore 
outsourcing have to simultaneously deal with institutional distance to and 
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organisational differences from overseas outside suppliers. At the same time offshore 
outsourcing, and particularly CSR outcomes from offshore outsourcing, form only a 
small part of the overall agenda of top management teams, and it is therefore easy for 
those teams to pay less attention to the issue than is required. Yet media attention is 
one of the strongest external stimuli for activating organisational attention (Hoffman 
& Ocasio, 2001; Ocasio, 2011). Thus, we aim to explicate whether and how attention 
can be used to overcome potentially damaging media attention towards CSiR.  
CSiR exposure can harm a firm’s reputation immediately, severely, and 
potentially permanently (Coombs, 2004; Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). The media 
are capable of affecting judgments and perceptions of stakeholders (Zyglidopoulos et 
al., 2012) and provoking retaliatory/punitive actions, such as boycotts (Alexander, 
2015; Braunsberger & Buckler, 2011; Grappi, Romani, & Bagozzi, 2013). Empirical 
evidence shows significantly negative stock market reactions to firms with publicized 
CSiR in offshore outsourcing operations (Rock, 2003). As such, it seems that negative 
media reporting is something companies seek to avoid. Yet, a question remains as to, 
why it is that some companies seem to attract far more media reporting than others. 
We observe that thus far the academic literature on this topic has insufficiently tackled 
the factors driving heightened media reporting on CSiR, nor has it studied firms’ 
efforts to avoid or minimize such reporting.  
In response to this lacuna, the central research question of our paper is what 
determines the level of media reporting on perceived corporate social irresponsibility 
originating from offshore outsourcing? In answering this question, our study looks 
into the effects of depth and breadth of organisational attention, as well as their 
interaction with a) the visibility of a firm, i.e. the general level of attention a firm 
attracts in the media, and b) prior media reporting on CSiR related to offshore 
outsourcing, i.e. whether the firm has a history of being looked at by the media. 
To underpin conceptually this investigation, we draw our mechanisms from 
the ABV of the firm. We then test these hypotheses using a very large database of 
media articles. Results suggest that broad (unfocused) organisational attention is 
positively associated with media reporting on CSiR, while deep (dedicated) 
organisational attention to CSR issues is negatively associated with media reports on 
CSiR. Finally, both depth and breadth of organisational attention and prior media 
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reporting show negative interaction effects with media reporting on CSiR from 
offshore outsourcing. That is, the positive relation between prior media reporting and 
later media reporting is negatively moderated by the depth and breadth of attention.  
This study makes numerous contributions to the literature. Firstly, we believe 
that we are the first to argue that attention does not just come in one ‘quantity’, but 
can and should be measured in terms of its breadth (how many categories of attention) 
and depth (how much attention). Furthermore, we show that effects of depth and 
breadth may differ. Second, we extend the ABV to a context where it has not been 
applied much, even though it would intuitively appear to be natural terrain for a theory 
that places managerial efforts at the heart of the analysis. Although the CSR literature 
has already discussed many external and internal factors that determine CSR strategies 
and performance outcomes, attention is a novel mechanism in this literature.    
4.2. Background 
The behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), particularly the branch on 
attention initiated by Ocasio (1997, 2011), suggests that organisations face a very wide 
range of issues (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) from which they must select only some 
to attend to because managerial attention is a scarce resource, perhaps the scarcest 
resource, of a firm. Ocasio (1997) refers to these competing issues as different foci of 
attention. Among competing agenda, some are selected to be attended to considering 
both internal and external conditions (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005).  
The internal conditions refer to available firm resources, distribution processes 
and decision making channels that include communications between top management 
and relevant managers at a lower level (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005; Ocasio, 1997). When 
attentional priorities of an organisation are usually set by top management, 
department-specific issues may travel from the bottom to the top (Barnett, 2008). 
Applying this to CSR, it should be noted that CSR is not necessarily on the top 
management agenda in many organisations (Doh, Lawton, Rajwani, & Paroutis, 2014).  
On the other hand, externalities are mostly the pressures and expectations from 
institutions and stakeholders (Carroll, 1979). And one of the most powerful external 
stimuli is what the media are interested in and highlight (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; 
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Ocasio, 2011). An increasing media attention to a certain issue increases public 
attention, and which in turn brings the issue to the attention of managers (Hoffman & 
Ocasio, 2001). CSiR in offshore outsourcing is potentially one such focus of attention. 
From Nike’s sweatshops to Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh, the media have 
persistently chased CSiR in offshore outsourcing operations. Accordingly, the issue 
cannot be easily neglected by the organisations that are immediately involved in such 
events and as a consequence experienced media and public attention (Cyert & March, 
1963; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). Firms that are not directly related but operating in the 
same industry are also likely to become attentive to the issue (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).  
We maintain that it is possible to distinguish between the breadth and depth of 
attention. In the management literature such a distinction between depth and breadth 
is very common in areas including knowledge and innovation (Leiponen & Helfat, 
2010) and internationalization (Kafouros, Buckley, & Clegg, 2012), and resource 
orchestration within firms (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011). Similar to these 
papers (e.g. Sirmon et al., 2011) we define breadth as the number of domains across 
which attention gets spread, while depth is defined as the amount of attention within 
a given domain.  
This is entirely consistent with the original conception of the ABV, particularly 
the notion of a structural distribution of attention, i.e. (Ocasio, 1997, p.191) “how the 
organisation distributes and controls the allocation of issues, answers, and decision-
makers within specific firm activities, communications, and procedures. According to 
this principle, attentional processes of individual and group decision-makers are 
distributed throughout the multiple functions that take place in organisations, with 
different foci of attention in each local procedure, communication, or activity. Each 
local activity within the firm involves a set of procedures and communications, and 
these procedures and communications focus the attention of decision-makers on a 
selected set of issues and answers”. 
Linking this to the context this paper, CSR demands on organisations are 
typically expressed across multiple domains and responding firm activities are 
undertaken across those domains. It is broadly understood that the most important of 
these domains are the environment, social, labour, human rights (Hoejmose & Adrien-
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Kirby, 2012; Waddock et al., 2002). Furthermore, it is widely recognized that avoiding 
CSiR is particularly challenging in offshore outsourcing. 
Offshore outsourcing we understand as a contract-based relationship between 
a buyer and an outside supplier located in another country (Bertrand & Mol, 2013; 
Contractor et al., 2010). Therefore some national institutional distance between the 
two firms exists, which can complicate matters when it comes to CSR (Doh, 2005; 
Midttun et al., 2007). CSR expectations vary depending on such institutions (Matten 
& Moon, 2008). Given that a significant driver of both offshoring (Lewin et al., 2009) 
and outsourcing (Kotabe, Mol, & Murray, 2008) is the desire to lower costs, buyer 
firms often seek out suppliers in emerging and developing countries where CSR 
expectations are lower, leading to misalignment in CSR practices. Practices that do 
not meet stakeholders expectation are considered to be irresponsible (Strike et al., 
2006). Moreover, stakeholders typically do not differentiate the locus of responsibility 
within a supply chain, and attribute blame to the buyer (Large & Thomsen, 2011). 
Additional challenges emerge from differing relationship characteristics. 
Buyer firms have limited control over the supplier’s practices, and there is information 
asymmetry (Ciliberti et al., 2011). Buyer firms may establish codes of conduct, 
execute periodic monitoring, and apply sanctions (Kolk & Van Tulder, 2002; Pedersen, 
2006), yet such practices have only limited effectiveness. Therefore, firms in this 
context need to pay close attention to CSR practices in order to avoid instances of 
CSiR. Again, increases in attention can come from branching out into further domains 
(breadth), or from more focused attention (depth). In general for firms to better manage 
CSR, attention needs to come from top management and be synchronized with other 
priorities (Doh et al., 2014). This by definition implies that limited resources will be 
allocated to CSR.  
Stakeholders acquire information on CSiR in offshore outsourcing 
relationships mainly from the media or NGO reports (Kendall, Gill, & Cheney, 2007). 
Particularly when the event occurs in far-flung locations, stakeholders will usually not 
have the insights to re-interpret the information as framed by the media (Mena et al., 
2016). As such the media play a significant role in forming stakeholders’ evaluations, 
opinions, and responses toward a firm (Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Mena et al., 2015).  
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By extension, the media can itself also be labelled as a stakeholder within the 
widely accepted definition of stakeholders as those who influence or are influenced by 
a firm (Freeman, 1984). Donaldson and Preston (1995) develop this concept further 
by categorizing stakeholders into “influencers” and “stakeholders” (p.86). While some 
constituents (e.g. investors) can be both, the media are categorized as influencers The 
media might have a weak direct influence on the firm, but the impact can be magnified 
through the media’s impact on other stakeholders (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & 
Shapiro, 2012). In this sense, the media are an “indicator of legitimacy” as they 
disseminate information and make it available through diverse platforms anytime, 
anywhere. Simultaneously, media outlets are also “sources of legitimation”, as they 
can frame facts using their own views and filters, to eventually influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p.56). In practice, the media only covers 
stories that are newsworthy, i.e. those stories that have demands and potential to attract 
readers (Grafström & Windell, 2011).  
4.3. Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
In developing our theory, we have two baseline expectations. The first of these is that 
highly visible firms are more likely to face media reporting on CSiR related to offshore 
outsourcing. The second is that media reporting in the previous year leads firms to be 
more likely to face media reporting on CSiR related to offshore outsourcing. 
Highly visible firms are more likely to face media reporting because larger and 
more visible firms have to deal with more pressing stakeholders (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). Pressures are particularly high for those firms doing well, owning strong 
resources and capabilities, operating in high impact industries, and thinking of 
themselves as exemplary socially responsible citizens (Barnett, 2014; Chiu & 
Sharfman, 2011). In a typical offshore outsourcing relationship a focal firm is in a 
developed country, while its supplier is based in a less developed country, and buyer 
firms are larger and more visible to stakeholders than suppliers, which means they face 
higher expectations and scrutiny (Stephen Brammer & Pavelin, 2004; Thorne,  
Mahoney, & Manetti, 2014; Zyglidopoulos, Georgiadis, Carroll, & Siegel, 2012). 
Buyers also typically operate in consumer-facing markets, while suppliers are in 
business-to-business markets.  
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Previous media reporting leads firms to be more likely to face media reporting 
because stakeholders tend to respond more actively to negative events than positive 
ones (Lange & Washburn, 2012) and hardly update their beliefs, especially from the 
negative to the positive (Barnett, 2007). This explains why firms with a past of 
negative events remain subject to more scrutiny and additional negative coverage 
(Chiu & Sharfman, 2011). This argument also extends across borders; a buyer firm 
with CSiR exposure is likely to face increased scrutiny across its entire supply chain, 
increasing the odds of another CSiR accusation.  
Such repetition reduces the tolerance of stakeholders (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990), 
which leads to a greater level of blame and punishment (Harvey, Madison, Martinko, 
Crook, & Crook, 2014). By contrast stakeholders are less critical toward a firm that 
has maintained a positive CSR reputation, since they consider the event to be an 
irregularity (Coombs & Holladay, 2001). As such, a firm’s past plays an important 
role when stakeholders make sense of new negative information about the firm 
(Barnett, 2007; Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).  
Beyond these baseline expectations, we develop hypotheses drawing upon the 
ABV, arguing for both a direct effect of depth and breadth of attention on media 
reporting on CSiR from offshore outsourcing, as well as moderating effects on the two 
baseline expectations just stated.  
4.3.1. Attention and Media Reporting on CSiR from Offshore Outsourcing  
Once CSR captures attention by external stimuli, e.g. the media, and through internal 
structures, e.g. distribution processes and decision making channels, it is included in 
a set of corporate strategies and eventually reflected in firm moves and behavior as 
firms put their resources including time, energy and efforts into the matter (Ocasio, 
1997). More resources are allocated  (Surroca et al., 2016) and response times to any 
relevant issue become shorter (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). As a result, firms deeply 
engaged in CSR issues in offshore outsourcing relationships will identify potential 
issues early on, come up with policies to address issues and shun media exposure.  
Thus, we argue that the most potent force in reducing CSR failure from 
offshore outsourcing is the amount of attention given to CSR by firms. Larger firms 
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often have specialized CSR or ethical supply managers at a higher level and these 
specialists focus most or all of their attention on CSR (Doh et al., 2014; Ocasio, 1997). 
As attention is typically followed by actual corresponding practices (Ocasio, 1997), 
firms with managers whose focus is on CSR are likely to make efforts to improve CSR 
performance or at least to endeavour to find ways to effectively avoid negative media 
reporting on CSiR in offshore outsourcing operations. We argue that the more 
attention is given to CSR issues, the higher the vigilance and scrutiny, which 
subsequently leads not only to improved performance (Surroca et al., 2016; Yadav et 
al., 2007), but also to quicker provision of responses and solutions to problems 
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). In short, organisational attention reduces the likelihood and 
the intensity of media reporting on CSiR. Thus:  
Hypothesis 1a: The depth of attention for CSR is negatively associated with 
media reporting on corporate social irresponsibility related to offshore 
outsourcing. 
The level of attentional focus is also determined by the number of agendas being 
attended to simultaneously. The key premise of ABV is that attention is a limited 
resource (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997), and therefore not all issues can be 
attended to equally (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). As Skinner's (1974) concept of ‘the 
focused factory’ suggests,  firms dedicating their attention to a limited number of 
agendas experience better performance outcomes than those whose attention is spread 
over a wide range of issues (Huckman & Zinner, 2008). The improved performance 
outcomes are achieved mainly through increased effectiveness and accumulated 
experience in dealing with a small particular set of activities repeatedly and intensely 
(Huckman & Zinner, 2008; Skinner, 1974).  
As there are numerous elements to CSR, managers have to decide whether to 
distribute their attention to all different aspects of CSR issues in the supply chain, or 
to engage in those that are most relevant. According to the UN global compact and 
GRI, there are four key aspects that require attention: environment, labour practices, 
human rights, and wider society. In detail, occupational health and safety, training and 
education are included in labour practices, and child/forced labour, freedom of 
association and discrimination pertain to human rights issues. Environmental aspect 
entails energy and water uses, emissions, materials while society covers corruption, 
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local communities, and anti-competitive behaviours (Global Reporting Initiative, 
2014). As such, the four main aspects in fact include several more detailed concerns.  
While some companies experience more issues around the environment (e.g. 
firms in food and chemical industries), others face more challenges related to human 
rights issues (e.g. firms in garment industry). Therefore, firms can choose to focus 
their attention on certain issues that are more relevant to their specific supply chain 
circumstances, to then likely to be rewarded with better outcomes. Distracted and 
unfocused attention distributed to a broad set of activities will reduce effectiveness 
and efficiency and deteriorate performance outcomes (Skinner, 1974). We 
acknowledge that there are firms that face multiple issues in relation to these four 
aspects. In such cases, firms may inevitably pay attention to diverse CSR issues in 
their supply chains, and which again may cause reduced performance outcomes 
overall due to the fact that all issues cannot be equally attended to and resources cannot 
be evenly allocated. Thus, we propose:  
Hypothesis 1b: The breadth of attention for CSR is positively associated with 
media reporting on corporate social irresponsibility related to offshore 
outsourcing. 
4.3.2. Attention and Visibility 
Nonetheless, when a visible firm pays in-depth attention to CSR issues in offshore 
outsourcing relationships, the firm can expect reduced media reporting for the 
following reasons. First, a high degree of attention means more resource allocation 
and subsequent performance improvement (Surroca et al., 2016). That is, the actual 
practices will be ameliorated. Thus, even with high scrutiny stakeholders hardly detect 
any CSiR in the firm’s offshore outsourcing relationships. Second, with an increasing 
level of scrutiny, the earnest efforts and commitments become more visible to 
stakeholders, and communication through positive media reporting or public 
announcement and campaigns is easier and cheaper for visible firms compared to the 
less visible counterparts. And such exposure is expected to enhance the firm’s 
reputation, legitimacy and the level of social approval (Deegan, 2002). Hence, we 
expect that the positive influence of visibility on media reporting will be reduced when 
in-depth attention is present.  
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On the contrary, it is expected that the positive association between visibility 
and media coverage is strengthened in the presence of broad attention. The first reason 
is consistent with the main hypothesis, broadly distributed attention is less likely to 
lead to actual practice improvement for limited resources and capabilities of the firm 
(Skinner, 1974). Hence, it is more likely that there are more issues to be discovered 
by an increased number of aspects to attend to. Second, the broad and distracted 
attention of a highly visible firm could also be acknowledged by stakeholders that the 
firm is engaging in and handling diverse issues well. Simultaneously, however, when 
the firm claims they are doing well in multiple CSR aspects, stakeholders may become 
sceptical and view the firm with greater suspicion (Arvidsson, 2010; Loughran, 
McDonald, & Yun, 2009). And this increased scepticism may lead to more detection 
of CSiR and more intense criticism. Thus, we suggest:  
Hypothesis 2a: The depth of attention negatively moderates the positive relation 
between visibility and the likelihood of media reporting on corporate social 
irresponsibility related to offshore outsourcing. 
Hypothesis 2b: The breadth of attention positively moderates the positive 
relation between visibility and the likelihood of media reporting on corporate 
social irresponsibility related to offshore outsourcing. 
4.3.3. Attention and Prior Media Reporting 
Attention can moderate the relationship between prior media reporting and later media 
reporting. We expect that the presence of in-depth attention can weaken the positive 
relationship between prior media reporting and later media reporting, through the 
following mechanism. Firstly, in-depth attention to CSR in offshore outsourcing 
means the issue is already one of the prioritised agendas in a firm (Doh et al., 2014), 
and therefore, there will lead to more precise and quicker amendments to practices 
(Ocasio, 1997). Secondly, a firm with experience of having been exposed to the media 
for CSR issues in offshore outsourcing relationships may have dedicated more of its 
attention to the particular problem to prevent any further issues and media coverage 
on the issues. It is expected that the firm’s effort is more effective, since the focus that 
needs attention is clearer (Skinner, 1974), and they are more motivated than before 
due to intense external stimuli (Desai, 2011; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). In detail, with 
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the heightened levels of motivation and focus, the firm can identify root causes, 
address the issues, and improve practices. Thirdly, the firm’s active engagement might 
help stakeholders forget about what happened earlier (Mena et al., 2016). Although it 
might be forgotten after a long period of time, or be countervailed by unintended 
events, instrumental work of managers and firms such as active communication with 
stakeholders can help stakeholders forget the negative memory and make things 
smoother for building up legitimacy again and increasing the level of social approval 
(Mena et al., 2016). 
On the other hand, we expect that broad attention intensifies the negative 
association between prior media reporting and later media reporting, firstly because a 
firm with broad attention may not be able to deal with a problem effectively and may 
fail to identify and address root causes because of lack of resources being allocated to 
the particular issue. Secondly, not only can the firm not focus attention on the right 
issue, but, it is also likely to waste efforts on less critical issues. Lastly, in the eyes of 
stakeholders, a firm attending to broad aspects even after a particular issue is 
discovered will be considered to be attempting to distract stakeholders’ attention or 
simply engaging in formality (Zavyalova et al., 2012). Thus, we propose:   
Hypothesis 3a: The depth of attention negatively moderates the positive 
relationship between prior media and the likelihood of media reporting on 
corporate social irresponsibility related to offshore outsourcing. 
Hypothesis 3b: The breadth of attention positively moderates the positive 
relationship between prior media coverage and the likelihood of media coverage 
on corporate social irresponsibility related to offshore outsourcing. 
Figure 4.1 is a graphical representation of the hypotheses. 
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Figure 4.1. Hypotheses 
 
4.4. Research Design 
4.4.1. Sample  
We selected a sample of the largest 120 product-based MNEs from industries known 
to be engaging in offshore outsourcing from the Forbes Global 2000 list for the period 
from 2000 to 2014. Purposeful sampling is appropriate given our research question 
(Appendix 4.1). To facilitate data collection through text searches in news articles and 
annual/CSR reports, we selected only firms from Anglo-Saxon countries: The United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, all liberal market economies to 
reduce institutional differences (Chen & Bouvain, 2009). The 15-year time period was 
chosen because it coincided with increased interest in CSR issues and the rise of 
modular strategies (Grafström & Windell, 2011; Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012; 
Lewin et al, 2009). 
We used FACTIVA, an online news database incorporating a wide variety of 
sources. FACTIVA has been used in previous work because its extensive database 
covers  different regions and time periods (e.g. Brammer, 2004; Desai, 2011a, 2011b; 
Grafström & Windell, 2011; Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016). However, unlike 
previous studies (e.g. Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Grafström & Windell, 2011; 
Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012), we did not select only a few prestigious media outlets, 
given our interest in understanding the effects on the general public, not merely an 
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elite (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Thus, we included all media outlets contained in 
the FACTIVA database.  
The total number of articles for these 120 companies over 15 years is 7,299,533 
and the trend shows a steady increase of the numbers for the selected period (see Table 
4.1). Therefore, it was necessary to filter these articles. We chose one random 
company from each selected industry and read all articles published from 2000 to 2014 
in order to pick up the terminologies applied by media when dealing with CSiR issues 
in an offshore outsourcing context. Based on the research and guidelines provided by 
the GRI (Global Reporting Initiative, 2014), we developed a set of filtering terms (see 
Appendix 4.2). This filtering process reduced the number of articles to 1,729,587. 
Through the article selection criteria and procedures (Appendix 4.3 & 4.4), eventually 
8,265 articles were included in the study (see Table 4.1). Appendix 4.5 demonstrates 
the process through which articles were filtered and selected using FACTIVA. 
Appendix 4.6 presents a representative article selected through the process while 
Appendix 4.7 shows an article that excluded by following the process.   
Table 4.1. The number of articles per year 
Year Total number of 
articles 
The number of media 
articles on CSiR in offshore 
outsourcing relationships 
2000               275,290                           196  
2001               299,559                           170  
2002               355,305                           235  
2003               356,250                           171  
2004               410,900                           155  
2005               458,474                           246  
2006               435,127                           546  
2007               452,313                           495  
2008               446,541                           352  
2009               518,648                           226  
2010               590,391                           640  
2011               668,441                           595  
2012               677,888                         1,665  
2013               685,396                         1,625  
2014               669,010                           948  
Total            7,299,533                         8,265  
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In order to increase the level of objectivity and to check later coding of articles, 
we undertook multiple interrater reliability tests. First, in order to test the validity of 
search terms, we examined news articles for three different time periods for three 
companies. These were selected following the pre-agreed criteria (Appendix 4.3) and 
the procedure (Appendix 4.4), first without filtering terms. Then, we applied the 
filtering terms to see if all the selected articles survived, which was indeed the case. 
Next, two of the authors and an unaffiliated researcher with relevant knowledge, were 
given a total of 264 articles and classified these into two categories: those that were to 
be included in the study and those that were to be excluded. These raters agreed on 
98.86% of the categorization of the articles.  
We then collected corporate voluntary disclosures to measure organisational 
attention. As Cho and Hambrick (2006) suggest, analysing written materials published 
by organisations such as letters to shareholders and annual reports is an effective way 
of understanding the attention of organisations and individuals. If managers and firms 
have made an effort to tackle CSR in offshore outsourcing, they are likely to want to 
signal this to stakeholders and prevent them from “adverse selection” (Campbell, 
Shrives, & Bohmbach-Saager, 2001; Clarkson, Overell, & Chapple, 2011; Mahoney, 
Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 2013). Voluntary disclosures, including public 
announcements, advertisements, annual reports and standalone CSR reports, are the 
means by which organisations can achieve this purpose (An, Davey, & Eggleton, 2011; 
Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Neu et al., 1998).  
Hence there has been an increase in the number of CSR reports published in 
recent decades (Bebbington, Larrinaga, & Moneva, 2008). The number of executives 
who are seriously concerned with CSR issues is also increasing significantly (Babin 
& Hefley, 2010), and 90% of fortune 500 companies have explicit CSR policies and 
over 50% issue CSR reports (Homburg, Stierl, & Bornemann, 2013). Voluntary 
disclosure and communications can reduce information asymmetry between 
companies and stakeholders and eventually enhance the trustworthiness of a company 
(Rodríguez & Lemaster, 2007). Studies suggest that publishing such reports can signal 
doing good (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2011), considering the costs 
and time of publication (Mahoney et al., 2013; Thorne et al., 2014).  
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4.4.2. Measures 
Dependent variable. Consistent with the hypotheses, the dependent variable is 
a count variable measuring a firm’s annual number of media articles relating to CSiR 
from offshore outsourcing. The number of media hits measures the level of issue 
salience and stakeholder attention (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Kiousis, 2004). Also, 
media reporting is a good proxy for public discussion on CSiR as “it can mobilize 
action by (a) legitimizing social problems in the eyes of previously disconnected actors 
and (b) connecting actors to a social problem by disseminating information on its 
moral intensity amongst previously unaware observers” (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009, 
p.546).  
Independent variables. Attention is measured using CSR disclosure by a firm. 
The ABV literature has frequently used text analysis of letters to shareholders as a way 
of measuring attention (Ocasio, 2011). However, we use the contents of reports rather 
than letters, since CSR in offshore outsourcing is rarely found in letters. Extant studies 
assume that the quantity of words can demonstrate the level of quality/commitment 
(Hammond & Miles, 2004). Thus the number of words, sentences, pages, and 
proportion, has typically been used as a proxy for the level of commitment to CSR 
(e.g. Brammer & Pavelin, 2004; Dagiliene, 2010; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; 
Loughran, McDonald, & Yun, 2009). Given that the length and structure of CSR 
reports vary substantially we use relative amounts, i.e. the proportion of text dedicated 
to supply chain issues in CSR reports and in the CSR sections of annual reports/ 10K 
reports, including tables and figures that may contain critical information (Unerman, 
2000). This proportion is then how we measure depth of attention.  
In order to measure breadth of attention, we used the categories used for 
defining report quality of the GRI (Global Reporting Initiative, 2014). Studies 
examining environmental and social disclosures have used GRI guidelines as a 
benchmark (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2011; Gamerschlag, Möller, & Verbeeten, 2011; 
Michelon et al., 2015), and we likewise look at the four aspects of environment, labour 
practices, human rights, and impact on society to create count variable, where each 
type of report adds 1 for a maximum score of “4”.  
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 We include annual reports, 10-K reports, and CSR reports (Mahoney et al., 
2013). Reporting signals attention well because it is essentially a voluntary rather than 
a (government) mandated one (Dagiliene, 2010; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Thorne et al., 
2014) and because it is more expensive than one-off and event-driven news article 
publications (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004; Mahoney et al., 2013; Thorne et al., 2014).  
Operationalization of the variables, depth and breadth of attention, includes 
several steps. For the period from 2000 to 2014 we collected CSR reports, where those 
were not available, we collected annual reports, and where those annual reports lacked 
narratives, we gathered 10-K reports. We acknowledge that the publication of 10-K 
and annual reports is not voluntary. Yet, the inclusion of CSR matters in the supply 
chain is not mandated for either type of report. Thus, such inclusion signals 
organisational attention. In order to control for the types of report we generated 
dummy variables called no report, 10K report, annual report and CSR report. 
One of our baseline variables, the visibility of a firm is measured as a count of 
the total number of articles about a given firm in a given year in the FACTIVA 
database. Some studies have used more indirect measures, such as revenue or the 
number of employees, can be used to proxy visibility, (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; 
Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012), but given that we have a more direct measure we prefer 
to use it. To prevent over-dispersion, we log transformed the number. The second 
baseline variable, prior reporting in the media is measured through the log 
transformed number of articles regarding CSiR from offshore outsourcing about a 
given company in the previous year.  
Control variables. Firm size is controlled for through the natural logarithm of 
the number of employees. Large and publicly held firms are more visible, and hence 
under higher pressure from stakeholders (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004; Thorne et al., 
2014). The logarithm of the stock market value of a firm and the logarithm of firm age 
are also controlled for, since they can similarly produce more stakeholder pressure. 
We control for whether a firm engages in B2B (business-to-business), B2C (business-
to-consumer), or both B2B & B2C markets because closeness to final consumers may 
make firms more interesting for media to report on. Six sector dummies are included. 
Firm financial performance may be related to CSiR expectations, and therefore we 
control for earnings per share (EPS). Revenue growth from the previous to the current 
  
90 
 
year ((revenuet – revenuet-1)/revenuet-1) is another control variables introduced to 
capture the effect of rapid growth, which may lead firms to engage in more, but less 
controlled, outsourcing to meet customer demand. We include organisational slack, 
calculated by dividing current assets by current liabilities, since having slack may 
provide firms with room to tackle CSR issues (Petrenko et al., 2016). Finally, year 
dummies are used to capture a variety of temporal effects. We log transform all 
continuous independent variables, in order to deal with skewness and kurtosis (Lane 
et al., 2013; Strike et al., 2006).  
4.4.3. Model Specification 
We estimate quasi-likelihood of unbalanced panel data with the generalized estimating 
equations (GEE) model in Stata. A Hausman test suggested that fixed effects are not 
appropriate and a Breusche-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test indicated the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. In such instances GEE provides consistent population-averaged 
estimates for cross-sectional data that are not normally distributed and heteroskedastic 
(Liang & Zeger, 1986; Zeger, Liang, & Albert, 1988). A Woodbridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data did not reject the null hypothesis, meaning there is no 
concern for first-order autocorrelation. The outcome variable is a count variable that 
is neither Poisson distributed nor normally distributed, but is over-dispersed. Also, 
within-subject values are repeatedly counted over time and are unlikely to be 
independent. Since we use a negative binomial model, log-transformation of the 
dependent variable is not necessary (O’Hara & Kotze, 2010). We obtained robust 
standard errors. A test of variance inflation factors showed a highest value of 5.36, 
with a mean of 2.26, meaning that multi-collinearity is unlikely to be a concern. The 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.2 and the results of our analysis are 
shown in Table 4.3.  
4.5. Findings 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 show that firms on average the subject firms 
spare 3.6 percent for CSR reporting either in the form of standalone reports or annual/ 
10K reports on average. When it comes to the scope of issues, the firms deal with 
1.139 aspects on average in their reports. Also, those firms that discuss the subject 
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matter in more depth are likely to deal with broader aspects considering the correlation 
between depth and breadth is 0.524.  
Table 4.3 presents the GEE estimates. Looking at the control variables first, as 
expected firm size and age have significant and positive effects on media reporting on 
CSiR in offshore outsourcing contexts. Firms engaging in B2C or both B2C and B2B 
businesses are also more often reported on by the media. There are also some smaller, 
and less consistent sectoral effects. Furthermore, the models demonstrate positive 
relationships between profit (EPS) and media reporting and negative relationships 
between market value and media reporting. We also find, interestingly, that the more 
advanced the type of reporting, the more negative is the association with media 
reporting. We believe that this is in itself indicative that when managers pay more 
attention to CSR this can lead to media taking a more positive stance on their firms.   
When we turn to the independent variables there is strong support throughout 
for hypothesis 1a, and support for hypothesis 1b in most models; while depth of 
organisational attention has a strongly significant and negative relation with media 
reporting on CSiR in Model 2 (p < 0.001), breadth of attention has a positive, yet 
somewhat weaker, association (p < 0.05).  
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We then proceed to test the interaction effects. As can be confirmed in Model 
3 and 4, which test hypotheses 2a and 2b, there is a positive, but statistically 
insignificant interaction between firm visibility and depth and between visibility and 
breadth of attention to CSR issues in offshore outsourcing. Model 5 shows that depth 
of attention has a strong negative interaction with prior media reporting (p < 0.01). 
That is, our hypothesis 3a is strongly supported. On the other hand, the hypothesis 3b 
is strongly rejected as demonstrated in Model 6. There is a negative interaction 
between breadth and prior media reporting (p < 0.01).   
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The moderating effect of depth of attention for the relationship between 
prior media reporting and later media reporting 
Figure 4.3. The moderating effect of breadth of attention for the relationship between 
prior media reporting and later media reporting 
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The interaction effects in our results are plotted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Figure 
4.2 illustrates how hypothesis 3a is supported; prior media reporting increases later 
media reporting only for firms with low attention to CSR in offshore outsourcing. 
With an increase in the depth of attention, firms with very intense prior media 
reporting do not experience an increase in later media reporting. That is, in-depth 
attention successfully and negatively moderates the strong positive relation between 
prior media reporting and later media reporting. However, firms with a low degree 
of prior media reporting experience no significant changes from depth of attention. 
Figure 4.3 shows hypothesis 3b is rejected, i.e. for firms with very intense prior media 
reporting, broad attention is effective in reducing later media reporting. 
4.6. Robustness Checks 
We performed some further tests to address potential concerns and to confirm that our 
results are sufficiently robust. Firstly, there is a possibility that the results are biased 
because we used unbalanced panel data. As GEE is incapable of handling this issue, 
we ran an additional analysis using a balanced sub-panel, with only 1,400 observations. 
The results are generally consistent, but hypothesis 1b is no longer supported and the 
negative interaction between breadth of attention and prior media reporting is no 
longer significant.  
Secondly, there may be a concern that some of the articles included in the 
control variable for visibility, are in fact also included in the dependent variable. A 
GEE regression where these articles were excluded from the control variable did not 
change the results.  
Thirdly, the main model uses population-averaged estimates and the Hausman 
test confirmed that a fixed effect is not an appropriate option for our data. Thus, we 
ran a negative binomial regression with random effects. This gave us generally 
consistent results, but hypothesis 1b is no longer supported. 
Fourth, we recognize a potential endogeneity issue arising from inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable as one of the independent variables. Thus, we ran an 
additional robustness check by removing the variable. The results were again generally 
consistent, with the exception of hypothesis 1b, which became insignificant.  
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Fifthly, our data panel is long (15 years), which means there is a chance that 
our results could be biased by the lesser attention towards CSR in the early 2000s. To 
ensure the robustness of our results in this sense, we therefore clustered years in order 
to see whether the results are still consistent. We ran the same GEE regression with 
data from 2008 to 2014 only, and this yielded consistent results.   
Next, Table 4.2 shows that the correlation between depth and breadth of 
attention is quite high as 0.524, we put them separately in different models in order to 
ensure that the correlation does not affect the results in the main model. Our first test 
conducted only with the variable depth of attention showed highly consistent results 
while the second test executed only with the variable breadth of attention yielded 
consistent but less significant results overall. 
Finally, given the significant negative association that the existence of CSR 
reports has with CSiR media reporting throughout the models, we ran extra 
regressions, Models 7 and 8, to test whether containing supply chain matters in 
standalone CSR reports per se interacts with our variables in the baseline expectations, 
visibility and prior media reporting. Consistent with depth and breadth of attention, 
the existence of CSR reports interacts negatively with prior media reporting. We plot 
the interaction between published CSR reports containing attention to CSR in offshore 
outsourcing relationships and prior media reporting in Figure 4.4. It suggests that the 
existence of CSR reports per se can significantly and negatively moderate the strong 
association between prior media reporting and later media reporting.   
 
 
Figure 4.4. The moderating effect of CSR reports for the relationship between prior 
media reporting and later media reporting 
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4.7. Discussion 
Attention matters. Drawing upon the attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997; 
Surroca et al., 2016) we examine what determines the amount of media reporting a 
firm receives in the area of CSiR from offshore outsourcing. We introduce a key 
distinction between depth and breadth of attention, demonstrate that these two 
variables have distinct effects, and additionally negatively moderate the effect of prior 
media reporting, i.e. attention helps firms that have received prior media reporting to 
reduce future reporting levels.  
We also find the expect direct effects from, visibility of a firm and prior media 
reporting, but given these are effectively predetermined, in contrast to depth and 
breadth of attention, which represent managerial choices to pay more attention. This 
study shows that depth of attention to CSR issues in offshore outsourcing significantly 
reduces media reporting on CSiR from offshore outsourcing. By contrast, for breadth 
of attention, measured as the number of categories of CSR issues (social, 
environmental, labour, and human rights), we find positive but also more inconsistent 
results. Regardless of whether this effective is indeed positive or not, these differential 
results demonstrate the usefulness of drawing a distinction between breadth and depth 
of attention, which we see as the key conceptual contribution of our paper.  
We believe this is because there are usually firm-specific kinds of CSR issues 
that are more urgent and require relatively more attention than others. Hence, 
distributing attention to different aspects hinders firms from effectively addressing 
CSR issues that are particularly critical to them while concentrating their attention on 
specific issues is more effective in reducing media reporting. More specifically, the 
positive relationship between breadth of attention and CSiR reporting by the media 
can be interpreted in three ways: first, as discussed above, firms are distributing and 
wasting their attention unnecessarily to other aspects and the issue that really requires 
attention is not sufficiently attended to. Secondly, firms have numerous difficulties in 
different areas and they attend to them all, but due to limited capabilities and resources 
they cannot effectively prevent potential CSiR practices or CSiR news reporting. 
Lastly, it is possible that firms simply and briefly write about their policy in different 
areas in order to make their reports look good as a form of impression management 
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and no actual efforts to improve are carried out (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Mahoney et 
al., 2013). 
Further interesting findings in this study are in the interaction terms, especially 
between prior media coverage and both breadth and depth of attention. For those firms 
that received intense media attention in the previous year and are therefore under 
increased scrutiny and attribution, later media reporting is not likely to be intense if 
the firm pays a substantial amount of attention. This actually applies to firms with both 
high and low prior media reporting, although our findings suggest in-depth attention 
works more effectively if a firm experienced intense prior media reporting. This can 
be interpreted in such a way that the firms’ attention and following resource allocation 
for problem solving works even more effectively where there has been prior media 
reporting as the firm is more confident about exactly what the problems that require 
attention are.   
A finding that requires a closer look is the antagonistic interaction of breadth 
of attention and prior media reporting. Contrary to our expectation, in this occasion, 
broadly distributed attention reduces media reporting for firms with intense prior 
media reporting. We assume that a firm might increase overall quality of attention 
toward CSR in offshore outsourcing after experiencing intense negative media 
reporting. There is a small branch of literature in the ABV maintaining that quality of 
attention is more critical in improving performance than focus of attention (e.g. Rerup, 
2009; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). Weick and Sutcliffe (2006) claim that when 
management is mindful and sufficiently disciplined, it can attend to more issues and 
achieve performance improvement in multiple areas. Due to prior media reporting, 
firms become capable of attending to potential issues as well as to existing kinds of 
CSiR problems, and our study shows that attention to both extant and latent issues are 
effective in reducing later media reporting.  
Our findings suggest that firms with intense prior media reporting need to 
deeply and broadly attend to CSR in offshore outsourcing relationships. That is, they 
should be deeply focused on and vigilant in a wide range of issues simultaneously.  
Throughout the models in this study, it is noticeable that attention shown in 
standalone CSR reports, rather than in the other types of reports, has a substantially 
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negative relationship with media discussion on CSiR related to offshore outsourcing. 
This implies that firms with a generally high attention to CSR and therefore those that 
publish standalone CSR reports are also likely to more effectively address CSiR in 
supply chains. In other words, firms that are socially responsible in general also tend 
to be good at managing supply chains. It could also be interpreted that they have 
constructed a good reputation and public image, so receive less attention to CSiR in 
offshore outsourcing as the media are less likely to cover negative news about firms 
with a high social approval (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011). 
4.8. Contributions 
This study benefits from combining insights from the ABV and makes the important 
link to offshore outsourcing strategies, which is crucial in an age of modularization 
(Lewin et al, 2009). By inviting the ABV into the discourse on CSR, we suggest this 
study makes a valuable contribution to the CSR literature. CSR is an important firm 
strategic decision that requires appraisal of external and internal conditions and should 
be aligned with the other top agenda of a firm in order to achieve competitive 
advantage (Doh et al., 2014). The ABV has been used in understanding other firm 
strategic decisions e.g. innovation (Yadav et al., 2007) and crisis management (Aveni 
& Macmitlan, 1990). Yet, CSR has not yet been examined in much depth with the 
perspective of ABV.  
The study also contributes to the ABV by separating out the two dimensions 
of depth and breadth of attention (e.g. Huckman & Zinner, 2008; Rerup, 2009; Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2006). The findings of this study confirm the traditional beliefs of ABV 
discourse by empirically proving that focused attention leads to improved performance. 
On top of that, the findings extend our knowledge by providing evidence that broad 
attention can also be useful for a firm with a prior reputational crisis.  
Empirically, the study makes a significant contribution to the CSR literature 
by suggesting an alternative way to measure CSR / CSiR performance. The focus on 
media articles reporting CSiR particularly fills a gap in the current literature; there are 
limited ways to measure social and environmental aspects of CSR in parallel (Stefan 
U. Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012; Klassen & Vereecke, 2012; Yawar & Seuring, 
  
100 
 
2017). This method also enhances the objectivity of the variable, while embracing 
practical concerns managers have of being publicly criticized.  
The study’s findings suggest that persistent and dedicated attention can 
substantially reduce CSiR and dealing with CSR issues in offshore outsourcing is a 
constant ‘battle’ that firms should fight. Furthermore we specifically link this to 
offshore outsourcing strategies, which is particularly important given the increasingly 
modular nature of services and goods production (Lewin et al., 2009). This also helps 
us to better understand the complications of avoiding CSiR in such a complex and 
challenging context.  
4.9. Limitations and Future Research 
We acknowledge that this study has some limitations. Firstly, we are not entirely 
certain whether all relevant industries have been included. We drew a conclusion that 
certain industries do not use offshore manufacturing suppliers when there is no clear 
evidence of such activities. This could lead to an omission of some relevant firms. 
Furthermore we limit the kinds of outsourced activities in the study to manufacturing 
and materials procurement, since most environmental and social issues happen in 
manufacturing operations. CSiR in service and IT outsourcing, for instance, are not 
included. Hence, the results may not be generalizable to the wider range of offshore 
outsourcing activities.  
In addition, the dependent variable, media hits, was collected solely from the 
FACTIVA database. It is likely that there are articles that have not been archived in 
FACTIVA, so the number of media hits used in the study might be missing some 
articles. However, the differences are not likely to significantly affect the general trend. 
In addition, as we use filtering words in order to reduce the number of the articles to 
go through, there could be some missing articles that apply alternative words and 
terminologies that are not part of our selection.  
Next, the study ignores the possibility that the nature of CSR issues affects the 
level of media attention, although in practice a violation of minimum wage is not likely 
to attract as much attention and criticism compared to when human lives are at stake. 
In the same sense, the present study does not analyze the respective levels and 
intensities of commitments to each CSR aspect. The investigation into and text 
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analysis of different aspects of CSiR in supply chain appearing in reports and in media 
articles could be investigated in future research using more advanced analysis 
technologies.  
This research extends the ABV by conceptually and empirically studying depth 
and breadth of attention. What the study does not do is to examine the way an issue 
gains attention and the way attention is then allocated to the issue in an organisation, 
as this is beyond the scope of the paper. This is an underexplored area (Nadkarni & 
Barr, 2008; Sullivan, 2010) despite its importance. Therefore, a promising research 
topic for the future is to delineate the mechanism through which CSR in offshore 
outsourcing or supply chain more broadly competes against other agenda and attracts 
attention in an organisation. Surveys, interviews or direct observations could be used 
to study this subject.   
4.10. Conclusion 
Preventing CSiR related to offshore outsourcing has become a critical agenda for 
companies and is gaining more attention in academic discourse (Barnett & Salomon, 
2012; Kolk & Pinkse, 2006). In this study, we seek to identify what drives the 
likelihood of firms being singled out for such CSiR. Our findings suggest that high 
visibility, prior media reporting and organisational attention are associated with CSiR 
reporting by the media. While visibility, prior media reporting and broad attention 
increase media reporting, in-depth attention successfully decreases it. More 
importantly, depth and breadth of attention negatively moderate the effects of prior 
media reporting on later media reporting of CSiR from offshore outsourcing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
102 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 4.1. Industry selection 
 
Included 
Industries 
Aluminium, Apparel/Accessories, Apparel/Footwear retail, Auto/Truck 
Manufacturers, Auto/Truck Parts, Beverages, Biotechs, Computer 
hardware, Computer services, Computer storage devices, Conglomerates, 
Construction materials, Consumer electronics, Containers & packaging, 
Department stores, Discount stores, Diversified chemicals, Diversified 
metals & mining, Drug retail, Electrical equipment, Electronics, Food 
processing, Food retail, Furniture & fixtures, Heavy equipment, Home 
improvement retail, House appliances, Household/ personal care, Iron & 
steel, Medical equipment & supplies, Paper & paper products, 
Pharmaceuticals, Printing & publishing, Recreational products, Restaurants, 
Semiconductors, Specialized chemicals, Tobacco. 
Excluded 
Industries 
Advertising, Aerospace & defence, Air courier, Airline, Broadcasting & 
cable, Business & personal services, Casino & gaming, Communications 
equipment, Computer & electronics retail, Construction services, Consumer 
financial services, Diversified insurance, Diversified utilities, Electric 
utilities, Environmental & waste, Healthcare services, Hotels & motels, 
Insurance brokers, Internet & catalogue retail, Investment services, Life & 
health insurance, Major banks, Managed health care, Natural gas utilities, 
Oil & gas operations, Oil services & equipment, Other industrial equipment, 
Precision healthcare equipment, Property & casualty insurance, Railroads, 
Real estate, Regional banks, Rental & leasing, Security systems, Software 
& programming, Specialty stores, Telecommunications services, Thrift & 
mortgage finance, Trucking 
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Appendix 4.2. Search terms 
Context Outsource, Outsourcing, Offshore, Offshoring, Contractor, Sub-contractor, 
Supplier, Vendor, Manufacturer 
Where Plant, Factory, Manufacturing facility, Farm, Plantation, Rainforest, Mines, 
Call centre 
Problems Human 
Rights: 
- -Human 
rights 
- -Child 
worker/labour 
- -Underage 
worker/labour 
- -Sweatshop 
- -Slave 
- -Conflict 
mineral 
Labour 
Practices: 
- -Minimum 
wage 
- -Working hour 
- -Overtime 
- -Working 
condition 
- -Safety 
 
Environment: 
- -Pollution (Pollute, 
Pollutant) 
- -Waste  
- -Contamination 
(Contaminate, 
Contaminant) 
- -Deforestation 
(Deforest) 
Society: 
- -Bribe/ Bribery 
- -Fraud  
- -Money laundry 
- -Animal rights 
- -Animal abuse 
Who is 
affected 
Child, Worker, Environment, Community 
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Appendix 4.3. Article selection criteria 
Checklist 
V 
1. Focal firm  
2. Name(s) or country(countries) of one or more supplier(s)   
3. CSR issues (e.g. Child labour, Pollution, Animal abuse, etc. see Appendix 4.2)  
 
Appendix 4.4. Article selection procedure 
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Appendix 4.5. An application of the article selection criteria and procedure  
a. Find articles for one of the selected companies for a year:  
 
b. Apply filtering terms (Appendix 4.2) in FACTIVA search tool:  
 
 
 
c. Articles selected by the step by step application of the article selection 
criteria and procedure shown in Appendix 4.3 and 4.4. 
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c-1. Article selection criteria  
  
c-2. Article selection procedure 
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Appendix 4.6. A representative article selected through the article selection process 
(downloaded from FACTIVA in Rich Text format) 
 
 
Observer World News Pages 
Revealed: Gap, Next and M&S in new sweatshop scandal: Indian workers are 
paid just 25p an hour and forced to work overtime in factories used by some of 
Britain's best-known high street stores. And while parents are out working, 
children roam the filthy sewage-filled streets 
 
Gethin Chamberlain    
2,265 words 
8 August 2010 
The Observer 
OB 
8 
English 
© Copyright 2010.  The Observer.  All rights reserved.    
 
Some of the biggest names on the British high street are at the centre of a major 
sweatshop scandal. An Observer investigation has found staff at their Indian 
suppliers working up to 16 hours a day. 
 
Marks & Spencer, Gap and Next have all launched their own inquiries into the 
abuses and pledged to end the practice of excessive overtime, which is in flagrant 
breach of the industry's ethical trading initiative (ETI) and Indian labour law. 
 
Some workers say they were paid at half the legal overtime rate. Gap, which uses 
the same factory as Next, confirmed it had found wage violations and gave its 
supplier a deadline of midnight last night to repay workers who lost out. M&S says 
it has yet to see evidence to support the wage claims. 
 
Workers also say that those who refuse to work the extra hours have been told to find 
new jobs. Those in the factory supplying Gap and Next also claim staff who refused 
to work extra hours were threatened and fired, a practice defined under international 
law as forced labour and outlawed around the world. The factory has pledged to 
apologise and reinstate anyone who lost their job. 
 
Next said it had found the situation to be "deplorable" and the chairman of the Indian 
company it uses has apologised and promised to make amends, blaming demand for 
workers at the forthcoming Commonwealth Games in Delhi for leaving factories 
short of staff. 
 
Gap admitted wage and overtime violations and ordered its supplier to reduce 
working hours to within the legal limits and to refund workers who have been 
illegally underpaid. 
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Marks & Spencer admitted its supplier had been operating excessive overtime but 
said it had acted quickly to tackle the problem. It admitted its own audits had found a 
number of other violations, which it described as "high risk issues in documentation 
and conditions". 
 
The Observer investigation found the factories were using workers hired through 
middlemen who paid them as little as 25p an hour, in the case of Gap and Next, and 
26p an hour for M&S. 
 
Workers at the factory used by Gap and Next said they had been required to put in 
up to eight hours a day in overtime, for which they claim to have been paid at half 
the legal minimum rate required by the ETI and Indian law. Some workers at the 
same factory said they had to work seven days a week, a practice condemned by 
their union as "slave labour". 
 
All three companies have told the Observer that they are totally committed to ethical 
trading and will not tolerate abuses in their supply chain. All say the problems were 
detected by their own auditing processes and that they have taken swift action to 
tackle them. 
 
The Observer spoke to workers from some of the factories involved. House of Pearl 
produces clothing for Gap and Next. Jawal Hussain, 24, who works in the House of 
Pearl factory, said that in June he worked 133 hours overtime on top of his normal 
eight-hour shifts, all at the basic single rate of pay. He pocketed a total of 6,100 
rupees [pounds 83]. He and many of his fellow workers are hired through a 
contractor, which is responsible for paying them. "There were two or three people 
who objected to the overtime and they were beaten up and now they have left the 
company," he said. 
 
He said they started at 9am and regularly worked through to 10pm with two half-
hour breaks, though sometimes they would go through to 2am the next day and be 
expected to return again later in the morning. 
 
Fellow worker Segar, 20, said he had worked every day in June, putting in 150 
hours of overtime: "I like the work but don't like the excessive overtime. But we are 
told if you don't want to work overtime you don't work here." 
 
The men said that by the time they had paid their rent, electricity, food and transport 
bills and sent a little money home to their families, they had nothing left and usually 
had to rely on credit to get through to the end of the month. The effects on families 
are clear to see in the narrow, muddy streets of the Kapashera district of south-west 
Delhi, close to the booming satellite city of Gurgaon and home to many of its 
garment workers. 
 
Most leave their homes before 8am and many do not return before 8pm. Some 
children attend schools but many can be found roaming the streets for hours on end. 
The Observer found several children playing in the filthy streets where pigs 
rummage through rubbish and stinking open drains carry sewage between the tiny 
one-room houses. 
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Six-year-old Bubli, a little girl with a weeping sore on her chest, said both her 
parents were out working. They left at 8am and did not usually return until 10pm, 
she said. Her 11-year-old sister was left in charge while they were at work. 
 
Sugriv, 10, was standing in the doorway of a relative's house. Both his parents were 
at work, he said; his mother usually got back about 8pm but his father was rarely 
home before 10pm. He played in the streets, he said, until it was time to go to school 
in the afternoon, and again after he got home again. 
 
At the Rao Bir Singh school, principal Manju Yudav said parents had to pay pounds 
5.50 a month - about 10% of their salaries - to send their children to the school. 
Many simply cannot afford it. 
 
"We don't want to work but are working because of our family expenses," said 
Mohan Singh, 25, a father of two children, who works in Viva Global's factory 
producing items for M&S. "If we don't work our salary will be stopped, but the rent 
of the house and the children's school fees won't stop." 
 
He was speaking during his lunch break a few blocks away from Viva Global's 
shabby, unmarked three-storey building in Gurgaon. "If we complain to the 
management, they are ignoring us, nobody is paying attention. If the workers says 
they don't want to work, then the management says you have another option, you can 
leave the company." Viva Global say it has now taken steps to address workers' 
concerns. 
 
Workers at the Viva Global factory in Gurgaon said they produced clothing for the 
M&S Girls' Limited range, billed as a "fun and fashionable new range" for girls aged 
six to 14. They said that until recently workers had been required to stay for up to 16 
hours a day on single pay. Viva Global says that orders have dried up and that there 
has been no excessive overtime for at least three months. 
 
One worker, Subhash, 35, said they could not feed their children on their 5,000 
rupees [pounds 69] a month basic wage. Pappu, 28, and Rajesh, 32, said they had 
worked from 9am to 10pm for a basic 4,600 rupees a month, with overtime paid at 
single rate. "We need to work for the money and if we don't the company will kick 
us out," said Bitthu, 26. 
 
In a statement Next said it had already started its own investigation into abusive 
practices at the Pearl factory, including excessive overtime and underpayment of 
workers. A spokesman described the situation as "deplorable". The company warned 
that it would drop the factory unless conditions improved rapidly. 
 
"It goes without saying that we were extremely concerned about this situation and 
are working actively with the supplier's management to improve conditions at 
Pearl," the spokesman said. 
 
Gap said all its factories had to stick to comprehensive and strict standards, which it 
said were non-negotiable. It said its staff had uncovered violations around excessive 
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overtime and overtime wage payments in June. A spokesman said Pearl had been 
ordered to pay back all the outstanding money and reduce working hours to the legal 
limit. But it said that firing its supplier would only hurt the workers. 
 
"We are conducting a full investigation, including a review of related documentation 
to ensure that the workers are paid in accordance with the law. If we find any areas 
of noncompliance, as is our policy, we will ensure that appropriate action is taken, 
including back payment of wages as appropriate," said a spokesman. 
 
Last year M&S launched a five-year ethical trading plan, complete with national 
advertising campaign under the slogan Doing the Right Thing, and new chairman 
Marc Bolland last month pledged to put the ethical policy at the heart of its business 
model. 
 
A spokesman for M&S said that it was essential to the retailer that its suppliers 
upheld strong ethical standards and that this was a condition of doing business with 
the company. He admitted that excessive overtime had been worked at the Viva 
Global factory earlier this year and said the company was taking action to deal with 
the problem. 
 
"Viva Global is a factory we have had issues with as it has fallen short of the high 
standards we require and are in the process of working closely with it (and the union) 
to do what we can to address them," the spokesman said. 
 
"We also believe it is important to do this to improve conditions for the workers and 
put right any wrongs that we have uncovered. On the issue of excessive overtime at 
Viva Global, further investigations at my end have uncovered that this had been a 
problem at the factory but on an irregular basis in the months preceding April." 
 
He said that the company had worked with Viva Global for five years and it was 
only this year that problems had surfaced. Since April the company had carried out 
11 factory visits, six unannounced, and was confident that there had been no 
excessive overtime in the past two months. 
 
M&S said Viva Global was one of 92 factories it sourced from in India and that it 
accounted for 1% of its output from the country. It said it had hired an experienced 
human resources manager at its request and improvements had been made. 
 
"Excessive overtime and not paying workers the correct overtime rate can also be 
an issue in Gurgaon. This is one of the reasons we have a large team on the ground 
in Delhi and among the strictest ethical standards in the world to prevent it becoming 
an ongoing issue at the factories we source from," the spokesman said. 
 
Venu Nair, the company's south Asia head, said M&S expected high standards and 
was constantly checking on working conditions to ensure those standards were met: 
"If we ever find instances of noncompliance, it's always our policy to work hard with 
our suppliers to try and fix the problem." 
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House of Pearl chairman Deepak Seth apologised and described recent trading 
conditions as a "nightmare". He said that a combination of demand for workers for 
projects for the Commonwealth Games, which will be held in October, and the 
annual return of workers to their home villages for the wedding season, had left the 
factories 40% short of their workers and that they had responded by increasing 
overtime beyond the maximum two hours per day allowed by law. 
 
"I do agree that excessive overtime has happened. . . and going forward we are not 
going to allow it, and whoever has worked more than two hours, and not been paid 
as per the wages, we are going to correct that situation," he said. "I've been talking to 
my factories everywhere that this kind of a thing has to stop because it is not fair to 
expect workers to work more than two hours a day overtime." 
 
He also promised to reinstate any workers sacked for refusing to put in the extra 
hours. 
 
Sudhir Kumar Makhija, chief operating officer for Viva Global, said the company 
was committed to ethical trading. "We are working closely with M&S and whichever 
issues they have raised in the past we have ensured that all have been rectified and 
we are saying that for the past three to four months there's been no excessive 
overtime here." 
 
He claimed that some workers may want to harm the company by making 
unsubstantiated allegations. He added that he was aware of workers who did eight 
hours in his factory and then another eight in another factory, but denied that any 
workers had put in 16- hour days in the one unit. 
 
"We love our employees. They are the source of our existence and their concerns of 
any nature are our priorities," he said. But he acknowledged that workers had 
complaints and said the company had hired an experienced HR manager "to address 
workers' grievances". 
 
Captions: 
 
Six-year-old Bulbi, whose parents must leave her at home while they work, in the 
streets of Delhi's Kapashera district. Below, the House of Pearl factory in Gurgaon 
and UK high-street labels ready to be sewn on to clothes. Photographs by Gethin 
Chamberlain for the Observer 
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Appendix 4.7. An example of the articles excluded through the article selection 
process (downloaded from FACTIVA in Rich Text format) 
Primark makes ethical commitment.   
 
176 words 
3 June 2006 
Drapers Record 
DRPREC 
11 
English 
© Copyright 2006.  EMAP plc.  All rights reserved.   
 
Primark has boosted its ethical credentials by joining the Ethical Training Initiative.   
 
The value retailer has joined the likes of Marks & Spencer, Next, Monsoon, 
Debenhams and New Look, which are already members of the organisation. It aims 
to promote respect for the rights of workers in factories and farms across the globe.   
 
Primark has faced pressure from ethical organisations to make its dealings with 
suppliers more transparent and posted its supplier code of conduct onto its website - 
at  www.primark.co.uk  - earlier this year.   
 
In signing up, Primark has agreed to adhere to the ETI's base code, which is a set of 
commitments covering issues including wages, health and safety and discrimination. 
It will put notices on its tills informing customers of its commitment to ethical 
trading.   
 
ETI director Dan Rees encouraged more value operators to join the organisation. He 
said: "Value retailers can make an important contribution to ethical trade and the fact 
that Primark has joined demonstrates a growing recognition that ethical trade makes 
good business sense."   
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Chapter 5 PAPER 3 
TRILATERAL GOVERNANCE: A SHIFTING PARADIGM TO ADDRESS 
LABOUR ISSUES IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
 
Abstract 
Labour issues in global supply chains have been a thorny problem for both buyer firms 
and their suppliers. Academic studies have focused mostly on the bilateral relationship 
between buyer firms and suppliers, looking at arm’s-length and close coalition models, 
and the associated mechanisms of coercion and cooperation. Yet continuing problems 
suggest that neither mechanism offers a comprehensive solution to the problem. This 
study investigates how buyer firms are now shifting toward a different model of 
trilateral governance that involves setting up an issue-driven coalition with competitor 
firms and/or an alliance with third-party organisations. These coalitions and alliances 
are then used to exert coercion more effectively to make suppliers act in accordance 
with buyers’ ethical sourcing initiatives. In this paper, based on interviews with 
managers involved in the setting up and management of such coalitions and alliances 
in the clothing retail industry, we examine the antecedents of the trilateral governance 
model and examine its effectiveness in addressing labour issues in global supply 
chains.  
Keywords: Coalition, collaboration, corporate social responsibility, CSR, global 
supply chains, labour issues, trilateral governance 
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5.1. Introduction 
Labour issues in supply chains have been a vexing problem for buyer firms based in 
western countries. Existing relationships with suppliers, whether arm’s-length or 
involving close collaboration, have failed to produce the desired effects—consider, for 
instance, recent disasters in Bangladesh (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015). Newspapers 
feature many stories about the exploitation of employees, under-age employment, 
sweat-shop labour conditions, and health and safety violations in suppliers’ factories 
in less developed countries. But all this negative publicity has not proved sufficient 
for buyer and supplier firms to resolve problems with working conditions in global 
supply chains.  
Over the years, the debates on buyer-supplier relationships have moved from 
arm’s-length transaction agreements to dense, collaborative, trust-based relationships 
to address labour challenges within supplier factories (Soundararajan & Brown, 2016). 
This is supported by evidence that top-down approaches to controlling labour issues 
in supply chains are ineffective (Neef, 2004; Park-Poaps & Rees, 2010). The premise 
of trust-driven collaborative agreements has been to work with suppliers and enable 
them to develop the necessary capabilities to address labour issues in supply chains. 
However, this bilateral collaborative approach has apparently not been effective 
enough to eradicate labour issues in supply chains (Turker & Altuntas, 2014). 
Consequently, of late, buyer firms have been scrambling for a new model to govern 
labour issues in supply chains, partly because of recent well-publicized disasters like 
the collapse of the Rana Plaza, an eight-story factory in Bangladesh supplying 
garments for western retail brands, and stakeholders’ unease over child labour, fair 
wages, and working conditions.  
This study is prompted by the observation that buyer firms have recently been 
moving to a new type of inter-firm alliances model and branching out to third-party 
organisations (TPOs) to cultivate the necessary power and legitimacy to coerce 
suppliers to adhere to their standards. As this study reveals, buyer firms believe that 
suppliers have gained sufficient power in supply chains to reject or undermine buyer 
initiatives; collective action is seen as a viable alternative to coerce suppliers into 
acting in accordance with ethical sourcing initiatives. Collective actions are actions 
taken jointly by buyer firms “in pursuit of the same collective good” (Marwell & 
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Oliver, 1993, p.4), i.e., improved working conditions. So the pendulum may be 
swinging back from the trust-based model to a more power-based model, driven by 
coercion and top-down control but exercised through a trilateral model, not in direct 
bilateral relationships. This paradigm shift has a profound impact on how people are 
managed at the supplier level. In this paper, which is based on interviews with 
managers involved in the setting-up and management of inter-firm supply-chain 
alliances and an extensive analysis of secondary data, we examine the antecedents of 
these alliances and critically examine their effectiveness in addressing labour issues in 
supply chains.  
We examine a paradigm shift toward trilateral governance, asking the question: 
Why do buyer firms from developed countries and their suppliers in developing 
countries in the garment industry use trilateral governance? In addition, we address 
the possible advantages and limitations of such a model. The new paradigm raises new 
and interesting questions for scholarly research, above and beyond current scholarly 
work on labour challenges in global supply chains that has mostly been focused on 
bilateral firm-supplier relationships or within-firm issues.  
A small number of studies have examined the role and impact of stakeholders 
on the management of labour in supply chains (c.f. Park-Poaps & Rees, 2010) but 
these have not focused on inter-firm cooperative alliances and the impact of involving 
TPOs to address labour issues in supply chains. So there has not been much empirical 
exploration of the trilateral mode of handling labour issues. Furthermore, forging 
alliances with competitors and TPOs to address labour issues in supply chains is 
theoretically interesting. Such alliances represent the collaboration of different 
organisations with often diametrically opposing objectives. As a result, firms risk 
having questionable labour practices in their supply chains exposed by TPOs. At the 
same time, TPOs risk losing their public trust and hard-earned legitimacy and 
credibility because of their cooperation with businesses. Hence additional transaction 
costs occur when organisations engage in trilateral governance (Nooteboom, 2004). 
This is true for both buyer firms and TPOs, so the general conceptual question of 
interest is why are organisations willing to bear such costs? This begs the question of 
what drives partnership formation with TPOs and competitors and how partnering 
affects costs (Wootliff & Deri, 2001). 
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This study is also relevant for practitioners. Buyer firms try to address labour 
issues in their supply chains for business as well as moral reasons. Labour problems 
in supply chains are more than “minor upstream inconveniences” (Jiang, Baker, & 
Frazier, 2009, p.169). They often receive wide media coverage and attract negative 
public interest. Several studies have reported that accusations of unethical practices in 
supply chains may lead to erosion of market positions and can result in substantial 
damage to brands (Emmelhainz & Adams, 1999; Frenkel & Scott, 2002; Nelson & 
Zadek, 2000). Moreover, sweatshop labour practices are considered a violation of 
universal human rights under the United Nations (UN) Declaration of Human Rights 
and International Labour Organisation (ILO) convention (Park-Poaps & Rees, 2010). 
The paper continues as follows. In the first section, we provide a background 
study of buyer-supplier relationships and labour issues. In the second section, we 
introduce our empirical research method. We report our findings in the third section, 
and end with the discussion and conclusions. 
5.2. Background 
5.2.1. Buyer-Supplier Relationships and Labour Issues: Toward a Coercive Model 
In the 1970s the footwear and apparel industry started the trend of offshoring and 
outsourcing production to developing countries where abundant, cheap, low-skilled 
labour was available (Lim & Phillips, 2008). While this reduced upstream costs, it also 
created a number of unintended adverse consequences, including mistreatment and 
exploitation of labour in supplier firms (Emmelhainz & Adams, 1999). Since the early 
1990s, a series of irresponsible business practices in developing countries has 
provoked vigorous criticism from both the public and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) (Kolk, 2003). Household names, including Nike, Walmart, Gap, 
and H&M, were held responsible for sweatshop conditions in factories in the 
developing countries where their branded goods were produced (Emmelhainz & 
Adams, 1999; Frost & Burnett, 2007). Even as recently as 2012 and 2013 deadly fires 
in several supplier factories and the collapse of the Rana Plaza complex in Bangladesh 
underscored the persistence of the problem over time (Wieland & Handfield, 2013).  
Initiatives to combat such labour issues in supply chains started in the early 
1990s. In 1991 Levi Strauss, followed by Nike in 1992, adopted codes of conduct and 
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internal audits focusing specifically on labour rights and working conditions (Murphy 
& Matthew, 2001; Pedersen, 2006; Roberts, 2003; Van Tulder & Kolk, 2001). This 
practice became widespread as other firms were subjected to strong institutional 
pressures to introduce codes of conduct and meet industry standards (Jørgensen, 
Pruzan-Jørgensen, Jungk, & Cramer, 2003). Firm-specific codes of conduct morphed 
into standards that can measure firm corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
performance and can be applied universally. Most of the industry-wide codes included 
fair labour issues in supply chains (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). Social 
Accountability International (SAI) developed SA8000, a standard for labour 
conditions and human rights issues (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007), and the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) provided guidelines for the communication of climate and 
human rights issues in 1997 (Othman & Ameer, 2009). The UN announced the UN 
Global Compact, another set of principles for human rights, the environment, and 
working conditions, in 1999 (Frenkel & Scott, 2002). These globally applied tools 
provided guidance for firms to prepare standardized codes (Albareda, 2013). 
Given that none of these initiatives are legally binding and act as guidelines 
and soft regulations at best, the challenge for multinational firms is how to deal with 
the problems when identified. In line with the exit-voice framework of Hirschmann 
(1970), in general multinational buyers have three options: to sever the relationship 
with a problematic supplier (exit), to impose sanctions such as reducing orders (partial 
exit), or to hand out warnings and repeat audits until the supplier takes corrective 
action (voice). Walking away might have an instant effect but the buyer will possibly 
end up with another supplier with similar issues (Wieland & Handfield, 2013), while 
it is easy for suppliers to deceive the buyer if repeat audits take place sporadically and 
last only a few days (Egels-Zandén, 2014; Plambeck & Taylor, 2014). In addition, 
monitoring is a costly procedure and smaller buyer firms and suppliers often do not 
have the financial or human resources needed for repeated audits (Ciliberti et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, suppliers seldom welcome investigation through audits (Morali & 
Searcy, 2012). 
Realizing the limitations of codes and audits, some buyers have substituted 
their top-down code of conduct and monitoring approach with a relational, trust-based 
approach (Soundararajan & Brown, 2016). Cooperation with suppliers includes 
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ongoing two-way conversations, information sharing, and training (Andersen & 
Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Lim & Phillips, 2008; Locke et al., 2007). The assumption here 
is that the proactive involvement of suppliers who hope for a long-term relationship 
may lead to better compliance (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lim & Phillips, 2008). However, 
this approach is not without limitations. Empirical evidence suggests that labour 
problems continue to exist. The collaborative approach is further complicated by the 
globalization of supply chains, where buyer firms source their products from several 
suppliers that can be located in different countries, making it costly and time-
consuming to build and sustain cooperative relationships throughout supply chains 
(Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014).  
At a global level, there have been multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) that 
involve multiple actors, are run by soft laws, and are driven to address CSR issues 
(Rasche, 2012). Under the broad and inclusive name of MSIs, there are a variety of 
groups and clusters that are different in terms of memberships, mechanisms and aims 
(Rasche, 2012). And they easily end up being abstract and nominal institutions that 
simply issue membership certificates or becoming a bigger scale bilateral governance 
where firms share globally agreed codes of conduct and their implementation is done 
individually, and not collaboratively supervised (Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Lund-
Thomsen, 2008). Although there are more focused approaches within the global MSIs, 
not many of them are specifically to deal with supply chain issues (Rasche, 2012). 
Collaborations to address supply chain issues have only recently emerged (Vurro, 
Russo, & Perrini, 2009).  
While such collaborations potentially include all relevant actors in global 
supply chains, there is a particular type of collaboration that is led by buyers and their 
competitors in an effort to increase their leverage on suppliers as well as the level of 
dependence from suppliers, and eventually induce higher level of compliance and 
collaboration from suppliers. Although such alliances are still not prevalent, they are 
of course widespread in other business areas, such as technological co-operation. 
Generally, firms enter into an alliance when they foresee a strategic or financial benefit 
in doing so (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). Unlike existing conventional MSIs that 
establish globally acknowledged codes of conduct and often degraded to certificate 
sellers, this new inter-firm collaborative paradigm aims to coerce suppliers and curb 
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their potential opportunism with very specific purposes, target suppliers/ countries/ 
issues; in so doing it is assumed that buyer firms reduce the chances that labour 
problems will occur, or at least lower their severity. Coercive strategies take the form 
of “threats, promises, and/or legalistic pleas” (Frazier, Gill, & Kale, 1989, p.59). The 
assumption here is that the threat of punitive action is more effective if it comes from 
a collective rather than from a single firm. 
5.3. Method 
To understand how this new model operates, we embarked on an exploratory study. 
An exploratory study is appropriate, given the limited existing knowledge on this topic 
and our focus to theorize around it, rather than formally test hypotheses. To select 
study participants, we first identified firms that were actively engaged with inter-firm 
coalitions or had a TPO alliance. Firms had to meet three key criteria for inclusion in 
this study. First, labour issues in supply chains had to be a relevant problem for them, 
as expressed in the media or public debate. Second, their annual or standalone CSR 
reports had to demonstrate that they were actively seeking some solution(s) to address 
these issues. Third, they had to be a part of a formal coalition or alliance addressing 
labour issues in supply chains. 
For our empirical investigation, we chose the retail clothes sector because of 
its long history with labour issues in supply chains. Clothing retailers have borne the 
brunt of public criticism and media scrutiny over labour issues in their suppliers’ 
factories. The companies selected for our research vary in size, target consumer, and 
ownership type, as shown in Table 5.1. This diversity was intentional, to enable us to 
capture the drivers for the formation of alliances and the differentiated impact on 
management of people at supplier factories. Through snowballing we included in our 
interviews TPOs frequently mentioned in earlier interviews with buyer firms. Given 
our interest in how firms seek to exploit trilateral governance, most interviews were 
with firm representatives. 
 
Table 5.1. Summary of interviews 
Period                November 2014–June 2016 
Types Face-to-face (2), skype (4), phone (3), written (2) 
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Duration (range)         30–90 minutes 
Firms                                           
Products served Apparel, footwear, home products, food, luxury fashion      
Types Public (3), private (3) 
Number of interviewees 9 
Designations of interviewees Director of sustainable business, head of sustainable 
business, head of responsible sourcing, former manager of 
international distribution, CSR program manager, former 
ethical sourcing coordinator, CSR manager, ethical trading 
team 
Country UK, Denmark, Hong Kong 
Number of employees 
(range) 
10,000–80,000 
Firm revenue (range) $2,000 million–$10 billion 
Non-profit enterprise                             
Description Pursuing transparency across supply chain by implementing 
technologies 
Number of interviewees 1 
Designation of interviewee Director/founder 
Multi-stakeholder initiative                             
Description Providing a platform for alliance of firms, trade unions, and 
NGOs 
Number of interviewees 1 
Designations of interviewee China representative 
 
Primary data were acquired from interviews with firm representatives in charge of 
CSR policies in supply chains and with managers from TPOs. Interviews were semi-
structured and centred on collaborative strategies to address labour issues in supply 
chains. The organisations and interviewees are not identified, to protect their identity. 
The company names are denoted by alphabets in order to anonymised them (see Table 
5.2). Extensive secondary data were collected to corroborate the interview data and 
included firms’ archived documents, other organisations, online sources, and the 
media. Interviewees’ responses were compared, confirmed, or challenged by these 
documents so we could avoid method bias through triangulation (Podsakoff et al., 
2012). The sources for our data are shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2. Characteristics of the sample companies 
Company ID Type Origin Ownership 
Company A Multinational retailer UK Public 
Company B Retailer UK Public 
Company C Luxury brand UK Public 
Company D Fashion brand UK Private 
Company E Retailer Denmark Private 
Company F  Garment manufacturing supplier Hong Kong Private 
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Table 5.3. Data sources 
Data source Details 
Interviews 11 interviews with current/former CSR practitioners of 
different organisations including retail companies, TPOs, 
and a supplier, conducted face-to-face, by Skype, telephone 
and written communication. Further details can be found in 
Table 5.1. 
Corporate reports 35 reports published by the companies interviewed 
between 2000 and 2016, e.g. CSR reports, sustainability 
reports, human rights reports, codes of conduct. 
Company websites CSR, ethical trading and partnership information available 
on the websites of the companies interviewed. 
Websites, reports, case 
studies published by 
TPOs/coalitions 
Information on aims, achievements, and memberships. e.g. 
ACT (Action, Collaboration, Transformation), Better 
Factories Cambodia, Cotton Campaign, SAC, SEDEX, The 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. Further 
details are available in Table 5.4. 
Published news articles and 
scholarly articles 
469 articles and commentaries published by the media 
2000–2016, accessed from the FACTIVA database and 
Google searches/Google Scholar 
 
Table 5.4. Examples of coalitions 
Name Mission 
ACT (Action, 
Collaboration, 
Transformation) 
Brands and retailers collaborate on a set of principles and work 
with suppliers and trade unions to address living wage issues. 
 
Cotton Campaign A coalition of NGOs and businesses that urge Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan governments to improve systems and eradicate 
forced- child labour in cotton fields. 
SAC (Sustainable 
Apparel Coalition) 
Brands and retailers collaborate to improve sustainability in 
apparel, footwear, and textile supply chains, measuring 
performance in a uniform way. 
Sedex Information 
Exchange (SEDEX)  
A platform where brands and suppliers share their supplier/audit 
information so they can reduce audit fatigue and join forces 
together when necessary to influence shared suppliers. 
The Accord (The 
Accord on Fire and 
Building Safety in 
Bangladesh) 
Brands, retailers, and trade unions work collaboratively to build a 
safe and healthy Bangladesh ready-made garment (RMG) industry.  
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5.4. Analysis and Findings 
Guided by the theoretical thematic analysis process suggested by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), the data analysis began with sufficiently familiarising with the collected 
interview data. This first step entails thorough transcription of all verbal expressions 
and repeated readings of the transcripts. The transcribed interview data were first 
coded and divided into concepts. The concepts were mostly predetermined based on 
literature review and guided the interview processes (see Appendix 4.1). The concepts 
were then reorganized and regrouped as categories. The categories were chosen as 
they were the most predominantly and frequently mentioned aspects from the data set, 
which were broadly about challenges in current practices and efforts to address the 
issues. And they were agreed by the co-authors who independently read the data.  Next, 
the data extracts were displayed with categories, and all extracts were compared to 
reveal similarities, patterns, and causality (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Through this 
approach, four main overarching themes: drivers, implementation, implications for 
labour issues, and challenges, and eight sub-themes were identified. At this stage, to 
ensure the homogeneity of data extracts under the same themes and the heterogeneity 
of the different themes, there were a recursive reading back and forth between the data 
set and the data extracts (Patton, 1990). Appendix 5.2 illustrates the process of the data 
analysis.  
5.4.1. Drivers 
The analysis of the interview data reveals that buyer firms entered an inter-firm–TPO 
alliance to address two interrelated issues: perceived power and informational 
asymmetries with suppliers.  
Power asymmetry. In principle a cooperative relationship can reduce 
transaction costs and enhance value outcomes (Atrek, Marcone, Gregori, Temperini, 
& Moscatelli, 2014; Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). Mutual trust and/or 
commitment is required for cooperation between a buyer and supplier (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994). Most of the interviewees confirmed that their firms have policies to 
develop and help suppliers to enhance working conditions in their factories. They try 
to build trusting relationships by ensuring suppliers that they will not abandon the 
relationship, asking for commitment from suppliers in return. When they become 
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aware of issues such as child labour, unethical behaviour or illegal discrimination, and 
safety violations, they give the factories time and, if necessary, resources to address 
them. Once there is evidence that suppliers are willing to make an effort to improve, 
the brands try to support them. A CSR program manager of Company B described 
their approach:  
‘What we have to do is send them a clear message. We are going to work 
with you. We have local teams. We are not going to charge you for all 
the advice and support. We do free training every month. In China, we 
do age verification, management systems, working hour training, all 
screening, every single month, in three different locations. We will 
provide the support, the advice, the expertise, the knowledge.’ 
Similarly, the director of sustainable business of Company A noted:  
‘Our policy is not to just walk away from suppliers. I think there’s 
different situations, when we check on the suppliers on board, we 
recognize that they will take some time to get to the standard that we 
want. ... But as long as we can see evidence of improvement and that they 
share the same set of values and the same aspiration to get to the 
standard, we will continue to work with them because we believe that’s 
the most responsible approach.’  
On a similar note, a former ethical sourcing coordinator of Company C 
reported:        
‘We continuously work with them and talk to them face-to-face or on the 
phone to help them to achieve those things. It’s not like we impose a 
policy on them. But we actually work with them all the time so they can 
improve themselves.’ 
We identified different scenarios regarding dependence between buyers and 
suppliers (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Ideally, a brand and a supplier work together 
collaboratively and cooperate on a basis of mutual trust and commitment. However, 
this scenario is most likely in a relationship where both parties are highly dependent 
on each other. In the retail industry, where manufacturing requires few brand-specific 
skills, most suppliers serve multiple buyers, and at the same time brands are likely to 
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source products from multiple suppliers. Therefore, rather than long-term 
relationships we mostly find arm’s-length relationships. In other words, the cases in 
the left and the bottom in Figure 5.1, in which either the buyer or the supplier is less 
dependent on the relationship, or neither party is particularly reliant on the relationship, 
are seen more often in the industry.  
Resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests that dependence determines the 
relative power of parties in a relationship. In an inter-organisational relationship, 
dependence and power have an inverse relationship (Provan & Gassenheimer, 1994); 
the less dependent party in the relationship is likely to have more power over its 
counterpart (Emerson, 1962). Perhaps surprisingly, buyer firms in the industry 
perceive large suppliers as having acquired substantial power over them. Switching 
costs are reported to be very high, because the initial investment in finding and 
establishing a relationship with the right suppliers is substantial (Harms et al., 2013). 
Our respondents therefore challenged the notion that buyers can easily switch between 
competing suppliers, because large suppliers have the capacity to supply many brands 
simultaneously and are therefore less receptive to pressure from buyer firms. This is 
evidenced by the head of responsible sourcing of Company A:  
‘I think where it is typically challenging is where you have no leverage. 
So if you buy very, very little from the supplier, it’s at the very beginning 
of the relationship, and maybe you have been buying there for a couple 
of weeks, it’s therefore very difficult to influence that organisation to 
make change happen.’ 
Under this kind of scenario pressure might even give the supplier an incentive 
to leave the relationship, as noted by the director of sustainable business of Company 
A: 
‘… they [suppliers] will probably not want to supply us anyways because 
more and more suppliers can choose who they sell products to.’  
The next scenario is where a buyer has less dependence and a supplier higher 
dependence on the relationship. This case might seem better, as it is now the buyer 
who has the power. However, all of our interviewees affirmed that simply auditing, 
monitoring, and enforcing buyer regulations would not improve working conditions 
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or labour rights issues in the factories. Continuous support and communication are 
necessary, since otherwise the supplier might simply try to cheat and manipulate data. 
A supplier who is not fully convinced of the need for improvements is easily tempted 
toward guile instead of making efforts to address issues. As the director of sustainable 
business of Company A put it:  
‘I think we need to have minimum standards. But that will never be 
enough to drive the transformation that we want to see ... You need to 
have those minimum standards, but they have limitations. And what we 
found really successful is that we find ways to inspire our suppliers so 
that they believe this is good for their business.’ 
The analysis of secondary data reveals that some of the firms in the study have 
as few as 200 suppliers and others nearly 700 (2016 CSR report, Company A; 2016 
CSR report, Company D). The suppliers are dispersed around the globe, from 29 to 41 
countries. Given that some big suppliers own multiple factories, the number of factory 
sites that require audits and monitoring increases exponentially. For example, one of 
the firms in our study had around 200 suppliers using 800 factory sites (2016 CSR 
report, Company D) and another had 662 suppliers and used 1,965 factory sites (2016 
CSR report, Company B). And the trend indicates that the number of suppliers used is 
increasing over time. According to our analysis of firms’ reports, most of the firms do 
not complete annual audits for individual factory sites. Company C, working with the 
smallest number of factories, claims it completed 100% audits in 2015 (2016 CSR 
report, Company D), while the firm with the largest number of suppliers recorded 49% 
completion that year (2016 CSR report, Company A). Our analysis of the reports 
demonstrates how challenging it would be for firms to communicate with every single 
supplier and convince it to be responsible when they are not able to complete one-off 
audits.  
Moreover, considering that in most cases the suppliers are in countries that are 
politically, economically, and legally less developed, interviewees reported that the 
problem is not always that suppliers do not want to fix issues, but that their government 
and society do not push them or help them sufficiently to do so. In this case, the 
proactive involvement of brands plays a more significant role. As the China 
representative of a TPO confirms: 
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‘Social auditing is very corruptive in China. So the idea is really to go 
beyond social auditing and to have really workers’ engagement and 
invest money on capacity building instead of just monitoring repetitively 
and meaninglessly.’ 
In the scenario where neither party is dependent on a relationship, which 
sounds unlikely but is in fact the most common scenario, addressing labour issues is 
rarely on the agenda. When there is an issue in this type of relationship, the easiest and 
simplest option for a buyer firm is to exit. Considering the low level of dependence, 
finding a new supplier is not likely to be problematic. But, as we pointed out earlier, 
it is highly likely that an alternative supplier’s operations will have similar issues, so 
the buyer firm is likely to have an incentive to try to find a way to address the issue 
and ask for compliance. However, a supplier’s low level of dependence significantly 
reduces the supplier’s incentive to comply and increases the likelihood that the 
supplier will exit the relationship. One of the firms in our study reported that 38 
relationships out of 1,965 were terminated due to non-compliance in 2015 (2016 CSR 
report, Company B). Company C had to leave its Chinese supplier in 2012 when it 
was discovered that the supplier was exploiting workers (The Guardian, 2012). The 
supplier was producing for multiple Western customers and Company C was sourcing 
only 3% of the supplier’s entire production (Overton, 2012), and which means low 
dependence from the supplier on the relationship. Neither of the two companies 
provided any detailed reasons for the extreme decisions in the report, but from the 
interviews and secondary data we learnt that those decisions are usually made when 
suppliers show little intention to address labour issues at their sites.  
In brief, high dependence on the relationship is likely to induce cooperative 
strategies, while low dependence leads to the opposite outcome. As can be seen from 
Figure 5.2, the low dependence of suppliers is more likely to create issues than the 
level of buyers’ dependence. Although game theory suggests that through repetition 
of the same games parties would eventually learn that cooperation gives them higher 
pay-offs (Axelrod, 1984; Jones, 1995), in reality, where buyers and suppliers have to 
take care of multiple relationships dispersed across countries, such focused repetition 
is not plausible for all relationships. In short, bilateral governance could not be 
expected to resolve problems with CSR in most of the relationships we looked at. 
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Figure 5.1. The level of dependence and buyers' expected strategies 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. The level of dependence and suppliers' expected strategies 
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‘So we have to be very realistic about, you know, using power. If you 
have power, then sanctions may work. If you don’t have the power in the 
relationship, you must prove to the supplier why this makes good 
business sense and encourage and enable them.’ 
Interestingly, the new trilateral approach is not aimed at substituting the 
bilateral cooperative paradigm. Firms in our study are not letting go of the cooperative 
approach just yet. Interviewees indicated that continuous conversation is still an ideal 
way to make changes and convince suppliers that the new approach will eventually 
benefit them. This, they argued, would enable them to overcome the limitations of top-
down unilateral compliance. Using threats, such as termination of contracts, was not 
emphasized but the importance of the suppliers making sense of improvements, as 
well as the effectiveness of conversations and persuasion, were stressed. Yet, one of 
the firms reported that 80% of their products are made by the top 10% of suppliers, 
while they source small amounts from the rest of the suppliers (2016 CSR report, 
Company D) and these relationships are likely to be arm’s-length, where conversation 
and persuasion are not likely to work. Two respondents also acknowledged that this 
approach is only effective with a limited number of key suppliers: 
‘In Bangladesh, our top three suppliers are quite big. They have grown 
with [our organisation]. So we are a very large customer and we have 
been collaborating with them ever since we started going into 
Bangladesh. So here we have a lot of leverage. And we are not 
demanding or asking them to do specific things. We are having an open 
and honest and equal dialogue about how to improve things.’ 
‘I think key suppliers, normally, they appear to be good also at CSR.’ 
The same applies to suppliers as well. Company F in our study, a Hong 
Kong-based supplier, remarks in its sustainability reported that it collaborates only 
with key clients (2016 Sustainability report, Company F). In the same sense, 
Company D reported in 2015 that they were making efforts to increase the average 
length of relationships with suppliers expecting better understandings of polices 
and improvements of practices (2015 CSR report, Company D).   
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Power asymmetry is more pronounced with relatively small buyer firms. Even 
though one of the firms in our study is a well-established and well-known brand, some 
of its larger suppliers consider it a small buyer, and it therefore has little power over 
them. As the director of sustainable business in Company A stated: 
‘The challenges are though [our firm] like many retailers has very few 
sites where we are the only or a very significant customer. In most sites 
we are one of many customers….’ 
Similarly, one of our interviewees, a former ethical sourcing coordinator of 
Company C, stressed the difficulty of applying power:  
‘We are just a tiny company so we have to work with so many different 
brands to achieve some common goal.’ 
For these firms overcoming power asymmetry and enforcing practices on 
suppliers can only happen if buyers using the same suppliers come together to 
collaborate, to increase the level of suppliers’ dependence, and consequently exert 
leverage over them.  
Information asymmetry. Interviewees reported that generally suppliers have 
better and more information about what goes on in their factories than buyers, and 
critical information is often withheld. A number of factors cause this information 
asymmetry. Interviewees suggested that suppliers have an information advantage 
because of geographical distance and their unwillingness to share critical information. 
Respondents also frequently cited the cost associated with acquiring information. Our 
interviewees reported that buyer firms allocated limited budgets to CSR issues in the 
supply chain. For instance, the former ethical sourcing coordinator of Company C told 
us: 
‘Sometimes we want to visit the place and it’s too far and we don’t have 
enough budget, so we cannot go and talk to them. So it can lead to 
communication breakdown because we cannot communicate with them. 
It’s too far. We cannot see them and we cannot see the farms and actual 
factories.’  
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Physical distance generates problems even when a brand has power over a 
supplier. Most interviewees expressed concerns about short-burst audits and said they 
distrusted them, as they are considered to be little more than box-ticking exercises, 
with limited understanding of suppliers’ day-to-day activities. The China 
representative of the TPO said: 
‘Audits will always be a snapshot of the day and it is not a tool for 
improvement, it is a tool for control. Not only are audits incapable of 
capturing actual practices, but also the results are sometime not 
trustworthy for deeply rooted, country-specific factors.’ 
In addition to suppliers withholding information, interviewees reported that 
cultural issues lay behind some of the problems with information asymmetry. Most 
suppliers are based in Asian countries where people are more hesitant to give bad 
news, and in order to save face tend not to discuss what went wrong and what 
caused failures at suppliers’ factories. The China representative of a TPO said: 
‘…[T]hat makes it more difficult to try and find causes and therefore 
come up with good solutions. So these are some of the challenges 
especially around issues around safety or worker conditions. … We 
recommend [our] members not to do the social auditing repetitively. … 
[A]uditing is very corrupted in China.’ 
Data also suggest that both buyers and suppliers suffer from audit fatigue. 
Constrained by limited resources, buyer firms have to conduct audits on multiple 
suppliers’ operations and at the same time suppliers have to go through several audits 
from multiple buyers. This creates additional costs at both ends. Individuals involved 
in audits are often bogged down with paper work, with little insight into the real 
working conditions of suppliers. One of the interviewees, the CSR programme 
manager of Company B, explains that this was the primary reason behind the 
company’s decision to join industry-led coalitions such as the Sustainable Apparel 
Coalition (SAC) and SEDEX, which aim to avoid duplicate audits and to standardize 
the currently diverse codes (see Table 5.3). As he put it: 
‘Why are we all having our own audits? Why are some factories being 
audited 10–15 times a year? But the auditors, they have a checklist 
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where 95% of the questions are the same. Why not have system where 
we all trust one type of audit and then leave the factories in peace to 
develop, instead of just taking days out of the calendar for audits so many 
times a year?’ 
5.4.2. Implementation 
There is consensus among our interviewees that brands cannot solve labour issues in 
supply chains individually. They need assistance from a party that specializes in local 
contexts and specific issues. As a result, they need TPOs, either Non-Profit 
Organisations (NPOs) or NGOs, in the inter-firm alliance. The aim is to combine the 
brands’ financial muscle with TPOs’ knowledge and experience in dealing with these 
issues. As the CSR programme manager of a UK retailer noted, “It is about sharing. 
It’s the key”. And they acknowledge that this has to be different from conventional 
MSIs as one of the interviewees points out: 
‘Multi-stakeholder initiatives have achieved very little…Multi-
stakeholder initiatives failed.’ 
Brands have started collaborating in the form of a trilateral model, brand–
competitors–TPOs, to overcome the inherent limitations of the bilateral approach and 
MSIs, creating platforms themselves where participating brands can complement each 
other targeting a single/ limited number of suppliers, countries, and issues. There is a 
strong belief that such joint approaches will ultimately address labour issues by 
coercing particular suppliers, industries, and even governments, into action. As the 
CSR programme manager of Company B noted: 
‘We will work with other brands. So we will find out if other brands are 
using the supplier as well. And then we will try to have a meeting with 
other brands and the supplier together. And then we will also ask an 
NGO to join because they are the third party and they can give some fair 
comments and they know a lot about that specific issue.’ 
Tasks once performed by buyer firms are now allocated to TPOs. For instance, 
firms in our study partner with one TPO to carry out employee surveys at suppliers’ 
factories. One of the interviewees explained that her organisation uses the services of 
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the TPO whenever there is a need to obtain information directly from workers, to avoid 
workers being forced into cooperation or being manipulated by factory owners. The 
TPO has developed a platform to approach and contact workers outside factories, 
using text messages or landlines at home, to obtain a realistic picture of working 
conditions. Data are also collected via questionnaires sent via mobile phones provided 
by the TPO that are not accessible by suppliers’ management. This may alleviate 
employees’ concerns about retaliation from their employers. The director of the TPO 
argued that the brands that sign up for this service are those that are most dedicated to 
resolving issues. This service helps these brands to identify issues and put into place 
appropriate measures to address them, before they lead to major incidents.  
Brands have also been working with multiple NGOs and NPOs when problems 
are observed in their supply chains. For example, when one of the firms in our study 
found out that children were employed in the manufacturing of clothes for its brand, 
instead of cancelling the contract or dissuading the supplier from using under-age 
workers, they asked a partner NGO to step in. Because of its expertise and 
embeddedness in the local institutional context, the NGO was able to provide a holistic 
solution that not only enables the children to go to school, but also supports the family 
for loss of income.  
5.4.3. Implications 
Representatives of firms in the alliance meet regularly to address the labour challenges 
and issues they face. The aim is to agree on common ways to approach these 
challenges and interact with one or multiple suppliers. The process is described by a 
TPO representative:  
‘They need to bring together all the brands sourcing from the same 
factory to deliver that message and use that leverage to influence their 
suppliers. So they need some kind of common action and consistency on 
issues. … It’s much stronger than only for example a small brand to 
deliver a single message to a single supplier. It’s really to maximize the 
leverage of the whole industry to influence suppliers in a country.’ 
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 Figure 5.3. Trilateral governance model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 is a graphical depiction of the trilateral governance model. Social 
issues are complex, especially in multi-level global supply chains (Selsky & Parker, 
2005). Three-party initiatives involving multiple (m) buyers and single (s) or multiple 
(m) organisations on each side—suppliers and TPOs—could be a more effective way 
of tackling the issues, because a) they circumvent problems with limited or one-sided 
dependence between the participating organisations (Waddell, 2000); and b) they use 
the TPO’s property of being an unbiased “bridging” organisation (Selsky & Parker, 
2005).  
One such example is Action, Collaboration, Transformation (ACT). Within 
this TPO, 17 international brands have decided to work collaboratively to address 
living wage issues in the garment industry. The role of the TPO here is to organize 
collaborative processes and carry out plans. The brands work together with the TPO 
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and effectively reduce audit fatigue. As the head of responsible sourcing of 
Company A explains:  
‘We’ve got a problem of audit duplication, let’s invite couple of other 
key retailers to help us how we address that. And that’s what led us to 
the formation of SEDEX.’  
SEDEX is about more than just sharing information. It also helps brands 
join forces and put pressure on suppliers to improve conditions, as they now know 
who else is using the same suppliers. Again, the head of responsible sourcing of 
Company A said: 
‘If it’s an expensive change, it’s not easy to influence that if the expensive 
change is going to be significantly more than the profit they are going to 
make on making the product. So that’s why we work with the 
organisations like SEDEX where you can get other purchasers who also 
purchasing from that same site to perhaps influence the owner to make 
the change.’ 
The power of coalitions does not stop at influencing suppliers. Sometimes 
problems do not simply lie with one particular supplier, but within the underpinning 
institutional characteristics of the country in which it is based. In such cases, one 
further role of the coalition is to lobby governments and NGOs to accomplish its goal. 
All of the brands that we interviewed confirmed and emphasized the importance of 
their coalition in influencing a range of stakeholders in their suppliers’ home countries. 
The CSR manager of Company A noted:  
‘If a coalition that is representing a large part of the country’s export 
goes to the government of course they can’t and will not just act exactly 
as industry is telling them but it has of course some influence on how 
they will make decisions in the future. … We have co-signed letters to 
the Bangladeshi government. I know the delegations have gone there 
also with brand representatives, and the minimum wage has been raised. 
I think 60% or something. Of course then everything else also gets more 
expensive. House rent, food, everything. But it has an influence, of 
course it has that.’ 
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Similarly, the CSR programme manager of Company B and the head of 
sustainable business of Company A told us: 
‘If you look at collaboration, as brands, who has economic power? The 
brands. We do. We have the money; we have the resource; we are the 
catalyst to make this happen. If we come together, strategically, 
collaboratively. How many billions do you think the brands source from 
the countries? You think they don’t have influence, leverage? Of course, 
they do.’ 
‘We learn together, we increasingly work together, … so together we are 
stronger.’ 
After the Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh in 2013, brands in 
developed countries developed the International Accord on Fire and Building Safety 
(The Accord). This legally binding agreement brings brands, retailers, and trade 
unions together and mandates public disclosure of factory inspection reports and 
subsequent remediation (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015). The CSR manager of 
Company B commented:  
‘Think about, for example, fire and building safety, obviously, that’s 
really important. We are very, very involved in The Accord. We see that 
as being a fundamental shift in the right direction. The fact that brands 
and everybody else has come together. You know, 170 brands now signed. 
Look at the impact it has. It’s been amazing. You know The Accord is the 
model. It’s the model that we all now need to replicate on all the other 
issues. … What I am saying is things can change. If you really want to 
you can change. What it requires is brands come together, sit down with 
the global union.’  
5.4.4. Challenges 
Our data suggest that the tripartite model is not without its problems. The key 
challenge of the inter-firm–TPO alliance is balancing confidentiality with appropriate 
disclosure of competitive information such as price structures and product quality. 
Buyer firms negotiate different contracts with suppliers. This affects the level of 
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information sharing between buyer firms. As a former ethical sourcing coordinator of 
Company C put it: 
‘And actually the difficult thing is with other businesses, we cannot share 
everything with each other. There’s always this question, “How much 
should we share with other brands?” It creates difficulty in achieving a 
common goal of trying to be more sustainable or environmentally 
friendly, or more ethical. So that’s the challenge.’  
Differences in the expectations of brands joining the coalition pose another 
major challenge. Those at the higher end with large margins are willing to tolerate an 
increase in labour costs, while those with low margins are more sensitive to increases 
in the cost of labour. These differences tend to drive firms in the coalition toward the 
lower standards, as a CSR programme manager of Company B observed: 
‘Because you’ve got 10 companies in a room and five of them want to do 
something good, three of them say, “Okay, whatever,” and one of them 
only wants to do this much. You can only do as much as the one that says 
“I wanna do this much.” So they only do what the lowest wants.’ 
5.5. Discussion 
Given the significant impact of negative publicity that can result from labour-related 
issues in the supply chain, firms, especially those engaged in offshore outsourcing, are 
finding new ways to ensure that their suppliers’ activities are consistent with buyer 
stakeholder expectations, expressed in policies and procedures. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that firms are increasingly moving from a paradigm of coercion of individual 
suppliers toward one characterized by collaboration with competitors and TPOs. But 
to date there have not been many academic studies of this particular collaborative 
model. 
In this paper we have explored the reasons why firms from developed countries 
and their suppliers in developing countries choose trilateral governance, the use of a 
coalition of competitor firms and/or third-party organisations, to alleviate negative 
labour conditions in sourcing factories. We found that buyer firms (brands) consider 
trilateral governance offers clear benefits for addressing labour issues at suppliers’ 
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factories. They see significant evidence that neither the previous arm’s-length, top-
down approach of coercion nor the trust-based cooperative approach effectively 
addresses the underlying causes of the problem.  
The bilateral governance models are bounded by several limitations. First, the 
trust-based cooperative approach is theoretically the best option for firms in managing 
labour issues with suppliers as cooperation leads to less monitoring, more compliance, 
and enhanced performance outcomes (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). Yet, in 
practice, our analysis suggests that firms, at least those in the retail industry, are not 
capable of developing such relationships with all suppliers due to the high number of 
suppliers with short contract periods or small sourcing amounts. Our analysis shows 
they only can maintain such relationships with a small number of key suppliers.  
As RDT suggests the relative power, the mainspring of enforcement and 
compliance in a top-down approach, is based on the level of dependence (Emerson, 
1962). Theoretically, the top-down approach is only effective when the buyer is less 
dependence and therefore possesses more power, and empirically, this study confirms 
that serious labour issues are likely to occur when the level of suppliers’ dependence 
is low.  
Horizontal inter-firm alliances not only help to exchange knowledge and 
develop best practices, but are also a more effective means of coercing suppliers into 
action and instigating their cooperation, because of greater bargaining power and the 
reduction of costs due to fewer audits. This confirms the main argument of RDT that 
the increased leverage of buyers over shared supplier(s) will increase the levels of 
dependence and compliance of the supplier(s) (Hoejmose, Grosvold, & Millington, 
2013). This is an extension of RDT as it is now applied to more than just two 
participants in a relationship, and the theory is used in explaining collective coercion 
that involve multiple participants rather than simple dyadic coercion.  
Our study further suggests that one specific advantage of inter-firm–TPO 
alliances is to stimulate discussion and knowledge-sharing among buyer firms. This 
can result in the pooling of resources to address labour issues. From the buyer firm 
perspective, the collective coercive approach helps to push through uniform 
regulations and standards, which reduces suppliers’ ability to resist buyer firms’ 
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demands, but at the same time heightens suppliers’ perceived sense of unfairness. Thus, 
coercion is likely to provoke invisible resistance from suppliers. For example, because 
of fear of retaliation or termination of contracts, instead of engaging openly in 
discussions of buyer firms’ demands that would benefit both parties, suppliers may 
revert to well-documented window-dressing strategies. And this is the reason why we 
would call this approach as the second-best. This calls for further research to examine 
the real impact of the emerging paradigm on labour practices at suppliers’ factories.  
Our interviewees did not have coherent policies to address the underlying 
causes of labour issues in the supply chain, beyond lobbying key stakeholders, such 
as local governments, persuasion, collaboration with suppliers, collective threats, and 
forceful coercion. The question of the extent to which collaboration and coercion 
mechanisms can really be distinguished from each other provides an interesting 
avenue for future theoretical and empirical research. We would expect collective 
coercion to weaken collaboration. Furthermore suppliers could counteract increased 
dependence on buyer firms by moving up the value chain and becoming direct 
competitors. An increase in disposable income in emerging economies is already 
making major suppliers in developing countries less reliant on western markets, and 
some suppliers are increasingly producing and selling their own branded goods (Wan 
& Wu, 2017). The shifting paradigm we describe may not be without downside risks. 
We observe that the new paradigm will enable buyer firms to conduct more 
frequent and thorough visits/audits, but the practicality of implementing collective 
coercion remains unclear because suppliers may be reluctant to cooperate. 
Furthermore, the participation of TPOs gives employees at supplier factories a chance 
to become directly involved in audits, which may provide more accurate information 
about labour practices. But this may not necessarily result in improvement in workers’ 
conditions. The problem of enforcement remains, due to the challenges we identify 
here, namely information asymmetry and institutional and physical distance between 
buyer firms and their suppliers. One of the major shortcomings of the new paradigm 
is that it does not address the underlying causes of labour issues in supply chains. At 
the same time we believe it may not be within the power of even a collective of firms 
to overhaul local regulations and their enforcement or other institutional features of 
countries like Bangladesh. 
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Like any empirical work, our study has some limitations. We deliberately 
chose to undertake an exploratory study, which means it is hard to generalise the 
findings to a wider population. Furthermore, because there is still only limited 
evidence about the effectiveness of the new approach, we focused more on the 
principles of this shifting paradigm, rather than its detailed practices. We believe there 
is room for more structured and larger-scale research efforts. For instance, it could be 
helpful to survey a larger number of firms on their use of bilateral versus trilateral 
governance mechanisms, and how this relates to CSR outcomes. 
5.6. Conclusion 
Labour issues in global supply chains have remained unresolved for some decades 
now, considering that Nike faced sweatshop scandals back in the 1970s and the Rana 
Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh occurred as recently as 2013. In this study we 
have sought to identify some root causes of failure in bilateral governance, and the 
extent to which a trilateral governance approach offers more practical and effective 
solutions to these issues. Our findings suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that suppliers’ 
dependence on a relationship matters rather more than the level of buyer dependence. 
Furthermore, interviews with practitioners suggest that a coercive trilateral approach 
through inter-firm–TPO alliances can potentially provide better solutions, because it 
increases supplier dependence in relationships, leads to more effective supplier 
relationship management, and may eventually enable higher levels of compliance. 
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Appendix 5.1. Interview guidelines and questions 
Introduction 
- Could you please tell me about your role in [organisation name]? 
Motivation 
- How has CSR become one of the top corporate agenda of [organisation name]? 
Was it more from external expectations (e.g. legal systems, NGOs, stakeholders 
including buyers) or from internal managerial decision (e.g. top-down/ bottom-up)? 
- How important do you think is responsible sourcing in your organisation compared 
to other agenda? 
- What do you think makes [organisation name]’s CSR initiative different from the 
initiatives of other manufacturing companies? 
Institutions 
- Could you please name some of the countries where your suppliers are located in? 
- Do you find it more difficult to control suppliers in more distant countries in terms 
of location, regulation, culture? If so, why is that so? 
- Based on your experience, how the differences between countries affect your 
efforts to maintain a desirable CSR level in offshore suppliers’ operations? Could 
you provide me with some examples? 
- Do you find the bigger the differences/ the wider the distance, the harder the 
alignment? Any example? 
Resources 
- What kind of CSR related infrastructures do you expect from your suppliers 
especially when you select new ones? 
- Could you explain how you check the internal information?  
Stakeholders 
- Who do you think are influential stakeholders in and outside of your supply chain 
that affect CSR policies and practices? 
Dependence 
- To what extent do you think your suppliers are substitutable? How easy is 
replacement? 
- Do you always have influence on your suppliers about what they do in terms of 
CSR? Or sometimes it is hard for you to enforce some policies? Could you explain 
in what kind of relationships it is particularly hard? 
Governance 
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- How do you investigate your suppliers’ behaviour? 
- How useful are your monitoring systems? 
- Could you tell me if your monitoring systems go through tier2, 3 suppliers as well? 
- How do you cope with any violence or breaches done by its suppliers?  
- How effective do you find those sanctions are? 
- I found that there happened some contract cancellations from your annual CSR 
report; from your experience, what mostly leads to contract cancellation? 
Cooperation 
- Do you have any example of any suppliers stayed in your supply chain particularly 
longer than the others? Why do you think thy stay longer? 
- How do you think trust is established in a relationship? Could you give some 
examples where trust was built in that way? 
- Could you please give an example where trust led to better CSR outcomes? 
- Which one do you think is more effective in terms of maintaining a desirable CSR 
level, strict governance or trust? 
Trilateral governance 
- Could you explain about the collaborations you have joined? And could you 
explain what are the motivations for such participation.  
- Do you think such collaboration would be one of the best solutions that you have 
as brands in developed countries? 
- The strategy of this collaboration, do you think the larger or having very specific 
target better? 
- Do you see the effectiveness of the collaborations already? 
- Do you experience/ foresee any difficulties as a participant of such collaboration? 
Achievement 
- Among the improvements in terms of CSR practices of [organisation name], what 
do you think have been the greatest improvements so far and what has been the 
most effective driver to the achievements? 
- What do you still see as challenges and what are you doing to address labour issues 
in global supply chains? 
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSION 
6.1. Summary of Findings 
This thesis systematically studies the mechanisms that explain CSR outcomes in 
offshore outsourcing relationships. In doing so, it also provides insights on how to 
minimize CSR failures rather than optimizing CSR performance in the context. 
Considering the complexity of the subject matter and the lack of methodical 
approaches in understanding it, the thesis presents three papers that study this 
phenomenon at different levels taking different approaches. Paper 1 conceptually 
grasps the phenomenon at/cross institutional and inter-organisational levels while 
Paper 2 empirically and quantitatively examines direct effects and interactions of 
organisational level factors including visibility, prior media reporting and attention to 
explain CSR failure defined as CSiR reported by the media. As a qualitative research 
paper, Paper 3 investigates the subject matter focusing on collaborations and dynamics 
among organisations involved and demonstrates how/why collaboration with other 
organisations including competitors, TPOs as well as suppliers has potential to 
improve CSR outcomes.  
Paper 1 sheds light on cross-border IORs by seeking to answer the question of 
what the theoretical explanations on CSR failure in offshore outsourcing are. 
Establishing a theoretical framework has not been a particular focus in this field 
(Brandenburg et al., 2014) despite the high degree of complication and the number of 
relevant levels that require a thorough conceptual approach. Guided by institutional 
theory and RDT, the conceptual framework proposes that institutional level and inter-
organisational level factors play major roles in determining CSR outcomes in the 
context of offshore outsourcing. Institutional distance increases the likelihood of CSR 
failure in offshore outsourcing relationships while dependence and cooperation 
between buyer and supplier are negatively associated with CSR failure. More 
importantly, the study proposes interactions between institutional distance and IORs. 
Cooperation in a relationship negatively moderates the positive relationship between 
institutional distance and CSR failure. Counterintuitively, on the other hand, 
dependence from suppliers positively moderates the relationship between institutional 
distance and CSR failure. With the existence of institutional distance, higher 
dependence leads to more CSR failure mainly due to increased costs, time and efforts 
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to improve practices to the level that is required by the advanced institution and 
desperation to maintain relationships. Therefore, dependent suppliers facing 
institutional distance are more tempted to window-dress rather than make actual 
changes in their practices.  
Paper 2 brings the discussion onto the organisational level and empirically tests 
hypotheses established with firm level elements. The research question of what drives 
media reporting on perceived corporate social irresponsibility originating from 
offshore outsourcing? seeks comprehension of a mechanism that explicates a more 
specific kind of CSR failure, CSiR exposed by the media. Acknowledging that the 
field of study has experienced a shortage of quantitative research (Harms et al., 2013), 
I attempted to figure out a way to quantitatively study the phenomenon.  
The key hypotheses of the paper are based on the  central premise that  
attention-based view of the firm that maintains organisational attention is a scarce and 
limited resource, and therefore, attention is inevitably selective (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Ocasio, 1997). Once an issue catches organisational attention, it is allocated with 
resources (Surroca et al., 2016), receives faster responses (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), 
and provided with solutions (Sullivan, 2010). Hence, the paper hypothesizes that in-
depth attention is negatively associated with the level of media reporting on CSiR from 
offshore outsourcing while organisational attention that is distributed to different 
aspects rather increases the level of media reporting. And these two hypotheses are 
strongly supported in the empirical test conducted with an extensive longitudinal data. 
The paper has two baseline expectations: positive associations of visibility and prior 
media reporting with later media reporting: 1) more visible firms will be more likely 
to be covered by the media on irresponsible practices in offshore operations run by 
their suppliers (Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012); firms 
with previous media reporting on similar issues are more likely to be covered again 
by the media (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; Coombs & Holladay, 1996). The empirical test 
proves a negative interaction between organisational attention and prior media 
reporting. The finding implies that for the firms with intense prior media reporting, 
both in-depth and broad attention can effectively reduce further media reporting. That 
is, unlike the firms with clean pasts, firms with previous negative media reporting 
should be deeply focused and vigilant of potential issues simultaneously. 
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While frameworks and findings in Paper 1 and 2 are generalizable to a broader 
population of firms that engage in offshore outsourcing operations, Paper 3 tries to 
have a closer look at the phenomenon within a more specific context. It looks at the 
retail sector and examines factors and actors involved in CSR matters in supply chains 
and the roles they play. Through interviews with CSR practitioners of UK and Danish 
retail firms, and mainly informed by RDT, the paper examines a shifting paradigm 
from dyadic to trilateral governance, and provides conceptual and empirical 
explanations for why this model is a way to circumvent information and power 
asymmetry in buyer-supplier relationships. Firms engaging in trilateral governance 
can take advantage of an increased leverage on shared suppliers and even on 
governments. Considering the fact that it is sometimes countries and their institutions 
rather than individual suppliers that cause fundamental issues, buyers sourcing from 
same countries collaborate and put pressure on the governments. TPOs involved in/ 
invited to this type of governance work as an arbitrator to intermediate idiosyncratic 
interests and different levels of commitments of buyers. The study implies that 
trilateral governance is capable of complementing bilateral governance when 
cooperation and enforcement within a dyadic framework is no longer a viable option.  
6.2. Contributions 
This thesis provides several important contributions to the study of CSR in supply 
chains. Firstly, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms 
explaining the phenomenon of CSR failure from offshore outsourcing at/cross 
different levels. As the literature review demonstrated, the extant literature is centred 
around answering the questions starting with what and why e.g. What has happened? 
Why are the issues happening? What has been done to address the issues? However, 
by discovering these mechanisms, this thesis answers the question of how: How can 
we explain the CSR performance outcomes in offshore outsourcing contexts? How do 
the relevant factors and actors interact and influence CSR outcomes? Reflecting on 
the complicated, multi-level context of offshore outsourcing and normative 
characteristics of CSR, the thesis uses multiple theories at/across multiple levels.  
Although institutional distance and factors in IORs have already been 
considered critical elements in cross-border inter-organisational relationships, their 
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interactions have been underexplored especially in understanding performance 
outcomes from buyer-supplier relationships. Paper 1 provides how IORs moderate 
institutional distance and inter-organisational differences. In doing so, the paper 
ultimately enables a prediction of performance outcomes from the particular type of 
relationship. Paper 2 used the attention-based view to explain CSR performances. 
Although attention has been considered to be a critical factor in understanding a firm’s 
decision-making processes in organisation studies (Sullivan, 2010) and CSR is one 
such strategic decisions that requisitely involve organisational attention, attention-
based view has not been much used in understanding CSR. Hence, this paper 
contributes to the CSR literature by bringing in attention as a key explanatory factor 
and a mechanism that formulates firm strategies and performance outcomes by 
reflecting internal and external conditions simultaneously. It also contributes to 
extending the discourses on ABV through theorizing and empirically testing 
organisational attention in its depth and breadth. The findings not only confirm the 
main arguments of ABV that focused attention rather than distracted attention 
improves performances, but also provide a new insight that broad attention contributes 
to performance improvement with a certain condition, prior media reporting in our 
research. The two papers fulfil not only the practical urgency of the subject matter 
driven by increasing expectations and pressures from stakeholders, but also academic 
urgency created by piecemeal approaches that lack theoretical lens and have limited 
generalizability.  
Second, the thesis adopts diverse approaches in investigating the mechanisms 
leading to the phenomenon. Although there is an increasing academic interest in CSR 
in supply chains, the majority of the published works are qualitative studies based on 
anecdotal cases or interviews. The field of study significantly lacks conceptual works 
and quantitative researches that offer findings applicable to a wider population 
(Brandenburg et al., 2014; Harms et al., 2013). In the Paper 1, a theoretical framework 
was developed to achieve a comprehensive understanding of CSR outcomes in 
offshore outsourcing and the framework was guided by multiple theories: institutional 
theory, RDT and relational view. The theories played individually before are now seen 
to be working conjointly. As one of the few endeavours comprehending the 
phenomenon theoretically, the paper makes a significant contribution to the field by 
providing one thorough and comprehensive conceptual framework. Paper 2 also has 
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its contribution to the CSR and CSR in supply chain literature by suggesting an 
original way to measure CSR/CSiR performance in a quantitative way. There has been 
a lack of quantitative research and this will broaden the field through an application 
of a new method that can be replicated so that findings can be generalized. Paper 3 is 
an exploratory study that pioneers a shifting paradigm in the field, to a trilateral 
governance. It does not stop at simply describing the new phenomenon but elucidates 
when it is necessary to look beyond bilateral governance and the mechanism through 
which trilateral governance works.  
CSR literature also benefits from this thesis. Extant studies have focused on 
definitions of CSR (e.g. Bowen, 1953; Carroll, 1999; Dahlsrud, 2008), drivers to CSR 
(e.g. Campbell, 2007; Freeman, 1984; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2001), the relation 
between CSR performance and other types of firm performance (e.g. Griffin & Mahon, 
1997; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2000). CSR has been often considered as a means to 
achieve more traditional corporate goals such as enhanced financial performance (e.g. 
Lev et al., 2010; Saeidi et al., 2015). However, this study looks at CSR as an outcome, 
not as one of the determinants of other types of firm performances considering the 
ever-increasing interest in firm CSR performance from stakeholders. Studies in this 
study put CSR as a dependent variable and attempts to comprehend internal and 
external factors leading to certain CSR outcomes. Furthermore, the research 
specifically focuses on CSR failure rather than CSR performance in general. Due to 
(potential) reputational damages companies experience for CSR failure, minimizing 
failure rather than optimizing performance comes first to the minds of practitioners. 
Also, for established firms the advantages of being best-in-class in CSR may be 
limited. In spite of the practical significance of preventing CSR failure, it has been an 
underexplored subject and this study contributes to the CSR literature by putting its 
emphasis on CSR failure and enabling prediction and prevention of such failure.  
This study makes a contribution to offshore outsourcing literature as well. The 
offshore outsourcing discourses have mainly concentrated on performance outcomes 
in terms of cost reduction (Ellram et al., 2008; Gilley & Rasheed, 2000) and innovation 
outcomes (Bertrand & Mol, 2013). Yet, there is an emerging stream of discussion 
concerned with social and environmental issues caused by offshore outsourcing 
decisions (Gray et al., 2017; Park & Hollinshead, 2011). CSR in supply chains has 
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been studied for a few decades now (Maloni & Brown, 2006) but there has been no 
proper attempt to comprehensively and theoretically understand the fundamental 
reasons for failures in practicing CSR particularly in the context of offshore 
outsourcing. Moreover, due to the lack of conceptual/ theoretical comprehension of 
the contextual peculiarities, there still exists confusion in defining the context of 
studies and some do not clearly differentiate domestic suppliers from overseas 
suppliers although the dynamics in different contexts can be considerably different 
(e.g. Pagell & Wu, 2009; Wiese & Toporowski, 2013). Hence, this thesis starts by 
clearly differentiating the different governance modes, domestic outsourcing, offshore 
outsourcing, offshoring, and analyses the factors leading to CSiR in offshore 
outsourcing contexts. The studies in this thesis contribute to the existing body of 
knowledge by providing a conceptual and empirical rationale for why CSR should be 
seen as an unexpected and hidden cost of offshore outsourcing.  
Table 6.1 presents findings, implications, and contributions that each paper 
makes.  
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6.3. Practical Implications 
The findings from the papers in this thesis have significant practical implications since 
they are geared towards what practitioners actually care about, CSR failure. The three 
papers acknowledge conditional elements that are given to the firms engaging in 
offshore outsourcing and prove that proactive involvement is the key to overcome the 
conditional challenges. In this sense, although the focus of the thesis is CSR failures, 
the implications for practice are not necessarily negative and rather positive as the 
thesis provides insights that can potentially help to reduce CSR failure.  
To be specific, the findings suggest that there are inherent difficulties in the 
context of offshore outsourcing, institutional distance and organisational differences, 
as well as firm level conditional factors, visibility and prior media reporting. However, 
outcomes can change when organisations and managers are willing to reduce the 
difficulties by proactively engaging in the particular issues they face and managing 
IORs. The strategies suggested in the papers include collaboration with relevant 
parties outside as well as inside supply chains. Also, strategically focused attention 
rather than distributed attention is usually more effective in reducing CSiR and media 
reporting on CSiR although firms with prior media reporting need to be equipped with 
both intense and vigilant attention.  
The proposed strategies in this thesis help to attenuate and minimize the 
negative effects of inter-organisational and cross-national differences on CSR in 
offshore outsourcing. When an organisation’s strategic decisions and moves are 
depend on their ability of prediction (Durand, 2003), the findings enable prediction of 
CSR performance outcomes by introducing the mechanisms how contextual 
conditions and strategic actions interact, suggesting that CSR outcomes in offshore 
outsourcing is a battle that firms should fight continuously.  
6.4. Limitations and Future Research 
The thesis inevitably carries some limitations. While covering the most relevant levels 
of analysis in individual papers, the thesis overlooks some potentially critical levels: 
individual and industry levels. Considering the fact that sometimes CSR decisions are 
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made solely by (top) individual managers, their intentions and motivations could be 
an important data for understanding a firm’s CSR strategies (Christensen et al., 2014; 
Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004; Petrenko et al., 2016; Swanson, 2008). But studies in 
this thesis assume that managers’ personal motives and decisions are embedded in 
organisational level strategic choices and actions. Paper 2 examines attention, but 
measures it at a more aggregated level, not at a micro level. The study shares the view 
of the Carnegie school that organisational outcomes are reconciliation of individual 
managers actions (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007; March & Simon, 1958). It is 
also the case that none of the papers explicitly take industry level factors into 
consideration. Firms often make decisions and strategies driven by industry 
isomorphism (Wanderley et al., 2008) and this is not considered as a separate level in 
the studies. Paper 1 assumes such elements are embedded in firm level factors, Paper 
2 controls for sectors in its statistical analysis, and Paper 3 only looks at the retail 
industry.  
There are empirical limitations as well. First of all, the conceptual framework 
proposed in Paper 1 is not empirically tested in this thesis mainly due to the limited 
doctoral time frame. Also, the text analyses conducted in Paper 2 were limited to 
counting the total number of media articles and calculating the proportions allocated 
to the subject matter in CSR/annual reports. The data are not extended to quantifying 
the levels of commitment to individual CSR aspects in the reports, and the numbers of 
media articles on different types of CSR issues. Paper 3 is also limited by the absence 
of rich interview data. The data were collected from 2014 to 2016, right after the 
factory collapse in Bangladesh. Firms and CSR managers became extremely cautious 
due to potential additional damages to their reputations. Hence, most of the 
interviewees wanted to be anonymized and reluctant to provide sensitive information. 
Although I managed to execute some quality interviews with key practitioners, the 
data was supplemented with secondary data.  
Future research could address these limitations. The propositions in the 
conceptual framework could be tested empirically. There are widely accepted and 
applied ways to measure institutional distance (Berry et al., 2010; Hofstede, 1983), 
and CSR/ CSiR performance could also be measured by using survey data or by 
adopting the method applied in Paper 2. Inter-organisational level factors including 
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levels of dependency and cooperation could be measured by survey methods. Given 
that most of the extant studies are conducted with the data collected from buyers in 
developed countries that only reflects buyers’ perspectives (Li et al., 2017), it will be 
of much interest to test the propositions with survey data obtained from suppliers. This 
would be a contribution to the literature by providing a new insight of how suppliers’ 
perception of inter-organisational relationships affects and moderates CSR 
performance outcomes in offshore outsourcing relationships.  
ABV is used in Paper 2, but examining the way an agenda catches attention is 
beyond the scope of the paper. As it is an underexplored area of research (Nadkarni & 
Barr, 2008; Sullivan, 2010), one promising research topic would be  to provide a 
mechanism that explains the process of how CSR, especially CSR in (global) supply 
chains, is selected among other competing agenda and occupies organisational 
attention. More specifically, a study could look into whether CSR is attended to 
through top-down or bottom-up processes in organisations. This could be of interest 
since, unlike general attention to CSR, the specific issue might be a concern for middle 
managers or managers at lower levels that are directly involved in relevant business 
functions. Furthermore, another study could be conducted in this realm by examining 
how attention is reflected on practices across individual hierarchical levels in an 
organisation. This research could be conducted through survey measures, intensive 
interviews or participant observations.   
Future research can take advantage of the versatility of the data collection 
method used in Paper 2, and extend the present research. As already acknowledged, 
the quantitative research in this thesis has its limitation of not differentiating aspects 
of CSR covered in news articles and in annual/CSR reports, future research can 
include variables such as the numbers of news articles covering different aspects of 
CSR and the amounts/ proportions in CSR/ annual reports allocated to respective 
aspects. The research could be about investigating whether the commitment to a 
certain aspect leads to less of failure in the particular aspect. Additionally, as the 
present research only looks at negative news articles, future research can extend the 
data by including positive news articles about positive events. And using more 
advanced text analysis technologies (e.g. DICTION, Python), it could analyze nuances 
(e.g. positive, negative, neutral) of the text and extend the findings. 
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Also, the effectiveness of the new governance model introduced in Paper 3 can 
be examined with an extensive amount of data. Studies on multi-stakeholder initiatives 
have been relatively underexplored and remaining rather descriptive. Considering that 
there are diverse forms of multi-stakeholder initiatives, focusing on the particular form 
of trilateral governance that involves competitors, third party organisations, and 
supplier(s) around specific issues, and empirically testing its mechanisms and 
effectiveness could be an interesting and promising research topic. Researchers could 
conduct surveys or focused interviews and investigate how participants assess their 
experiences with this new approach.  
6.5. Concluding Remarks 
The thesis examines the phenomenon of CSR failure in offshore outsourcing 
relationships from the mechanisms leading to the outcomes through to a shifting 
paradigm in an effort to address existing problems. It adopts diverse methods and 
approaches designed to tackle specific research questions: a theoretical approach, a 
quantitative study and a qualitative piece of research. The conceptual paper and the 
quantitative paper suggest that, considering contextual challenges that are given and 
hardly changeable, firms should make purposeful and proactive efforts to overcome 
the challenges (Abdi & Aulakh, 2017, p.773), and one of the detailed strategies is 
suggested in the qualitative paper. As the findings of this thesis imply, CSR in supply 
chains is a complicated matter entangled in and across diverse factors across different 
levels. The thesis takes a critical step to a thorough disentanglement of this complex 
subject. It yields new insights that make predictions of CSR outcomes in offshore 
outsourcing possible and a wealth of insights for further research that will amplify the 
knowledge in this burgeoning field.   
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